Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At Carter’s trial, for possessing between five and 15 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, an officer testified about his work with an informant who had said Carter was involved in distributing drugs and that he heard the informant call Carter to order cocaine. Carter’s lawyer did not object to the testimony about the informant’s out-of-court statements and actions. During closing argument, the state referred to the informant’s statements and actions, again without objection. Carter sought post-conviction relief, citing the Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected both claims, finding that the testimony was offered not to show the truth of what the informant said but to explain why the police investigated Carter. Carter filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting the same theories. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial. While there is a good argument that Carter’s lawyer should have objected to some of the testimony about the informant and its use during closing argument, Carter did not show prejudice. The court noted Carter’s dramatic efforts to flee and then to dispose of the bags in view of officers. View "Carter v. Douma" on Justia Law

On December 24, 2009, inmate Conley’s hand was examined by a prison nurse, who described Conley’s symptoms to Dr. Birch over the phone; throbbing pain, severe swelling, discoloration, and loss of function throughout the entire hand. The nurse concluded in his treatment notes that Conley suffered from a “possible/probable fracture.” Dr. Birch ordered a regimen of ibuprofen and ice but did not order an x-ray until almost five days later. The x-ray revealed that Conley’s hand was fractured, and years later, he continues to suffer from chronic pain and limited mobility. In 2011, Conley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the days following his injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Birch, stating that a reasonable jury could find that, based on the information conveyed to her in her December 24 telephone conversation, Dr. Birch strongly suspected that Conley’s hand was fractured. Dr. Birch’s uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that, by declining to order an x-ray of Conley’s hand at such a crucial point in the healing process, she exacerbated his lasting injuries. View "Conley v. Birch" on Justia Law

Sweatt , an African-American male, worked for Union Pacific, performing manual labor jobs. After a few years, Sweatt experience pain in his shoulder and hands. It progressed to the point that Sweatt could no longer do his job. Sweatt sought a less strenuous position— Security Officer—through Union Pacific’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Sweatt did not get the job. Sweatt sued, alleging violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Seventh circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue before November 30, 2009, outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them time-barred. Regarding the failure to hire, the court noted that Sweatt was not forthcoming about an arrest incident during his interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount. View "Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

FRCP 4(c)(3) requires a court to order that service be made by a U.S. marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued former warden Werlinger, for violations of his constitutional rights. The judge allowed him to proceed pro se and, in June 2014, directed the Marshals Service to serve Werlinger. The Marshals replied within days that Werlinger had retired and left no forwarding address. The court directed the Marshals to make another attempt by contacting the Federal Bureau of Prisons or conducting an Internet search of public records, stating that “reasonable efforts do not require the marshal to be a private investigator for civil litigants or to use software available only to law enforcement officers." Two days later, the Marshals replied: Was not able to locate using internet database searches. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal as premature. The “court should not have accepted the responses…. Not that the Service can be expected to do the impossible. If Werlinger changed his name to Siddhārtha Gautama and is now a monk of a Buddhist temple in Tibet, the Marshals Service probably couldn’t find him by efforts proportionate to the importance of finding … plaintiff would be out of luck … the statute of limitations shall be tolled … while the Marshals Service redoubles its efforts to FIND WERLINGER!” View "Williams v. Werlinger" on Justia Law

Price, a convicted felon, was convicted of possessing a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Applying the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the court concluded that Price had three qualifying convictions and imposed a sentence of 250 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2008. The district court rejected his first collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his prior crimes did not fall within the scope of the ACCA’s residual clause; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Price then asked the Seventh Circuit to authorize a successive collateral attack, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3), to assert a claim under the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, that imposition of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA residual clause violates due process because the clause is too vague to provide adequate notice. Noting that the government had not responded, the Seventh Circuit granted relief. Johnson explicitly overruled a line of Supreme Court decisions and broke new ground by invalidating a provision of ACCA. Johnson rests on the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause, so the new rule concerns constitutional law and was previously unavailable to Price. Price never presented this claim before. The court concluded that the rule is categorically retroactive to cases on collateral review. View "Price v. United States" on Justia Law

Evansville police became aware of Internet threats against police, coming from an IP address at the home of 68-year-old Louise Milan and her 18-year-old daughter. They had an unsecured wifi network. Before they searched, police saw, two doors from the Milan house, Murray, who had been convicted of intimidating a police officer. Two officers thought him the likeliest source of the threats. Some officers thought, mistakenly, that a man named Milan made the threats. Surveillance revealed no man at the Milan house. A search of the Milan house was conducted by an 11-man (all-white) SWAT team in body armor, accompanied by a news team. The team knocked and, without allowing reasonable time for a response, broke open the door and a window, and hurled two “flash bang” grenades. Police rushed into the house, searched, found no evidence of criminal activity, handcuffed the Milans (black women), and led them outside. A day later, police discovered that Murray had used Milan’s network and requested that he come to police headquarters. Murray was arrested without incident and pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in Milans’ suit. The police acted unreasonably and precipitately in flash banging the house without a minimally responsible investigation. The open network expanded the number of possible suspects and one extra day of surveillance, with a brief investigation of Murray and the male Milans, would have reassured police that there was no danger in the Milan house. View "Milan v. Bolin" on Justia Law

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College as a part-time, non-tenure track, adjunct professor. Silk’s typical teaching load included four courses during fall and spring semesters and two or three summer classes. The College finalized written contracts with adjuncts just before the start of the semester. In March 2010, Silk agreed to teach two sociology courses during the summer term. In April, Silk took a medical leave of absence for heart surgery and did not inform the College of his anticipated return date. During visits to Silk’s classes to arrange for substitute instructors, administrators discovered problems with assignments, syllabi, and attendance. Administrators informed Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned. The dean met with Silk to discuss the issues with his classes. Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. Issues arose during a classroom observation by administrators. The dean instructed human resources to place Silk on the “do-not-hire list” and informed Silk that there would be no more classes for him. Silk’s students filed a complaint regarding Silk’s instruction. After his termination, Silk filed suit, alleging discrimination based on age and disability and retaliation for having filed an EEOC complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the College, except with respect to the fall 2010 semester, and remandedfor determination of whether the College reduced Silk’s course load because of perceived impairment. View "Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his left ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “meals lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and examination by an orthopedist as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that more than a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The court granted the doctors summary judgment, reasoning that waiting before immobilizing Petties’s ankle could not have constituted deliberate indifference because several physicians held different opinions and that a jury could not reasonably find that rejection of the recommendation for physical therapy constituted deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A jury could not reasonably find that the treatment of Petties’s ankle rose to the level of a constitutional violation. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Miller sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), which can cause severe heartburn. When Miller arrived at the prison he was taking Zantac for his GERD, but his prescription expired. At his intake screening he stated that he suffers from GERD and that he took prescription medication for it. He later told the director of nursing that he wanted his prescription renewed. A month later he saw another nurse, who scheduled him to see a doctor the following day. The appointment was cancelled because the prison was on lockdown. A guard whom he told that he needed to see a doctor replied that he should file a grievance, which he did. Though he marked it “emergency,” the warden determined that it was not an emergency, which meant that Miller could not see a doctor until the lockdown ended. During the two months before he saw a doctor, he complained repeatedly to staff about his GERD, to no avail. Once, upon vomiting stomach acid, he pressed an emergency button. A guard stated “you are not bleeding, you are not dead… it can’t be an emergency.” Eventually, the doctor renewed his prescription. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the judge engaged in “medical speculation.” View "Miller v. Campanella" on Justia Law

Swanson resigned from the Village of Flossmoor’s police department after suffering two strokes in 2009, six weeks apart, the second of which left him unable to perform as a detective. Swanson claimed that the Village failed to reasonably accommodate him—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act—upon his return to work from his first stroke by not permitting him to work exclusively at a desk. He also claimed that the Village violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him on the basis of his race and national origin, citing instances in which Village employees made racially offensive comments to him during his employment. He claimed that the Village excluded him from criminal investigations after his first stroke and then contemplated the possibility of moving him out of the investigations division entirely after his second stroke. The district court granted the Village summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Title VII claims time-barred because Swanson failed to lodge a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days after the alleged discrimination and finding the ADA claim deficient in view of his doctor’s recommendation that Swanson work “part-time” following his first stroke. View "Swanson v. Village of Flossmoor" on Justia Law