Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College as a part-time, non-tenure track, adjunct professor. Silk’s typical teaching load included four courses during fall and spring semesters and two or three summer classes. The College finalized written contracts with adjuncts just before the start of the semester. In March 2010, Silk agreed to teach two sociology courses during the summer term. In April, Silk took a medical leave of absence for heart surgery and did not inform the College of his anticipated return date. During visits to Silk’s classes to arrange for substitute instructors, administrators discovered problems with assignments, syllabi, and attendance. Administrators informed Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned. The dean met with Silk to discuss the issues with his classes. Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. Issues arose during a classroom observation by administrators. The dean instructed human resources to place Silk on the “do-not-hire list” and informed Silk that there would be no more classes for him. Silk’s students filed a complaint regarding Silk’s instruction. After his termination, Silk filed suit, alleging discrimination based on age and disability and retaliation for having filed an EEOC complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the College, except with respect to the fall 2010 semester, and remandedfor determination of whether the College reduced Silk’s course load because of perceived impairment. View "Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his left ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “meals lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and examination by an orthopedist as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that more than a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The court granted the doctors summary judgment, reasoning that waiting before immobilizing Petties’s ankle could not have constituted deliberate indifference because several physicians held different opinions and that a jury could not reasonably find that rejection of the recommendation for physical therapy constituted deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A jury could not reasonably find that the treatment of Petties’s ankle rose to the level of a constitutional violation. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Miller sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), which can cause severe heartburn. When Miller arrived at the prison he was taking Zantac for his GERD, but his prescription expired. At his intake screening he stated that he suffers from GERD and that he took prescription medication for it. He later told the director of nursing that he wanted his prescription renewed. A month later he saw another nurse, who scheduled him to see a doctor the following day. The appointment was cancelled because the prison was on lockdown. A guard whom he told that he needed to see a doctor replied that he should file a grievance, which he did. Though he marked it “emergency,” the warden determined that it was not an emergency, which meant that Miller could not see a doctor until the lockdown ended. During the two months before he saw a doctor, he complained repeatedly to staff about his GERD, to no avail. Once, upon vomiting stomach acid, he pressed an emergency button. A guard stated “you are not bleeding, you are not dead… it can’t be an emergency.” Eventually, the doctor renewed his prescription. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the judge engaged in “medical speculation.” View "Miller v. Campanella" on Justia Law

Swanson resigned from the Village of Flossmoor’s police department after suffering two strokes in 2009, six weeks apart, the second of which left him unable to perform as a detective. Swanson claimed that the Village failed to reasonably accommodate him—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act—upon his return to work from his first stroke by not permitting him to work exclusively at a desk. He also claimed that the Village violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him on the basis of his race and national origin, citing instances in which Village employees made racially offensive comments to him during his employment. He claimed that the Village excluded him from criminal investigations after his first stroke and then contemplated the possibility of moving him out of the investigations division entirely after his second stroke. The district court granted the Village summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Title VII claims time-barred because Swanson failed to lodge a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days after the alleged discrimination and finding the ADA claim deficient in view of his doctor’s recommendation that Swanson work “part-time” following his first stroke. View "Swanson v. Village of Flossmoor" on Justia Law

Attacked by a fellow prisoner while being transported from a court hearing to an Illinois jail, Robinson, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that guards were deliberately indifferent to his safety in failing to protect him. On December 30, 26 days after the court entered final judgment dismissing the suit, Robinson moved to extend the 28-day deadline for filing a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. Rule 6(b)(2) prohibits extending the time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion, Robinson missed the deadline. A month later the judge issued an order construing the motion as a Rule 59(e) motion and gave Robinson another 30 days to supplement it, since the motion stated no grounds for relief but just asked for more time. Two weeks after the 30-day deadline the judge denied the ‘Rule 59(e) motion.’ Robinson filed another such motion 12 days later. The judge construed it as a Rule 60(b) motion because the deadline for filing a Rule 59(e) motion had passed. Rule 60(b) lists six grounds for relief from judgment, including “any other reason.” The judge denied Robinson’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, stating no relief was available. View "Robinson v. Sweeny" on Justia Law

Based on 2004 Milwaukee muggings, McGhee was charged with armed robbery, theft of movable property from a person, and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent. Public defender Thomey was appointed. On the first day of trial, Thomey notified the court that McGhee wished to raise an alibi defense and requested that he be allowed to call two unlisted witnesses. Counsel explained that McGhee had not mentioned it to him until two days earlier. Defense counsel also moved to withdraw because McGhee wished to discharge him andhe believed that McGhee’s alibi defense raised “certain ethical problems.” The court denied the motions. Following the court’s rulings, McGhee stated that “my attorney never asked me about no alibi. … I called his office …. He doesn’t return my phone calls to come see me. How can I tell him I have a alibi if I can’t get in touch with him? I’m in the prison…. and [for him to ]say something about my witnesses as far as perjury … that’s a bunch of BS.” Seeking federal habeas relief, McGhee argued that the state court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial; the state court reasonably determined that McGhee had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation. View "McGhee v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Officer Beasley was dispatched and spoke to Hack, who stated that he had been asleep when his neighbor, Howlett, grabbed and threatened him, and thrust a hand down the front of Hack’s pants. Hack guessed that Howlett had entered by prying open a bathroom window. Hack described Howlett as wearing a white t‐shirt. Beasley called Howlett. Beasley recalls that Howlett stated, without prompting, that he did not enter Hack’s bathroom or “g[e]t into his neighbor’s pants.” Howlett says that he never made these statements. When Howlett arrived, wearing a tan collared shirt, not a white t‐shirt, Hack identified Howlett as the person who had assaulted him. Beasley arrested Howlett. Howlett was charged with burglary, criminal confinement, residential entry, intimidation, and battery. He was acquitted. Howlett filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the false‐arrest allegations, finding them time-barred, and rejected a malicious prosecution claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beasley had probable cause to arrest Howlett. Beasley and the city are immune from Howlett’s state‐law malicious‐prosecution claim. Howlett’s malicious‐prosecution claim against Beasley and the city cannot survive summary judgment because Howlett did not allege a separate constitutional injury and did not submit evidence that Beasley acted out of malice or lacked probable cause. View "Howlett v. Hack" on Justia Law

Apollo owned Franklin, Wisconsin property, which it rented to DKCLM, for the sale and servicing of boats. DKCLM subleased part of the property to Kreil, an officer of DKCLM, who lived in a house on his leased part of the property. In 2005, Apollo initiated eviction for failure to pay rent. Apollo agreed to dismiss the case and DKCLM and Kreil promised to pay and agreed that in the event of a future default Apollo would be entitled to seek a writ of restitution without notice to Kreil. Apollo asked a Wisconsin court for that relief on August 15, 2005. Nine days later the court issued the writ, but stayed enforcement until September 26. Execution of the writ began on October 5, Kreil was evicted and a judgment of $54,000 was entered against him. Six years later Kreil filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in a federal district court against Milwaukee County and detective Miller, claiming that the entry onto the property was an unreasonable seizure of Kreil’s leasehold because it occurred after the statutory deadline for accomplishing an eviction and that the county removed and destroyed or otherwise discarded private property.The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting state law remedies. View "DKCLM, Ltd. v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2010, while Hinkle was finishing his elected term as Sheriff of Wayne County, his 14-year-old step-daughter accused him of sexually abusing her while helping her apply chigger medicine. A Charleston police officer interviewed the girl and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services notified state police. White, a state police investigator, interviewed the step-daughter and she repeated her claim. Her sister (another stepdaughter) said that Hinkle had also helped her apply chigger medication and that it was nonsexual. She said she thought her sister was lying because Hinkle and her mom were too strict. Hinkle denied the allegation. The step-daughter later recanted her claim of sexual abuse several times. A prosecutor declined to press charges, but the accusations became well-known in the community. White talked to a lot of people with whom he had no business sharing details of the investigation. The rumors grew to include a story that Hinkle was an arsonist. Hinkle filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against White and his supervisor, alleging denial of his right to liberty in the occupation of his choice without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Hinkle had not established a protected liberty interest. View "Hinkle v. White" on Justia Law

Quadri bought an apartment in Chicago at a foreclosure sale. Later, she learned that the police had investigated a disturbance there, and visited the apartment with her real estate agent and a locksmith. Quadri’s agent called 911 after they found Hurem in the unit. Hurem told police he had paid rent to Quadri’s husband, but he failed to obtain a receipt, lease, or any other paperwork. He apparently got keys from a former tenant. He refused to leave. Quadri’s husband denied taking rent from Hurem. Two days later, Quadri again found Hurem in the apartment; her agent again called 911. Hurem still could not produce anything proving he had a right to be there and again refused to leave. The officers arrested him, but he was not charged. Hurem sued the Quadris, the officers, and the city, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful eviction and civil rights violations. After the Quadris and the city were dismissed as defendants, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of all but one officer. Hurem dropped his case against the last one. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hurem did not show that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and waived any due process claim. View "Hurem v. Tavares" on Justia Law