Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s hearsay statement; and that his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The hearsay evidence was not sufficiently reliable to require Indiana courts to disregard long-established rules against using ex parte witness interviews as substantive evidence at trial. His able trial counsel tried hard to have the statement admitted; they were not successful but also were not constitutionally ineffective. As for the waiver of counsel claim, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim in a careful discussion tailored to the facts of this case. Its rejection of the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law

When the Chicago Board of Education deems a school to be deficient, it implements a reconstitution, replacing all administrators, faculty, and staff. A school may be subject to turnaround if it has been on probation for at least one year and has failed to make adequate progress . Under the collective bargaining agreement, tenured teachers are placed in a pool where they continue to receive a full salary and benefits for one school year. If a tenured teacher does not find a new position within that year, she is honorably terminated. Others are eligible for the cadre pool where they can receive substitute assignments, paid per assignment. From 2004-2011, the Board reconstituted 16 schools. In 2011, the Board identified 74 schools by removing schools that met the objective criteria related to standardized test scores and graduation rates. Brizard chose the final 10 schools. All were in areas where African Americans make up 40.9% of tenured teachers. No schools were selected from the north side, where only 6.5% of tenured teachers are African American. Of the teachers displaced, 51% were African American, despite comprising just 27% of the overall CPS teaching population. Teachers and the Union filed suit. The court declined to certify a class of: All African American persons … teacher or para-professional staff … subjected to reconstitution. The court found that the plaintiffs had not met established a common issue and had not adequately shown that common questions of law or fact predominated over individual claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the class can be certified under both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

At Carter’s trial, for possessing between five and 15 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, an officer testified about his work with an informant who had said Carter was involved in distributing drugs and that he heard the informant call Carter to order cocaine. Carter’s lawyer did not object to the testimony about the informant’s out-of-court statements and actions. During closing argument, the state referred to the informant’s statements and actions, again without objection. Carter sought post-conviction relief, citing the Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected both claims, finding that the testimony was offered not to show the truth of what the informant said but to explain why the police investigated Carter. Carter filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting the same theories. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial. While there is a good argument that Carter’s lawyer should have objected to some of the testimony about the informant and its use during closing argument, Carter did not show prejudice. The court noted Carter’s dramatic efforts to flee and then to dispose of the bags in view of officers. View "Carter v. Douma" on Justia Law

On December 24, 2009, inmate Conley’s hand was examined by a prison nurse, who described Conley’s symptoms to Dr. Birch over the phone; throbbing pain, severe swelling, discoloration, and loss of function throughout the entire hand. The nurse concluded in his treatment notes that Conley suffered from a “possible/probable fracture.” Dr. Birch ordered a regimen of ibuprofen and ice but did not order an x-ray until almost five days later. The x-ray revealed that Conley’s hand was fractured, and years later, he continues to suffer from chronic pain and limited mobility. In 2011, Conley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the days following his injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Birch, stating that a reasonable jury could find that, based on the information conveyed to her in her December 24 telephone conversation, Dr. Birch strongly suspected that Conley’s hand was fractured. Dr. Birch’s uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that, by declining to order an x-ray of Conley’s hand at such a crucial point in the healing process, she exacerbated his lasting injuries. View "Conley v. Birch" on Justia Law

Sweatt , an African-American male, worked for Union Pacific, performing manual labor jobs. After a few years, Sweatt experience pain in his shoulder and hands. It progressed to the point that Sweatt could no longer do his job. Sweatt sought a less strenuous position— Security Officer—through Union Pacific’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Sweatt did not get the job. Sweatt sued, alleging violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Seventh circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue before November 30, 2009, outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them time-barred. Regarding the failure to hire, the court noted that Sweatt was not forthcoming about an arrest incident during his interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount. View "Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

FRCP 4(c)(3) requires a court to order that service be made by a U.S. marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued former warden Werlinger, for violations of his constitutional rights. The judge allowed him to proceed pro se and, in June 2014, directed the Marshals Service to serve Werlinger. The Marshals replied within days that Werlinger had retired and left no forwarding address. The court directed the Marshals to make another attempt by contacting the Federal Bureau of Prisons or conducting an Internet search of public records, stating that “reasonable efforts do not require the marshal to be a private investigator for civil litigants or to use software available only to law enforcement officers." Two days later, the Marshals replied: Was not able to locate using internet database searches. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal as premature. The “court should not have accepted the responses…. Not that the Service can be expected to do the impossible. If Werlinger changed his name to Siddhārtha Gautama and is now a monk of a Buddhist temple in Tibet, the Marshals Service probably couldn’t find him by efforts proportionate to the importance of finding … plaintiff would be out of luck … the statute of limitations shall be tolled … while the Marshals Service redoubles its efforts to FIND WERLINGER!” View "Williams v. Werlinger" on Justia Law

Price, a convicted felon, was convicted of possessing a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Applying the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the court concluded that Price had three qualifying convictions and imposed a sentence of 250 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2008. The district court rejected his first collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his prior crimes did not fall within the scope of the ACCA’s residual clause; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Price then asked the Seventh Circuit to authorize a successive collateral attack, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3), to assert a claim under the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, that imposition of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA residual clause violates due process because the clause is too vague to provide adequate notice. Noting that the government had not responded, the Seventh Circuit granted relief. Johnson explicitly overruled a line of Supreme Court decisions and broke new ground by invalidating a provision of ACCA. Johnson rests on the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause, so the new rule concerns constitutional law and was previously unavailable to Price. Price never presented this claim before. The court concluded that the rule is categorically retroactive to cases on collateral review. View "Price v. United States" on Justia Law

Evansville police became aware of Internet threats against police, coming from an IP address at the home of 68-year-old Louise Milan and her 18-year-old daughter. They had an unsecured wifi network. Before they searched, police saw, two doors from the Milan house, Murray, who had been convicted of intimidating a police officer. Two officers thought him the likeliest source of the threats. Some officers thought, mistakenly, that a man named Milan made the threats. Surveillance revealed no man at the Milan house. A search of the Milan house was conducted by an 11-man (all-white) SWAT team in body armor, accompanied by a news team. The team knocked and, without allowing reasonable time for a response, broke open the door and a window, and hurled two “flash bang” grenades. Police rushed into the house, searched, found no evidence of criminal activity, handcuffed the Milans (black women), and led them outside. A day later, police discovered that Murray had used Milan’s network and requested that he come to police headquarters. Murray was arrested without incident and pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in Milans’ suit. The police acted unreasonably and precipitately in flash banging the house without a minimally responsible investigation. The open network expanded the number of possible suspects and one extra day of surveillance, with a brief investigation of Murray and the male Milans, would have reassured police that there was no danger in the Milan house. View "Milan v. Bolin" on Justia Law