Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In June 2001, Morgan County Deputy Starnes stopped Pruitt’s vehicle. Starnes called in Pruitt’s driver’s license and registration and was told that a recent robbery report suggested Pruitt might be in possession of stolen weapons. Pruitt emerged from his vehicle with a handgun, and the two exchanged gunfire. Starnes was struck by five shots. He underwent surgery, developed an infection, and died. The state charged Pruitt with murder, attempted murder (Pruitt also shot Deputy Starnes’s son, who was accompanying his father as part of a college internship), and related offenses. Indiana state courts affirmed his conviction and imposition of the death penalty. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Pruitt intellectually disabled and categorically and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence to support his claim of intellectual disability, by failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase mitigating evidence regarding his schizophrenia and its effects. View "Pruitt v. Neal" on Justia Law

Thomas, a Wisconsin prisoner, was injured in the Dane County Jail, while being handcuffed after disobeying an order. Disciplinary proceedings followed. Pending his hearing, Thomas was placed in punitive segregation, where, he alleges, he did not have access to the inmate handbook he had received just the day before. The jail charged Thomas with violating several major rules, including those prohibiting physically contacting staff, acting in a disorderly manner, and expelling bodily fluids at another person. Thomas waived a disciplinary hearing and received 10 days of segregation as punishment, but was transferred back to state custody four days after the incident. About a year later, Thomas sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) the officers involved in the incident. Upon screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the district court dismissed some claims and allowed his excessive force claim and his related claims for failure to intervene, retaliation, and battery to proceed, then dismissed those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that administrative remedies were not actually available. Thomas could not raise his grievance about the jail guards at his disciplinary hearing. View "Thomas v. Reese" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Kervin alleged, in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that prison officials violated his constitutional rights after he insisted on being allowed to see his lawyer, who had come to the prison to speak with him. The meeting did occur, delayed by a few minutes. He contends that a guard threatened to file a false complaint and that he was placed in segregation as punishment and denied due process of law when his attempts to seek redress through the prison’s grievance system for his wrongful punishment were thwarted by biased grievance officers. Kervin admits he was punished that for defying the guard’s order by asking to be let out of the day room to meet with his lawyer after being told that he could not leave the room just yet. The district judge dismissed on the pleadings, after screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: backtalk by prison inmates to guards, like other speech that violates prison discipline, is not constitutionally protected. Kervin did not allege that he suffered any significant psychological or other injury from segregation . View "Kervin v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Mucha filed suit against two Milwaukee police officers alleging they detained him without a warrant or other justification, thereby violating his Constitutional rights. Plaintiff himself was a Milwaukee police officer: he had been on leave as a result of work-related stress. A psychiatrist that examined plaintiff stated that "Jason Mucha is, in a not very veiled manner, threatening to shoot people in police command. He has a considerable stash of firearms. Hearing this, I cannot send him back to work. This is a public safety issue." The police department received the report shortly before a "SWAT" team was dispatched to plaintiff's home. Plaintiff told officers that he had "dreams" or "thoughts of suicide and hurting himself." Officers decided to detain plaintiff; the record was unclear whether the officers decided to detain plaintiff on their own accord, or if they were under orders. Plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to a mental health facility. Plaintiff was released three days later. Plaintiff argued that the officers did not have probable cause to believe he was mentally ill or posed a danger to himself or others. The issue this case presented for the Seventh Circuit's review centered on whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The Seventh Circuit did not understand the trial judge's determinations that plaintiff was acting "rationally" when police interviewed him prior to taking him to the mental health facility. As such, the Court overruled the trial court's decision to deny the officers immunity, reversed and remanded the case for dismissal against the officer-defendants. View "Mucha v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After an argument with his wife on their wedding anniversary, Jerome Weinmann went to his garage, drank half a bottle of vodka, and put the barrel of a shotgun in his mouth. He was unable to pull the trigger. Susan Weinmann called 911 for help. The officer who responded, Deputy McClone, shot Jerome four times. Jerome survived and sued McClone under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for using unconstitutionally excessive force. McClone invoked qualified immunity, but the district court refused to grant summary judgment in his favor on that basis. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that McClone had decided to kick in the door within three minutes of arriving and did not attempt to communicate with Jerome before entering, so he did not have a reasonable belief that Jerome posed a threat. View "Weinmann v. McClone" on Justia Law

Childress claims that, upon completion of a prison‐sponsored reentry program at the Big Muddy River Correctional Center in Illinois, the instructor delivered a computer disk containing Childress’s resume to the property officer, who placed it in Childress’s property box. Childress later was discharged on mandatory supervised release, with a condition that he could not possess any computer‐related material. Following his release, a routine inspection of his living quarters revealed the envelope containing the computer disk. His release was revoked. After serving his extended sentence, Childress, acting pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed following review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A. On reconsideration, the court determined that Childress was not a prisoner within the meaning of the PLRA but that his action should be dismissed on in forma pauperis review (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding dismissal premature. The complaint set forth sufficient facts to proceed against at least one defendant and Childress should have been granted the opportunity to amend his complaint to cure deficiencies in the remainder of his claims. The court failed to consider adequately Childress’s request to recruit counsel. View "Childress v. Walker" on Justia Law

Hankins, convicted in Arkansas of felony battery, was re-released on parole in March 2007. She moved to Illinois, where she came under the supervision of Illinois Department of Corrections parole officer Lowe. Hankins filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she asked him when her parole would expire and that he refused to tell her, saying that Arkansas would determine when it expired and would revoke her parole if she asked Arkansas authorities for the date. In February 2011 Lowe informed her that her parole had expired. Hankins claimed she was subjected to the restrictions imposed on her by the conditions of her parole for 13 months beyond when her parole had actually ended. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of an Eighth Amendment claim, stating that Lowe “was guilty of deliberate indifference or its equivalent, recklessness deliberately” when he “withheld essential information that he was required to obtain, and could readily have obtained and given her.” The court remanded for determination of when Hankins’ parole actually ended. View "Hankins v. Lowe" on Justia Law

Castro, Brooks, and Florez sued their former employer, DeVry University, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that DeVry retaliated against them by terminating their employment for complaining about their supervisor’s racially and ethnically derogatory remarks. DeVry transferred the supervisor three months after plaintiffs complained. After that, he neither supervised plaintiffs nor participated in the termination decisions. Evidence concerning their individual circumstances and job performance varies. The district court granted summary judgment to DeVry on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the claims by Castro and Brooks, but reversed as to Florez. Castro was terminated 30 months after the complaint because of poor performance over a sustained period. Brooks was terminated 15 months after the complaint because of multiple instances of dishonesty and inconsistent performance. Neither Castro nor Brooks raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether these reasons were pretexts for retaliation. Florez, however, raised a genuine issue of material fact about motive. He was terminated 10 months after the complaint for inconsistent performance and “volatile behavior.” DeVry has conceded that Florez’s performance did not justify his termination. Florez offered evidence that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explanation was a pretext. View "Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc." on Justia Law

Pidgeon pled no contest to second-degree sexual assault of a child; other counts were dismissed. Pidgeon claims that he accepted the plea because his attorney and the prosecutor told Pidgeon that, if he did not accept the plea, he was subject to the Wisconsin persistent offender law, Wis. Stat. 939.62(2m). Under that law, a third “serious felony” conviction results in mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Counsel apparently thought that Pidgeon’s 1991 aggravated battery conviction constituted a serious felony; a conviction for the sexual assault would constitute a second serious felony; and Pidgeon faced a third possible conviction (third-degree sexual assault of an adult) in a case in which Pidgeon had not yet been charged. If Pidgeon agreed to the plea bargain, the district attorney’s office agreed not to prosecute. Both attorneys were wrong; the 1991 conviction does not constitute a serious felony. After exhausting state remedies, Pidgeon sought federal habeas corpus relief. The court found that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective, allowing Pidgeon to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on Pidgeon’s failure to call former counsel as a witness during the hearing, as would be required in an ineffective assistance hearing in Wisconsin state court. View "Pidgeon v. Smith" on Justia Law

Armstrong was imprisoned for 29 years for a rape and murder. He maintains his innocence. His conviction was set aside in 2005. In 2009 a Wisconsin state judge dismissed the charges because the prosecution had destroyed key exculpatory evidence. Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging shocking prosecutorial misconduct, including: destroying potentially exculpatory evidence from the crime scene; arranging for highly suggestive hypnosis of an eyewitness; contriving suggestive identification show-ups; concealing a later confession from a third party that was relayed by a person with no apparent motive to fabricate the report; and enlisting lab technicians to perform an inconclusive DNA test that consumed the last of a sample that could have proven Armstrong’s innocence and identified the true killer. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; federal due process claims based on destruction of exculpatory evidence are not barred by the availability of state tort remedies for the same wrongs. At the time of the original investigation, it was clearly established that bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence would violate a suspect’s due process rights. A reasonable police officer or prosecutor would not have concluded that he could destroy evidence to avoid disclosing it. If Armstrong can show that unconstitutional destruction of exculpatory evidence caused him to a deprivation of liberty, he can sue for that injury without a second trial. View "Armstrong v. Norsetter" on Justia Law