Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Inmate Perez was injured during a prison basketball game. A nurse wrapped his hand. She could not provide medicine or stitch his wound. The following day, Perez saw a physician who prescribed antibiotics, but did not stitch his wound, and, recognizing the injury's severity, recommended a specialist. Approval took days, while Perez had an open, bleeding wound. On May 20, Perez filed a grievance, claiming retribution for a prior grievance. Perez’s May 20th grievance was rejected. On May 21, Perez was taken to Carle Clinic and saw a physician’s assistant, who could not suture the wound because of its age. Prison officials did not follow care instructions, nor did they return Perez for follow-up. Perez filed another grievance on June 17 and unsuccessfully appealed denial of his earlier grievance. On December 6, Perez returned to the Clinic. On January 10, 2011, Perez filed another grievance, concerning the seven-month delay , continued pain, and indifference by prison medical staff. In March, Perez had surgery. Due to the 10-month delay, Perez claims to have irreparable damage. He unsuccessfully sought assistance with his grievance. Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court twice denied requests for counsel, screened his complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that, liberally construed, Perez’s complaint stated valid Eighth Amendment and First Amendment retaliation claims. View "Perez v. Fenoglio" on Justia Law

In 1982, Gacho was arrested, along with others, and confessed his involvement in two murders, signing a written statement. Gacho and Titone stood trial in Judge Maloney’s court. Gacho’s girlfriend was the star prosecution witness, having witnessed the key events. Her testimony largely aligned with Gacho’s confession, which was admitted at trial. The jury found Gacho guilty in 1984 and he was sentenced to death. Judge Maloney was corrupt; he has “the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case.” Gacho claims that Maloney solicited a bribe from him but his family could not raise the money. Titone’s family paid Maloney $10,000 to fix his case, but he was convicted anyway. Gacho also claims that his trial lawyer, McDonnell, the son-in-law of Sam Giancana, longtime boss of the Chicago Outfit, was operating under an impermissible conflict of interest and was otherwise ineffective. The district court dismissed, without prejudice his most recent federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court issued a non-final, non-appealable order. Gacho may refile his petition after he exhausts state remedies. View "Gacho v. Butler" on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Koeneke worked, for 12 years, as a Rockford School District bus driver. She experienced problems with children on her bus and filed incident reports with Sharp and, later, went to West, the terminal manager. She was told that she did not know how to discipline the children and was later suspended for two days for failing to perform a proper pre-trip inspection of her bus. Gonzalez-Koeneke claims that her suspension was actually retaliation for having gone to West. Her union steward told her that Wilson (a District official) wanted her to quit, but Wilson issued a “Removal Form” that same day, resulting in suspension of her bus-driver permit for three years. Gonzalez-Koeneke was terminated based on her suspended permit. She filed suit pro se, alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed with prejudice, noting its standing order that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a party requests an opportunity to amend in its response. Gonzalez-Koeneke moved to set aside the judgment and to amend her complaint. The district court denied the motion, stating that she had not explained how she would amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West" on Justia Law

In 2009, unknown assailants shot and killed Marty, who had sporadically provided intelligence to narcotics officers in Belvidere, Illinois, since 2006. Marty’s mother, Flint, filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The constitutional claims boil down to allegations that Marty was targeted and killed in retribution for his actions as a police informant, and that the defendants are liable for failing to protect him. The day defendants moved for summary judgment, about a month after discovery closed, Flint moved to reopen discovery and for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Officer Dammon and Berry (Marty’s primary police contacts) lied throughout discovery. The judge denied both motions. Flint’s response to the summary judgment motion did not comport with Local Rule 56.1, which guides how parties must marshal evidence at the summary judgment stage. Applying that rule, the district court deemed admitted most of defendants’ factual assertions, ignored additional facts raised in Flint’s response briefing, and granted summary judgment against her. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge acted within his discretion to deny Flint’s tardy motions and Flint’s procedural gaffe left an evidentiary record insufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Flint v. City of Belvidere" on Justia Law

Stanbridge is confined in a secured facility under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1, which allows for civil commitment of individuals who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffer from a mental disorder that predisposes them to future acts of sexual violence. Stanbridge sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 2005 criminal conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Stanbridge had already served his full sentence for his 2005 conviction. The district court, therefore, dismissed Stanbridge’s petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider claims related to Stanbridge’s criminal conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Stanbridge’s argument that he remains “in custody” pursuant to his sexual abuse conviction because that conviction serves as a necessary, though not sufficient, predicate for his current confinement. Stanbridge’s civil commitment is merely a collateral consequence of his criminal conviction, insufficient to render Stanbridge in custody pursuant to that conviction. View "Stanbridge v. Scott" on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a Milwaukee police officer from 1995 until 2011, was discharged from his employment after, in January 2011, he failed to report for work. Gonzalez is Caucasian and worked in District 4, a predominately African-American police district. He had seven earlier disciplinary actions within two years and his request for leave during the time in question had been denied. Gonzalez alleges that he was discharged because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city after denying Gonzalez’s motion to compel discovery, in which he specifically requested that the city turn over a District 4 “climate survey.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting he lateness of Gonzalez’s request, his lack of diligence in obtaining information about the climate survey, and his inability to show how he was prejudiced by the district court’s ruling,. View "Gonzalez v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Tidwell, an Illinois inmate, file suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that three prison guards violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to protect him from attack by a fellow inmate and then subjected him to excessive force by restraining him during the attack. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for two of the guards, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the third. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Tidwell’s claims concerning his attorney and his inability to obtain the testimony of inmates. The court stated that he offered no reason to think that new counsel or an investigator might have turned up evidence that would have affected the outcome of the case. The witnesses whom he hoped to find were former inmates who, he says, would have been able to corroborate parts of his testimony, but the testimony would at best have duplicated Tidwell’s own testimony. Tidwell does not assert that any of these potential witnesses saw the actual incident. View "Tidwell v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that facts increasing a defendant’s maximum permissible sentence must be determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, by the trier of fact. In 2002, in Harris, the Court held that facts increasing the minimum permissible sentence may be found by a judge on the preponderance of the evidence. In 2013, in Alleyne, the Court overruled Harris and held that facts controlling both minimum and maximum sentences are in the jury’s province and covered by the reasonable-doubt standard. A jury convicted Crayton of distributing heroin. The indictment alleged that Hedges died from using Crayton’s product, but the jury could not decide unanimously whether Hedges’s death resulted from Crayton’s heroin. The judge found that it did. Under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) this required a sentence of at least 20 years’ imprisonment; without of the finding that Crayton’s heroin killed Hedges, the range would have been 0 to 20 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2011. While Alleyne’s case was pending, Crayton filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed while waiting for Alleyne. When Crayton filed another after the Supreme Court issued its decision, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review. View "Crayton v. United States" on Justia Law

Former employees of an Indiana city sued the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the mayor had fired them because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The mayor responded that political affiliation was a permissible qualification for their jobs. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the mayor with respect to nine of the 11 plaintiffs, finding his argument concerning political qualification for the jobs was sufficiently arguable to entitle him to qualified immunity, but declined to certify interlocutory appeal with respect to the other two plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings pending interlocutory appeal, reasoning that whether a job is one for which political affiliation is a permissible criterion presents a question of law. Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. The court later dismissed in part, reasoning that a trial might show that one plaintiff has more discretion than her job description indicates. View "Allman v. Smith" on Justia Law

Perotti , convicted as a felon possessing ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 210 months. Perotti was housed at the Terre Haute penitentiary, where he found employment as an orderly in the prison’s education department, which provides classroom instruction to inmates and oversees the prison’s leisure and law libraries. Perotti was responsible for janitorial tasks, supervised by instructors. An instructor offered him a promotion to the position of law clerk, assisting other prisoners with legal research. He accepted, but was later told that the department administrator had disapproved the promotion because Perotti had filed too many grievances. After an associate warden intervened he was given the position, about a month later. He was removed from that position weeks later, after another instructor filed a misconduct report that Perotti possessed another inmate’s legal materials outside of the library, in violation of prison rules. He was vindicated and awarded back pay, but he was not reinstated nor given another job before he was transferred to another facility. A jury rejected his claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and arranging for Perotti to participate in the trial by video conferencing. View "Perotti v. Diane Quinones" on Justia Law