Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Armed men were robbing Milwaukee businesses, wearing dark sweatshirts and ski masks. Officers saw three men approach a store in dark clothing, with hoods pulled over their faces. One attempted to enter, while the others stood watch. They found the doors locked and fled. As officers pursued them, two jumped into a running car driven by a fourth person. The third man fled on foot. The car, registered to Welch, led police on a high-speed chase before being stopped. Police discovered Welch hiding under a car near the store. In his first trial, Welch was convicted of four counts. In the nine-day second trial, he was found guilty of eight counts of armed robbery, conspiracy, fleeing an officer, and bail-jumping. The jury heard testimony from three accomplices, five others linking him to the robberies, two forensic experts, 12 police officers, and 20 victims. Two officers referred to other criminal charges against Welch. After exhausting his appeals, Welch sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting that admission of those statements violated his right to a fair trial and that his counsel was ineffective for not contesting them. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, finding reasonable the Wisconsin appellate court’s conclusion that any error in admitting the statements was harmless, given the quantity and quality of evidence against Welch. View "Welch v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Burks and Jones were hired as Union Pacific “Signal Helpers.” During orientation in January 2011, they were informed that they would be employed through December 2015, or until the company “moved in a different direction.” The position carried a 90-day probationary period; they were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. They were the only African-American members of their class. On February 9, 2011, Burks was told that “it wasn’t working out.” Burks lodged a complaint with Schop in Union Pacific’s Equal Employment Opportunity department alleging racial discrimination. Schop found no evidence that Burks was fired because of his race, but concluded that he had not been given an opportunity to improve and offered reinstatement in exchange for a general release with a new 90-day probationary period. Burks signed and returned to work. Burks worked for seven days before requesting a transfer. He was transferred and completed his probationary period, but was later notified that Union Pacific abolished the Signal Helper position, effective October 2011. Jones had similar experiences. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting claims that Union Pacific denied an opportunity to take a test that was required for promotion, based on impermissible retaliation for complaints of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that positions within the seniority district became available during the relevant period. View "Burks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civil detainee in Illinois, appealed an adverse jury verdict in his deliberate indifference suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a facility physician. Plaintiff alleged that the district court should have declared a mistrial after the physician violated a pretrial ruling by the court by mentioning to the jury that plaintiff was incarcerated for 26 years. Plaintiff also challenged the strength of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not declaring a mistrial where the jury could already infer from plaintiff's testimony and the medical issues that plaintiff had dating back to 2002 that plaintiff had spent a long in prison. Because plaintiff did not preserve his second argument, the court cannot reach the issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Collins v. Lochard" on Justia Law

Davis, a civil detainee under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, sued security guards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they refused to remove Davis’s hand restraints while he used the restroom and then laughed as he struggled to unzip his pants and urinate. A jury awarded him $1,000 in compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit vacated, based on an improper “elements” jury instruction, but rejected an argument based on a Facility directive that permitted removal of restraints only “[w]ithin a secure facility in order to utilize the restroom.” There was conflicting testimony as to whether the corridor behind the courtroom was “secure.” The directive allowed Wessel and Lay to call their supervisor for permission to remove the restraints, and a reasonable jury could find that they chose not to do so for the purpose of humiliating Davis. Davis had no means of escape from the windowless restroom other than by force through Wessel and Lay (while Davis still wore leg shackles), and Wessel and Lay were each considerably larger, younger, and healthier than Davis. A jail cannot shield a cruel and unusual punishment from legal challenge simply by imposing it on everyone equally. View "Davis v. Wessel" on Justia Law

Inmate Perez was injured during a prison basketball game. A nurse wrapped his hand. She could not provide medicine or stitch his wound. The following day, Perez saw a physician who prescribed antibiotics, but did not stitch his wound, and, recognizing the injury's severity, recommended a specialist. Approval took days, while Perez had an open, bleeding wound. On May 20, Perez filed a grievance, claiming retribution for a prior grievance. Perez’s May 20th grievance was rejected. On May 21, Perez was taken to Carle Clinic and saw a physician’s assistant, who could not suture the wound because of its age. Prison officials did not follow care instructions, nor did they return Perez for follow-up. Perez filed another grievance on June 17 and unsuccessfully appealed denial of his earlier grievance. On December 6, Perez returned to the Clinic. On January 10, 2011, Perez filed another grievance, concerning the seven-month delay , continued pain, and indifference by prison medical staff. In March, Perez had surgery. Due to the 10-month delay, Perez claims to have irreparable damage. He unsuccessfully sought assistance with his grievance. Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court twice denied requests for counsel, screened his complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that, liberally construed, Perez’s complaint stated valid Eighth Amendment and First Amendment retaliation claims. View "Perez v. Fenoglio" on Justia Law

In 1982, Gacho was arrested, along with others, and confessed his involvement in two murders, signing a written statement. Gacho and Titone stood trial in Judge Maloney’s court. Gacho’s girlfriend was the star prosecution witness, having witnessed the key events. Her testimony largely aligned with Gacho’s confession, which was admitted at trial. The jury found Gacho guilty in 1984 and he was sentenced to death. Judge Maloney was corrupt; he has “the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case.” Gacho claims that Maloney solicited a bribe from him but his family could not raise the money. Titone’s family paid Maloney $10,000 to fix his case, but he was convicted anyway. Gacho also claims that his trial lawyer, McDonnell, the son-in-law of Sam Giancana, longtime boss of the Chicago Outfit, was operating under an impermissible conflict of interest and was otherwise ineffective. The district court dismissed, without prejudice his most recent federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court issued a non-final, non-appealable order. Gacho may refile his petition after he exhausts state remedies. View "Gacho v. Butler" on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Koeneke worked, for 12 years, as a Rockford School District bus driver. She experienced problems with children on her bus and filed incident reports with Sharp and, later, went to West, the terminal manager. She was told that she did not know how to discipline the children and was later suspended for two days for failing to perform a proper pre-trip inspection of her bus. Gonzalez-Koeneke claims that her suspension was actually retaliation for having gone to West. Her union steward told her that Wilson (a District official) wanted her to quit, but Wilson issued a “Removal Form” that same day, resulting in suspension of her bus-driver permit for three years. Gonzalez-Koeneke was terminated based on her suspended permit. She filed suit pro se, alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed with prejudice, noting its standing order that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a party requests an opportunity to amend in its response. Gonzalez-Koeneke moved to set aside the judgment and to amend her complaint. The district court denied the motion, stating that she had not explained how she would amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West" on Justia Law

In 2009, unknown assailants shot and killed Marty, who had sporadically provided intelligence to narcotics officers in Belvidere, Illinois, since 2006. Marty’s mother, Flint, filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The constitutional claims boil down to allegations that Marty was targeted and killed in retribution for his actions as a police informant, and that the defendants are liable for failing to protect him. The day defendants moved for summary judgment, about a month after discovery closed, Flint moved to reopen discovery and for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Officer Dammon and Berry (Marty’s primary police contacts) lied throughout discovery. The judge denied both motions. Flint’s response to the summary judgment motion did not comport with Local Rule 56.1, which guides how parties must marshal evidence at the summary judgment stage. Applying that rule, the district court deemed admitted most of defendants’ factual assertions, ignored additional facts raised in Flint’s response briefing, and granted summary judgment against her. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge acted within his discretion to deny Flint’s tardy motions and Flint’s procedural gaffe left an evidentiary record insufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Flint v. City of Belvidere" on Justia Law

Stanbridge is confined in a secured facility under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1, which allows for civil commitment of individuals who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffer from a mental disorder that predisposes them to future acts of sexual violence. Stanbridge sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 2005 criminal conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Stanbridge had already served his full sentence for his 2005 conviction. The district court, therefore, dismissed Stanbridge’s petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider claims related to Stanbridge’s criminal conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Stanbridge’s argument that he remains “in custody” pursuant to his sexual abuse conviction because that conviction serves as a necessary, though not sufficient, predicate for his current confinement. Stanbridge’s civil commitment is merely a collateral consequence of his criminal conviction, insufficient to render Stanbridge in custody pursuant to that conviction. View "Stanbridge v. Scott" on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a Milwaukee police officer from 1995 until 2011, was discharged from his employment after, in January 2011, he failed to report for work. Gonzalez is Caucasian and worked in District 4, a predominately African-American police district. He had seven earlier disciplinary actions within two years and his request for leave during the time in question had been denied. Gonzalez alleges that he was discharged because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city after denying Gonzalez’s motion to compel discovery, in which he specifically requested that the city turn over a District 4 “climate survey.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting he lateness of Gonzalez’s request, his lack of diligence in obtaining information about the climate survey, and his inability to show how he was prejudiced by the district court’s ruling,. View "Gonzalez v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law