Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Attacked by a fellow prisoner while being transported from a court hearing to an Illinois jail, Robinson, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that guards were deliberately indifferent to his safety in failing to protect him. On December 30, 26 days after the court entered final judgment dismissing the suit, Robinson moved to extend the 28-day deadline for filing a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. Rule 6(b)(2) prohibits extending the time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion, Robinson missed the deadline. A month later the judge issued an order construing the motion as a Rule 59(e) motion and gave Robinson another 30 days to supplement it, since the motion stated no grounds for relief but just asked for more time. Two weeks after the 30-day deadline the judge denied the ‘Rule 59(e) motion.’ Robinson filed another such motion 12 days later. The judge construed it as a Rule 60(b) motion because the deadline for filing a Rule 59(e) motion had passed. Rule 60(b) lists six grounds for relief from judgment, including “any other reason.” The judge denied Robinson’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, stating no relief was available. View "Robinson v. Sweeny" on Justia Law

Based on 2004 Milwaukee muggings, McGhee was charged with armed robbery, theft of movable property from a person, and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent. Public defender Thomey was appointed. On the first day of trial, Thomey notified the court that McGhee wished to raise an alibi defense and requested that he be allowed to call two unlisted witnesses. Counsel explained that McGhee had not mentioned it to him until two days earlier. Defense counsel also moved to withdraw because McGhee wished to discharge him andhe believed that McGhee’s alibi defense raised “certain ethical problems.” The court denied the motions. Following the court’s rulings, McGhee stated that “my attorney never asked me about no alibi. … I called his office …. He doesn’t return my phone calls to come see me. How can I tell him I have a alibi if I can’t get in touch with him? I’m in the prison…. and [for him to ]say something about my witnesses as far as perjury … that’s a bunch of BS.” Seeking federal habeas relief, McGhee argued that the state court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial; the state court reasonably determined that McGhee had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation. View "McGhee v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Officer Beasley was dispatched and spoke to Hack, who stated that he had been asleep when his neighbor, Howlett, grabbed and threatened him, and thrust a hand down the front of Hack’s pants. Hack guessed that Howlett had entered by prying open a bathroom window. Hack described Howlett as wearing a white t‐shirt. Beasley called Howlett. Beasley recalls that Howlett stated, without prompting, that he did not enter Hack’s bathroom or “g[e]t into his neighbor’s pants.” Howlett says that he never made these statements. When Howlett arrived, wearing a tan collared shirt, not a white t‐shirt, Hack identified Howlett as the person who had assaulted him. Beasley arrested Howlett. Howlett was charged with burglary, criminal confinement, residential entry, intimidation, and battery. He was acquitted. Howlett filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the false‐arrest allegations, finding them time-barred, and rejected a malicious prosecution claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beasley had probable cause to arrest Howlett. Beasley and the city are immune from Howlett’s state‐law malicious‐prosecution claim. Howlett’s malicious‐prosecution claim against Beasley and the city cannot survive summary judgment because Howlett did not allege a separate constitutional injury and did not submit evidence that Beasley acted out of malice or lacked probable cause. View "Howlett v. Hack" on Justia Law

Apollo owned Franklin, Wisconsin property, which it rented to DKCLM, for the sale and servicing of boats. DKCLM subleased part of the property to Kreil, an officer of DKCLM, who lived in a house on his leased part of the property. In 2005, Apollo initiated eviction for failure to pay rent. Apollo agreed to dismiss the case and DKCLM and Kreil promised to pay and agreed that in the event of a future default Apollo would be entitled to seek a writ of restitution without notice to Kreil. Apollo asked a Wisconsin court for that relief on August 15, 2005. Nine days later the court issued the writ, but stayed enforcement until September 26. Execution of the writ began on October 5, Kreil was evicted and a judgment of $54,000 was entered against him. Six years later Kreil filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in a federal district court against Milwaukee County and detective Miller, claiming that the entry onto the property was an unreasonable seizure of Kreil’s leasehold because it occurred after the statutory deadline for accomplishing an eviction and that the county removed and destroyed or otherwise discarded private property.The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting state law remedies. View "DKCLM, Ltd. v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2010, while Hinkle was finishing his elected term as Sheriff of Wayne County, his 14-year-old step-daughter accused him of sexually abusing her while helping her apply chigger medicine. A Charleston police officer interviewed the girl and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services notified state police. White, a state police investigator, interviewed the step-daughter and she repeated her claim. Her sister (another stepdaughter) said that Hinkle had also helped her apply chigger medication and that it was nonsexual. She said she thought her sister was lying because Hinkle and her mom were too strict. Hinkle denied the allegation. The step-daughter later recanted her claim of sexual abuse several times. A prosecutor declined to press charges, but the accusations became well-known in the community. White talked to a lot of people with whom he had no business sharing details of the investigation. The rumors grew to include a story that Hinkle was an arsonist. Hinkle filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against White and his supervisor, alleging denial of his right to liberty in the occupation of his choice without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Hinkle had not established a protected liberty interest. View "Hinkle v. White" on Justia Law

Quadri bought an apartment in Chicago at a foreclosure sale. Later, she learned that the police had investigated a disturbance there, and visited the apartment with her real estate agent and a locksmith. Quadri’s agent called 911 after they found Hurem in the unit. Hurem told police he had paid rent to Quadri’s husband, but he failed to obtain a receipt, lease, or any other paperwork. He apparently got keys from a former tenant. He refused to leave. Quadri’s husband denied taking rent from Hurem. Two days later, Quadri again found Hurem in the apartment; her agent again called 911. Hurem still could not produce anything proving he had a right to be there and again refused to leave. The officers arrested him, but he was not charged. Hurem sued the Quadris, the officers, and the city, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful eviction and civil rights violations. After the Quadris and the city were dismissed as defendants, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of all but one officer. Hurem dropped his case against the last one. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hurem did not show that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and waived any due process claim. View "Hurem v. Tavares" on Justia Law

Armed men were robbing Milwaukee businesses, wearing dark sweatshirts and ski masks. Officers saw three men approach a store in dark clothing, with hoods pulled over their faces. One attempted to enter, while the others stood watch. They found the doors locked and fled. As officers pursued them, two jumped into a running car driven by a fourth person. The third man fled on foot. The car, registered to Welch, led police on a high-speed chase before being stopped. Police discovered Welch hiding under a car near the store. In his first trial, Welch was convicted of four counts. In the nine-day second trial, he was found guilty of eight counts of armed robbery, conspiracy, fleeing an officer, and bail-jumping. The jury heard testimony from three accomplices, five others linking him to the robberies, two forensic experts, 12 police officers, and 20 victims. Two officers referred to other criminal charges against Welch. After exhausting his appeals, Welch sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting that admission of those statements violated his right to a fair trial and that his counsel was ineffective for not contesting them. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, finding reasonable the Wisconsin appellate court’s conclusion that any error in admitting the statements was harmless, given the quantity and quality of evidence against Welch. View "Welch v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Burks and Jones were hired as Union Pacific “Signal Helpers.” During orientation in January 2011, they were informed that they would be employed through December 2015, or until the company “moved in a different direction.” The position carried a 90-day probationary period; they were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. They were the only African-American members of their class. On February 9, 2011, Burks was told that “it wasn’t working out.” Burks lodged a complaint with Schop in Union Pacific’s Equal Employment Opportunity department alleging racial discrimination. Schop found no evidence that Burks was fired because of his race, but concluded that he had not been given an opportunity to improve and offered reinstatement in exchange for a general release with a new 90-day probationary period. Burks signed and returned to work. Burks worked for seven days before requesting a transfer. He was transferred and completed his probationary period, but was later notified that Union Pacific abolished the Signal Helper position, effective October 2011. Jones had similar experiences. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting claims that Union Pacific denied an opportunity to take a test that was required for promotion, based on impermissible retaliation for complaints of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that positions within the seniority district became available during the relevant period. View "Burks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civil detainee in Illinois, appealed an adverse jury verdict in his deliberate indifference suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a facility physician. Plaintiff alleged that the district court should have declared a mistrial after the physician violated a pretrial ruling by the court by mentioning to the jury that plaintiff was incarcerated for 26 years. Plaintiff also challenged the strength of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not declaring a mistrial where the jury could already infer from plaintiff's testimony and the medical issues that plaintiff had dating back to 2002 that plaintiff had spent a long in prison. Because plaintiff did not preserve his second argument, the court cannot reach the issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Collins v. Lochard" on Justia Law

Davis, a civil detainee under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, sued security guards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they refused to remove Davis’s hand restraints while he used the restroom and then laughed as he struggled to unzip his pants and urinate. A jury awarded him $1,000 in compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit vacated, based on an improper “elements” jury instruction, but rejected an argument based on a Facility directive that permitted removal of restraints only “[w]ithin a secure facility in order to utilize the restroom.” There was conflicting testimony as to whether the corridor behind the courtroom was “secure.” The directive allowed Wessel and Lay to call their supervisor for permission to remove the restraints, and a reasonable jury could find that they chose not to do so for the purpose of humiliating Davis. Davis had no means of escape from the windowless restroom other than by force through Wessel and Lay (while Davis still wore leg shackles), and Wessel and Lay were each considerably larger, younger, and healthier than Davis. A jail cannot shield a cruel and unusual punishment from legal challenge simply by imposing it on everyone equally. View "Davis v. Wessel" on Justia Law