Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tidwell, an Illinois inmate, file suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that three prison guards violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to protect him from attack by a fellow inmate and then subjected him to excessive force by restraining him during the attack. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for two of the guards, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the third. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Tidwell’s claims concerning his attorney and his inability to obtain the testimony of inmates. The court stated that he offered no reason to think that new counsel or an investigator might have turned up evidence that would have affected the outcome of the case. The witnesses whom he hoped to find were former inmates who, he says, would have been able to corroborate parts of his testimony, but the testimony would at best have duplicated Tidwell’s own testimony. Tidwell does not assert that any of these potential witnesses saw the actual incident. View "Tidwell v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that facts increasing a defendant’s maximum permissible sentence must be determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, by the trier of fact. In 2002, in Harris, the Court held that facts increasing the minimum permissible sentence may be found by a judge on the preponderance of the evidence. In 2013, in Alleyne, the Court overruled Harris and held that facts controlling both minimum and maximum sentences are in the jury’s province and covered by the reasonable-doubt standard. A jury convicted Crayton of distributing heroin. The indictment alleged that Hedges died from using Crayton’s product, but the jury could not decide unanimously whether Hedges’s death resulted from Crayton’s heroin. The judge found that it did. Under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) this required a sentence of at least 20 years’ imprisonment; without of the finding that Crayton’s heroin killed Hedges, the range would have been 0 to 20 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2011. While Alleyne’s case was pending, Crayton filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed while waiting for Alleyne. When Crayton filed another after the Supreme Court issued its decision, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review. View "Crayton v. United States" on Justia Law

Former employees of an Indiana city sued the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the mayor had fired them because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The mayor responded that political affiliation was a permissible qualification for their jobs. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the mayor with respect to nine of the 11 plaintiffs, finding his argument concerning political qualification for the jobs was sufficiently arguable to entitle him to qualified immunity, but declined to certify interlocutory appeal with respect to the other two plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings pending interlocutory appeal, reasoning that whether a job is one for which political affiliation is a permissible criterion presents a question of law. Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. The court later dismissed in part, reasoning that a trial might show that one plaintiff has more discretion than her job description indicates. View "Allman v. Smith" on Justia Law

Perotti , convicted as a felon possessing ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 210 months. Perotti was housed at the Terre Haute penitentiary, where he found employment as an orderly in the prison’s education department, which provides classroom instruction to inmates and oversees the prison’s leisure and law libraries. Perotti was responsible for janitorial tasks, supervised by instructors. An instructor offered him a promotion to the position of law clerk, assisting other prisoners with legal research. He accepted, but was later told that the department administrator had disapproved the promotion because Perotti had filed too many grievances. After an associate warden intervened he was given the position, about a month later. He was removed from that position weeks later, after another instructor filed a misconduct report that Perotti possessed another inmate’s legal materials outside of the library, in violation of prison rules. He was vindicated and awarded back pay, but he was not reinstated nor given another job before he was transferred to another facility. A jury rejected his claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and arranging for Perotti to participate in the trial by video conferencing. View "Perotti v. Diane Quinones" on Justia Law

Rossi was assaulted by several persons, one of whom was an off-duty Chicago police officer. Glenn Mathews, a detective with the Chicago Police Department, was assigned to investigate. For six weeks, Mathews did practically no work on the case; he followed zero leads, did not inspect the crime scene, and questioned no witnesses other than Rossi. Aside from taking some messages and filing perfunctory reports, he exerted no discernible effort. He then closed his investigation. Rossi sued Mathews under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that he violated his constitutional right to judicial access because his failure to investigate led to the spoilage of evidence in his civil suit against the assailants. He also brought a Monell suit against the city for perpetuating a “code of silence” that shields police officers from investigation and promotes misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that Rossi was not denied judicial access because the police did not conceal from him any facts which prevented him from obtaining legal redress from his assailants, and dismissal of Rossi’s Monell claims for lack of evidence of widespread practices on the part of the police department. View "Rossi v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Demonstrators gathered outside an abortion clinic, planning to display signs containing images of aborted fetuses. Then-Officer Lalowski was finishing an overnight shift when he noticed the demonstrators and stopped his marked police vehicle, telling demonstrators not to impede traffic or to stop anyone from entering the clinic and that he would arrest them if they did not comply. Emmerth claims Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow.” Others claim that Lalowski used repeated profanities and threats. Lalowski concedes that the confrontation was “adversarial” but denies using profanity. The exchange lasted only minutes. Later, he decided to confront the demonstrators about their signs. Off duty, wearing plain clothes, he returned in his personal vehicle, and spoke to an officer on duty and to Emmerth, making insulting comments about her weight and touching her. Lalowski stayed for approximately 80 minutes. A demonstrator called 911 to request police assistance in dealing with him. An investigation of his conduct resulted in a report that “Lalowski’s conduct … toward the public was harsh, profane, and unruly and caused a huge disturbance.” Lalowski’s disciplinary history included five suspensions and two written reprimands. After hearings, Lalowski was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claim of retaliation for protected speech, 42 U.S.C. 1983, but vacated with respect to his Illinois law administrative review claim. View "Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines" on Justia Law

Joyce and Thomas divorced in 1999. Thomas continued to live in her apartment and borrow money. They occasionally had sex. Joyce threatened to kick Thomas out many times. Around 2 a.m. on December 27, 2006, Cruz, the downstairs neighbor, woke to hear screaming, choking, and thumps, followed by 10 minutes of silence, and the sound of dragging. She then saw Thomas and another leave the building. Cruz later heard someone go into Joyce’s apartment and say “oh my god move.” Police received a call from Thomas at 3:24 a.m. saying Joyce was unconscious. She was pronounced dead at 4:19 a.m. Thomas told differing stories, eventually stating: “I do believe I was accidentally responsible for the death of Joyce.” Thomas was convicted of intentional murder, first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. Thomas argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consider and consult with an expert to review the pathologist’s report and perhaps testify consistently with the defense’s theory that Thomas unintentionally caused Joyce’s death by putting pressure on her neck for too long during sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of his habeas petition. Reasonable counsel would have consulted a forensic expert; the state’s expert testified there was no evidence of external bruising but was still sure that this was intentional strangulation. Given the weakness of the case, especially concerning intent, had an expert testified, there is a reasonable probability the trial would have turned out differently. View "Thomas v. Clements" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, once a standout high school basketball player, sued 942 U.S.C. 1983) Valley View Community School District, and the Illinois High School Association, raising claims of First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process, unconstitutional policy, section 1983 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. He alleged that the District and IHSA singled him out for residency investigations, which rendered him ineligible to participate in basketball for 10 days, because his mother complained to the District. The district judge determined that plaintiff failed to comply with local Rule 56.1 and deemed admitted all of the defendants’ properly supported facts and disregarded plaintiff’s additional facts that lacked evidentiary support. Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to include with that motion “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law,” organized by numbered paragraphs and referring to supporting materials that substantiate the asserted facts. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants complied; plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, was required to, but did not comply. View "Friend v. Valley View Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The City of Milwaukee is defending several lawsuits brought by scores of plaintiffs alleging that its police officers conducted unconstitutional stops and searches, including strip‐searches and body‐cavity searches. Judge Stadtmueller was assigned to preside over several cases. Milwaukee, asserting that some of the judge’s comments in opinions and conferences in the related cases raise questions about his impartiality, moved for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a). The judge declined. Milwaukee sought a writ of mandamus. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The five challenged statements were made during the course of litigation; “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep‐seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Judge Stadtmueller is presiding over several of these cases. It is not surprising that he might draw conclusions about the nature of the issue or problem. He is expected to look for and consider common threads and possible systemic problems to manage the cases effectively and decide them fairly. Even considering all the challenged statements together, nothing reasonably suggests deep-seated antagonism. View "City of Milwaukee v. Stadtmueller" on Justia Law

In the Democratic primary preceding the 2010 election, the candidates for Sheriff were Miller, a St. Joseph County Police Department sergeant, and Grzegorek. Grzegorek won the general election. Miller sought to be appointed either Assistant Chief or Warden of the county jail. Grzegorek appointed as Assistant Chief a man who had been Sheriff from 1985 to 1998 and retained the current Warden. The head of the Detective Bureau, an appointee of the new Sheriff, stated that Miller should take charge of the Property Room. The Department had accumulated about 1000 guns, which needed to be sorted. Miller took the position, which involved no change in compensation or rank, but months later, expressed dissatisfaction. He was offered a position in the Family Violence Unit. He declined, and continued in the Property Room until the sorting was complete, then returned to the Detective Bureau. Miller claims that his assignment to the Property Room was degrading and that he was not asked about his interest in other vacant positions that would have been promotions. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of racial hostility. Miller’s qualifications were less impressive than those of the persons appointed to the positions he wanted. View "Miller v. St. Joseph County" on Justia Law