Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008 Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. His presentence investigation report classified him as a career offender based on two convictions for assault. Despite the fact that his convictions were for “intentional, knowing, or reckless” assault, counsel did not object. The court sentenced Ramirez as a career offender, treating the Texas convictions as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Ramirez retained new counsel and moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the career-offender designation. The judge denied the motion and, because postconviction counsel failed to keep Ramirez informed about the postconviction proceedings, Ramirez did not timely request a certificate of appealability. He tried filing a late request, but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He moved under FRCP 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment. The district judge denied the motion, on the belief that there is a rigid rule under which there is no right to counsel on collateral review. The Seventh Circuit remanded. noting that the Supreme Court significantly changed its approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at initial review collateral proceedings in 2011 and 2013, so that Ramirez’s argument is cognizable under Rule 60(b), View "Ramirez v. United States" on Justia Law

Stinson spent 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. He was exonerated by DNA evidence and sued the lead detective and two forensic odontologists who investigated the murder and testified at trial. The odontologists were the key prosecution witnesses. They testified that bite marks on the victim’s body matched Stinson’s dentition. In his suit for damages, 42 U.S.C. 1983, Stinson alleged that the odontologists fabricated their opinions, the detective put them up to it, and the three suppressed evidence of the fabrication, in violation of his right to due process. The district court denied the defendants’ claim of absolute or qualified immunity from suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While absolute immunity does not apply because Stinson sued the defendants primarily for their investigative misconduct, not their testimony at trial, the defendants remain protected by qualified immunity, which is lost only if Stinson presents evidence showing that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. He did not do so. Stinson’s evidence, accepted as true, shows at most that the odontologists were negligent; it does not support his claim that they fabricated their opinions. An error in forensic analysis—even a glaring error—is not actionable as a violation of due process. View "Stinson v. Gauger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at Stateville prison in Illinois, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the prison’s medical staff was deliberately indifferent to the results of 11 blood tests, administered over a period of more than five years, that indicated that he was either diabetic or prediabetic, or had progressed from prediabetic to diabetic during the period. He alleges that not until the last of these tests, late in 2010, did he learn that his blood glucose counts were dangerously high The district court dismissed the suit as time-barred. We need to distinguish between two types of glucose blood test—fasting and random. The Seventh Circuit reversed. For the medical staff of a prison to know that an inmate is diabetic or prediabetic, yet not tell him, let alone do nothing to treat his condition, is to be deliberately indifferent. The defendant now knows that he was diabetic or prediabetic in 2007, but plaintiff may not have known of the cause of his distressing symptoms until November 2010, and the two-year statute of limitations would have been tolled during the interval between that discovery and his filing suit because he was exhausting prison administrative remedies. View "Nally v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

D. Stahl claimed she was the victim of vicious, physical bullying by fellow East Porter students. D. complained to school officials. Apart from witnessing the counselor talk to one alleged bully and seeing the principal call another to her office, D. does not know if officials took any action. D. alleges that some teachers and coaches participated or were complicit in the bullying. Eighth Grade girls, preparing to play basketball, taunted D. D’s mother, Debbie came to the school and yelled at the alleged bullies. D.’s father, George, arrived and confronted the principal. Leaving the gym, George and his father confronted alleged bullies. The girls yelled that the men had attacked them. The principal called the police, who did not issue a citation. Superintendent Gardin stated that Debbie and George were banned from East Porter property until they met with him. The Stahls never arranged a meeting. D voluntarily did not return. The Stahls contacted a neighboring school district. George testified that he was advised that the school had “open enrollment." George told the principal about the ban. That evening, the principal informed them that D. would not be permitted to enroll.The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the Stahls’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no genuine issue of material fact under the state-created danger standard. D. did not identify any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently with regard to her attempt to transfer schools. View "D. S. v. East Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp" on Justia Law

Preddie worked as a fifth-grade teacher in the Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation during the 2010–2011 school year. After Preddie was absent 23 times, the BCSC did not renew his contract. Preddie, an African-American, is diabetic, and his son suffers from sickle cell anemia. Preddie filed suit, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and 1991. The case district court granted summary judgment in favor of the BCSC on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except as to Preddie’s FMLA claims. Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

While he was an inmate, the Pontiac Illinois prison refused to equip Plaintiff with gloves and a hat when he exercised in the prison yard in cold winter weather. His indoor cell was too small for the exercise he needed to prevent his back muscles from atrophying because of arthritis. The refusal was pursuant to a policy that the prison justified on the ground that offenders have placed feces inside gloves and hats and swung them at staff members or offenders from a distance, and have used them to hide dangerous contraband. Plaintiff in discovery requested incident reports to support the justification but was told that the database is searchable only by date of report, so the demand was too burdensome. The district judge agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it is difficult to believe that Pontiac prison has no searchable records of inmates’ assaults on guards and that the defendants should at least be required to present testimony documenting the use of gloves and hats as weapons, but that the suit fails for failure to allege indifference to his need for those items. The court noted that prison personnel had very limited knowledge of Plaintiff’s problem. View "Diaz v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Rowe was diagnosed with reflux esophagitis, (GERD), which may cause esophageal bleeding and can increase the risk of esophageal cancer. The prison physician told him to take Zantac pills. Rowe was permitted to keep Zantac in his cell and take pills when he felt the need, until his pills were confiscated and he was told that he would be allowed to take a Zantac only when a nurse gave it to him or buy it at the commissary. He complained that he needed to take Zantac with his meals. No reason was articulated for forbidding him to keep Zantac given him by prison staff while permitting him to keep Zantac that he bought at the commissary. Zantac is not a narcotic. Rowe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. After he filed suit, he ceased receiving Zantac because his authorization to receive over-the-counter Zantac free of charge lapsed. He was told to purchase the drug from the commissary if he wanted it. Rowe claims he could not afford to buy it. A doctor opined that his condition didn’t require Zantac. The doctor later relented. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, noting contradictory evidence and that the claim is “far from frivolous.” The court urged the court to consider appointing a neutral expert. View "Rowe v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Dunnet, a highway construction company, is prequalified to bid and work on Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) projects and competes for federally assisted highway construction contracts. Dunnet is owned and controlled by two white males. Between 2007 and 2009, its average annual gross receipts were over $52 million. To receive federal-aid funds for highway contracts, IDOT must have a “disadvantaged business enterprise” (DBE) participation program. A DBE is a for-profit small business concern that is at least 51% owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. There is a rebuttable presumption that women and members of racial minority groups are socially and economically disadvantaged, but an individual owner of any race or gender may qualify as “socially and economically disadvantaged.” A firm is not an eligible DBE if the firm (including affiliates) has had average annual gross receipts over its previous three fiscal years, greater than $22.41 million. Illinois has not met its DBE participation goals. Dunnet was denied a goal waiver and was not awarded a major expressway project. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting Dunnet’s claim that IDOT’s DBE Program discriminates on the basis of race, concluding that Dunnet lacked standing to raise an equal protection challenge based on race and that the Program survived the constitutional and other challenges. View "Dunnet Bay Constr. Co. v. Borggren" on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law