Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Runnion was active in a troop run by Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, the largest regional Girl Scout organization in the United States. Megan is deaf. For several years she had sign language interpreters provided by the Girl Scouts that enabled her to participate fully in the troop’s activities. Girl Scouts then stopped providing interpreters. When her mother complained, Megan’s entire troop was disbanded. Megan alleges that the Girl Scouts violated the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. 794) by refusing to provide her with sign language services and then by disbanding her troop because her mother complained. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the court erred when it rejected as futile the “principally engaged” theory of Rehabilitation Act coverage in plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint. View "Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of state gun crimes arising out of a shootout. He sought state post-conviction relief. The court denied his motion; the court of appeals affirmed. Johnson had 30 days to seek review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. He applied for a loan to help cover the cost of the paper, photocopying, and postage. Wisconsin law permits inmates to borrow $100 annually for that purpose. The prison business office denied the request. Johnson contends that he met eligibility requirements. Johnson sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the wrongful denial of his loan request should excuse his failure to petition the state supreme court for review. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. Johnson did not establish that the denial of his application was an objective, external impediment to his ability to comply with procedural rules or that it actually prevented him from petitioning for review. Johnson argued that the business office misinterpreted or misapplied prison policies. No state court has ruled on that question. For a federal habeas court to excuse a procedural default based on its own interpretation of a state prison policy, without guidance from the state courts, would be contrary to principles of federalism and comity that constrain federal habeas review. View "Johnson v. Foster" on Justia Law

Hill pleaded guilty to attempted extortion and to making a false statement to federal investigators concerning his extortion of bribes from liquor licensees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence in 2011. Hill filed a civil suit, claiming that FBI and IRS agents forced their way into his house with drawn weapons, searched the house, seized and kept his lawfully owned handgun, and twirled a loaded gun making Hill “so scared” that he was “in tears.” While being questioned he felt disoriented, was crying from pain in his head, and blacked out, but the agents did not call for medical assistance. He later learned that he had suffered a stroke. The district court dismissed, citing a Supreme Court holding that a person who has been convicted of a crime cannot seek damages or other relief under federal law (a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or “Bivens”) for violation of his rights by officers who participated in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge, if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff [in the civil suit] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that only his claim that his false statement to the officers was coerced is barred. View "Hill v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, citing the Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die. If the district court concludes that Webster meets the requirements of Atkins, it should issue the writ stating that Webster is entitled to relief from the death penalty. View "Webster v. Daniels" on Justia Law

In 2004, Miller sought to build a four-unit condominium project on her Monona lot. The process stalled while Miller bought another lot, amended the plan, and abated an unexpected asbestos problem. She had unsuccessful negotiations with her neighbor, a former mayor, who trespassed on her property at the direction of city officials and took photographs for use at a planning commission meeting to oppose her project. Citations were issued for creating a public nuisance and working without a proper permit; the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a “stop work” order because of asbestos; Miller was required to erect a fence; and she was told that weeds were too high and was ordered to remove various structures. A court rejected three out of four citations issued against her, stating that, although “some of the efforts to enforce compliance were unreasonable,” Miller had not pointed to any similarly situated person who had been treated differently. Monona refused to adjust the taxes on Miller’s property to reflect the demolitions. Officials continued to trespass by parking cars on her property. In 2010, Miller filed suit, asserting equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, finding that Miller had not identified a suitable comparator and that there was no evidence that Miller had been treated unfairly because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting conceivable rational reasons for various actions and requirements. View "Miller v. City of Monona" on Justia Law

There was a burglary of the Buhr property. Olson’s neighbor had placed a deteriorated, unlicensed trailer on the Olsons’ property. Believing that it was abandoned, Olson fixed and painted the trailer, leaving it near the road. The trailer disappeared. Olson did not file a police report. Detective Sherrick discovered the trailer in a ditch and suspected that Olson had stolen the trailer and used it to transport lawn mowers stolen from Buhr. He obtained warrants that authorized the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints and a search of the Olsons’ property. Despite obtaining no evidence implicating Olson, Detectives Sherrick and Shaw allegedly told assistant state’s attorney Ziegler that Olson should be charged. Ziegler had no personal knowledge. He swore that the facts set forth in the information were true, relying on the detectives’ statements. Olson was arrested. Charges were later dismissed. The district court dismissed Olson’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The prosecutor allegedly swore to the truth of facts to obtain the warrant. Acting as a witness, not as a state advocate, he is not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Neither the detectives nor the prosecutor are entitled to qualified immunity. The complaint permits a reasonable inference that the detectives, the prosecutor, or all three gave false information to the judge who issued the warrant. View "Olson v. Champaign County" on Justia Law

Schlemm, a member of the Navajo Tribe, and a prisoner, sought an order requiring the prison to accommodate his religious practices under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. Members of the Tribe honor the dead through dancing, praying, and eating traditional foods. Wisconsin concedes that this celebration is religious and that Schlemm sincerely believes that “traditional foods” should include game meat. The prison rejected his request for game meat or ground beef and his offer to secure a sealed platter from an outside vendor. The prison permits Jewish inmates to have outside vendors supply sealed Seder platters. Defendants maintain that serving venison would be too expensive, would exceed the capacity of institutional kitchens, and would violate a rule limiting prison foods to those certified by the USDA. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the denial does not impose a “substantial burden” on Schlemm’s religious exercise; the state has a “compelling governmental interest” in costs and using USDA-inspected meats; and that the denial is the “least restrictive means” of furthering those interests. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the state was not entitled to summary judgment and ordering a preliminary injunction allowing Schlemm to order venison and to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell and during group ceremonies. View "Schlemm v. Frank" on Justia Law

In 2004, Thurman, a drug dealer, attempted to bribe four Maywood police officers. They reported the attempt to the State’s Attorney. That Office also learned that an individual arrested by Maywood police had stated that Thurman had officers on his payroll. An undercover sting, “Operation Pocket Change,” began with the officers pretending to be dirty cops and accepting from Thurman weekly payments of $1,200. Monitoring Thurman’s cell phone (with a warrant), revealed numerous contacts between Thurman and Officer Wade, resulting in a wiretap. The team agreed to announce, at a roll call at which Wade was present, that officers should stay clear of an area in which Thurman’s dealers were known to sell. In intercepted telephone calls, Wade warned Thurman that “Granny’s house was hot.” Wade claims that he did not hear the announcement, but made up the tip in an attempt to turn Thurman into a confidential informant. A search of Wade’s home computer uncovered a fraudulent arrest warrant for Thurman. Thurman later stated that Wade helped him rob a supplier by pretending to arrest him and seizing the drugs, using the fake warrant. A jury acquitted Wade, who sued the village and the officers for equal protection violations and malicious prosecution. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Probable cause supported his prosecution. Wade cannot succeed by reframing the claim as a class-of-one equal protection claim. The court noted Wade’s failure to identify a similarly-situated individual who was treated more favorably. View "Wade v. Collier" on Justia Law

Rhodes was charged with two counts of kidnapping. He retained Kovac. A jury acquitted him on one count; a different jury convicted him on the other. Rhodes appealed, claiming that Kovac had rendered ineffective assistance. The case was remanded, based on a problem with the jury. The court appointed a public defender, Kaiser. About two months before the trial was to begin, Kaiser moved to end his appointment. Rhodes wanted to represent himself. The court held a hearing and warned Rhodes, at length, about the dangers of self-representation. Kovac , who was present, said that he believed Rhodes was not engaging in gamesmanship or building a record for appeal, but that Rhodes had not retained him. After receiving a waiver, the judge granted Rhodes’s request. During the weeks that followed, there were several requests for additional time. It was not clear whether Kovac was representing Rhodes. The judge eventually told Rhodes he could not “have it both ways,” refused to grant an adjournment, and denied motions for standby counsel. The jury convicted Rhodes of kidnapping and aggravated battery. Wisconsin courts rejected his appeal. The federal district court granted habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Neither of the state courts’ reasons for rejecting Rhodes’s last-minute request for counsel was unreasonable. View "Rhodes v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Doe, a minor female, was drinking in a group at an apartment complex in Arlington Heights and Mount Prospect. A site manager called 911. Three males began moving Doe to a secluded area. She was so intoxicated that they had to hold her up. Arlington Heights Officer Del Boccio arrived, talked to the males, allowed them to leave with Doe without asking for identification, and left the scene. One of the three, Balodimas, was on probation for armed robbery; Doe and the other males were minors. Del Boccio reported that the subjects were gone on arrival. The three males then carried Doe into a laundry room. When the site manager observed this, he again called 911. Mount Prospect police responded and caught Balodimas sexually assaulting Doe. Doe sued Del Boccio and Arlington Heights, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state claims. The district court dismissed and denied Doe’s motion to amend her complaint to allege that Del Boccio was a racist who wanted harm to come to her because she was a white girl socializing with African-Americans. Doe referred to an incident when Del Boccio, operating an unmarked police car, ran over and killed an eight-year-old African-American boy and lied to cover it up. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Del Boccio did not create the danger, nor did he do anything to make the danger to Doe worse. View "Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights" on Justia Law