Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rossi was assaulted by several persons, one of whom was an off-duty Chicago police officer. Glenn Mathews, a detective with the Chicago Police Department, was assigned to investigate. For six weeks, Mathews did practically no work on the case; he followed zero leads, did not inspect the crime scene, and questioned no witnesses other than Rossi. Aside from taking some messages and filing perfunctory reports, he exerted no discernible effort. He then closed his investigation. Rossi sued Mathews under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that he violated his constitutional right to judicial access because his failure to investigate led to the spoilage of evidence in his civil suit against the assailants. He also brought a Monell suit against the city for perpetuating a “code of silence” that shields police officers from investigation and promotes misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that Rossi was not denied judicial access because the police did not conceal from him any facts which prevented him from obtaining legal redress from his assailants, and dismissal of Rossi’s Monell claims for lack of evidence of widespread practices on the part of the police department. View "Rossi v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Demonstrators gathered outside an abortion clinic, planning to display signs containing images of aborted fetuses. Then-Officer Lalowski was finishing an overnight shift when he noticed the demonstrators and stopped his marked police vehicle, telling demonstrators not to impede traffic or to stop anyone from entering the clinic and that he would arrest them if they did not comply. Emmerth claims Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow.” Others claim that Lalowski used repeated profanities and threats. Lalowski concedes that the confrontation was “adversarial” but denies using profanity. The exchange lasted only minutes. Later, he decided to confront the demonstrators about their signs. Off duty, wearing plain clothes, he returned in his personal vehicle, and spoke to an officer on duty and to Emmerth, making insulting comments about her weight and touching her. Lalowski stayed for approximately 80 minutes. A demonstrator called 911 to request police assistance in dealing with him. An investigation of his conduct resulted in a report that “Lalowski’s conduct … toward the public was harsh, profane, and unruly and caused a huge disturbance.” Lalowski’s disciplinary history included five suspensions and two written reprimands. After hearings, Lalowski was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claim of retaliation for protected speech, 42 U.S.C. 1983, but vacated with respect to his Illinois law administrative review claim. View "Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines" on Justia Law

Joyce and Thomas divorced in 1999. Thomas continued to live in her apartment and borrow money. They occasionally had sex. Joyce threatened to kick Thomas out many times. Around 2 a.m. on December 27, 2006, Cruz, the downstairs neighbor, woke to hear screaming, choking, and thumps, followed by 10 minutes of silence, and the sound of dragging. She then saw Thomas and another leave the building. Cruz later heard someone go into Joyce’s apartment and say “oh my god move.” Police received a call from Thomas at 3:24 a.m. saying Joyce was unconscious. She was pronounced dead at 4:19 a.m. Thomas told differing stories, eventually stating: “I do believe I was accidentally responsible for the death of Joyce.” Thomas was convicted of intentional murder, first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. Thomas argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consider and consult with an expert to review the pathologist’s report and perhaps testify consistently with the defense’s theory that Thomas unintentionally caused Joyce’s death by putting pressure on her neck for too long during sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of his habeas petition. Reasonable counsel would have consulted a forensic expert; the state’s expert testified there was no evidence of external bruising but was still sure that this was intentional strangulation. Given the weakness of the case, especially concerning intent, had an expert testified, there is a reasonable probability the trial would have turned out differently. View "Thomas v. Clements" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, once a standout high school basketball player, sued 942 U.S.C. 1983) Valley View Community School District, and the Illinois High School Association, raising claims of First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process, unconstitutional policy, section 1983 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. He alleged that the District and IHSA singled him out for residency investigations, which rendered him ineligible to participate in basketball for 10 days, because his mother complained to the District. The district judge determined that plaintiff failed to comply with local Rule 56.1 and deemed admitted all of the defendants’ properly supported facts and disregarded plaintiff’s additional facts that lacked evidentiary support. Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to include with that motion “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law,” organized by numbered paragraphs and referring to supporting materials that substantiate the asserted facts. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants complied; plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, was required to, but did not comply. View "Friend v. Valley View Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The City of Milwaukee is defending several lawsuits brought by scores of plaintiffs alleging that its police officers conducted unconstitutional stops and searches, including strip‐searches and body‐cavity searches. Judge Stadtmueller was assigned to preside over several cases. Milwaukee, asserting that some of the judge’s comments in opinions and conferences in the related cases raise questions about his impartiality, moved for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a). The judge declined. Milwaukee sought a writ of mandamus. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The five challenged statements were made during the course of litigation; “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep‐seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Judge Stadtmueller is presiding over several of these cases. It is not surprising that he might draw conclusions about the nature of the issue or problem. He is expected to look for and consider common threads and possible systemic problems to manage the cases effectively and decide them fairly. Even considering all the challenged statements together, nothing reasonably suggests deep-seated antagonism. View "City of Milwaukee v. Stadtmueller" on Justia Law

In the Democratic primary preceding the 2010 election, the candidates for Sheriff were Miller, a St. Joseph County Police Department sergeant, and Grzegorek. Grzegorek won the general election. Miller sought to be appointed either Assistant Chief or Warden of the county jail. Grzegorek appointed as Assistant Chief a man who had been Sheriff from 1985 to 1998 and retained the current Warden. The head of the Detective Bureau, an appointee of the new Sheriff, stated that Miller should take charge of the Property Room. The Department had accumulated about 1000 guns, which needed to be sorted. Miller took the position, which involved no change in compensation or rank, but months later, expressed dissatisfaction. He was offered a position in the Family Violence Unit. He declined, and continued in the Property Room until the sorting was complete, then returned to the Detective Bureau. Miller claims that his assignment to the Property Room was degrading and that he was not asked about his interest in other vacant positions that would have been promotions. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of racial hostility. Miller’s qualifications were less impressive than those of the persons appointed to the positions he wanted. View "Miller v. St. Joseph County" on Justia Law

Locke, a parolee, sued Haessig, a state official, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause, based on how Haessig responded to Locke’s complaint that her subordinate, a parole officer, was sexually harassing Locke. Locke provided evidence that Haessig was told of the harassment, failed to intervene or investigate, and then threatened to retaliate against Locke for complaining. The district court denied Haessig’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Haessig’s claim that she lacked the required intent to discriminate. Accepting Locke’s version of the facts, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Locke. Haessig was told of Locke’s complaints, but never met with him to discuss the allegations or tried to protect him from further harassment. According to Locke, after hearing of his complaint, Haessig expressed anger toward Locke and said he would never get off of his electronic ankle monitor until he was discharged from parole. A reasonable jury could infer intent to discriminate. That was clearly established law in 2008 when the events took place. Haessig had reasonable notice that her alleged actions were unlawful and so is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Locke v. Haessig" on Justia Law

Mintz started at Caterpillar in 2005. In 2007, Mintz was promoted to manufacturing engineer: an intermediary between the design department and the production floor, supervised by Turpen. Mintz moved to a different assembly line and, in 2011, began reporting to Rumler. Mintz’s duties included managing “grief” and engineering change orders; grief refers to discrepancy between what was ordered and what employees are scheduled to build. Mintz’s 2010 evaluation, prepared by Turpen, included an overall rating of “3B-Valued Performance.” The section that involved grief and change orders stated “does not meet.” His first review of 2011 resulted in a lower “3C” rating. Mintz, the only African American engineer working in the area at Caterpillar, believed that his rating was based on race. For the third quarter, Mintz received a “4-Needs Improvement,” indicating potential termination. Rumler assigned others to assist Mintz in resolving deficiencies. He allowed Mintz to work overtime and during a shutdown. Mintz’s 2011 year-end evaluation was “4”with a “does not meet” assessment of grief and change orders. His performance had worsened, causing tear down hours and assembly line down time. Mintz claimed racial discrimination. The year-end evaluation resulted in a $9,500 difference in his bonus payment. Mintz had no evidence of any race-related comments or jokes. He did not identify any Caterpillar employee that he believes was treated better than him. In 2012, Mintz transferred to another department where he remains employed. In his suit, claiming violation of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Caterpillar. Mintz was not meeting legitimate expectations and had no evidence that his complaint of race discrimination caused his evaluation. View "Mintz v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

Stern worked at St. Anthony’s Health Center (SAHC) as Chief Psychologist, with supervisory, administrative, and clinical responsibilities. In 2010, Stern received an annual performance evaluation that assigned an overall score of 2.54/4, citing concerns over administrative responsibilities. Weeks later, a subordinate resigned and, during her exit interview, said Stern had “cognitive issues.” There had been patient complaints. Other coworkers expressed similar concerns about “possible dementia.” SAHC required Stern to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation and placed him on a paid leave of absence. SAHC agreed to Stern’s choice of the Chief of Clinical Neuropsychology at Washington University Medical School, for the evaluation. The final report indicated short-term memory deficiencies, with a level of memory functioning below expectation and stated “Stern is not believed to be fit for duty in his current position.” Stating that it could not provide a position with reduced responsibilities, SAHC terminated Stern. Stern sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted SAHC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stated that it was troubled that SAHC failed to engage in an interactive process to find reasonable accommodations to permit Stern to continue his employment, but that Stern failed to create an issue of fact as to whether he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Taylor sued prison officials alleging civil-rights violations. His complaint included misjoined claims, one of which was a failure-to-protect claim against Officer Brown. A magistrate issued a show-cause order indicating that he was inclined a remaining claim concerning medical indifference, but that Taylor could avoid a severance order and a second filing fee if he dismissed one of the misjoined claims voluntarily. Taylor drafted a response voluntarily dismissing his claim against Brown. Two days before the judge’s deadline, Taylor gave the document to a prison librarian to be e-filed. He was immediately transferred to another correctional facility. The court clerk never received the dismissal, however, and the judge severed the claim, opened a new case, and assessed a second filing fee. Both Taylor and the officer argued that Taylor’s voluntary dismissal was timely under the prison mailbox rule, but the court never addressed the issue. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the district court did not provide an opportunity to prove that the late-received documents were filed in a timely manner. The court noted that a nonjurisdictional deadline was at stake, and the opposing party conceded below that the mailbox rule applied. View "Taylor v. Brown" on Justia Law