Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boyd was arrested and released from jail pursuant to a bond agreement, subject to bond conditions, including that he not engage in any criminal activity. While on release, Boyd was arrested and charged in Wisconsin state court with 10 counts, including three counts of armed robbery with the threat of force; being a felon in possession of a firearm; possessing a short-barreled shotgun; taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent by the use of a dangerous weapon; battery; unlawfully and intentionally pointing a firearm at another person; operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent; and resisting or obstructing a law enforcement officer. The state charged Boyd in the same proceeding with 10 counts of bail jumping: it charged one bail-jumping count for each of the underlying substantive offenses that Boyd allegedly committed while on bond. A jury convicted Boyd on all 20 counts. He was sentenced to over 40 years’ imprisonment. After he exhausted state remedies, the district court denied his petition for habeas relief, in which he contended that he was being punished for both bail jumping and the substantive offenses in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Boyd v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In 2004, Seneca and Tari Adams endured vicious beatings by Chicago police officers and prolonged detentions. Along with their sister, Sicara, they sued the city and the officers. The city admitted its liability to all three plaintiffs for false arrest, excessive force, and race discrimination; it also stipulated that it was liable to Seneca and Tari for malicious prosecution in violation of state law. The jury returned awards of $2.4 million to Seneca, $1 million to Tari, and $300,000 to Sicara. The district court entered an order reducing those amounts to $1.17 million for Seneca, $350,000 for Tari, and $125,000 for Sicara The court did not give the plaintiffs the option of a new trial in lieu of accepting the lower amount. Seneca and Tari appealed. The Seventh Circuit vacated for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict A true remittitur order gives the winning party a choice: he may either accept a specific reduced monetary award or he may opt for a new trial. These plaintiffs never agreed to the reduction in their award and were never offered the option of a new trial; they were entitled to appeal. View "Adams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Miller began work as a technician at Polaris Laboratories in Indianapolis in 2009. About eight months later, Miller was fired for repeated failures to meet an average daily quota of 260 samples processed per day. Miller, who is African‐American, asserts that during her employment at Polaris she suffered from racial discrimination that had an effect on her work performance. Miller had complained to supervisors that she had been called “the colored girl’ and about other derogatory remarks. At one point, a supervisor refused to train or even talk to Miller. There was evidence that Miller was given more challenging work than others. She sued Polaris, contending that it violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted Polaris summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Miller established genuine issues of material fact on discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Miller v. Polaris Labs., LLC" on Justia Law

In both cases, consolidated on appeal, family members called police officers to their home because a family member had locked himself in a room of his home and was threatening suicide. The officers responded to the distress call, but in both cases the situation ended with the person’s death as a result of shots fired by the officers. On behalf of the deceased person, the plaintiffs in each case brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they effected the seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity in one case and affirmed denial of the same motion in the other. Officers responding to a scene in which a suicidal person is locked in a room are faced with the difficult determination as to whether delay in responding will allow the person to further harm himself or to become aggressive toward others. It is clearly established, however, that officers cannot resort as an initial matter to lethal force on a person who is merely passively resisting and has not presented any threat of harm to others. View "Brown v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Jackson was serving an 18-month sentence in Illinois when he was extradited to Wisconsin to face charges of identity theft. In Wisconsin, Jackson sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging the extradition. Jackson’s petition argued that Wisconsin lacked authority to prosecute him because the extradition was invalid, in that he was transferred to Wisconsin before a scheduled hearing in Illinois on the validity of the warrant, in violation of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which both Illinois and Wisconsin have adopted. The district court denied Jackson’s petition, finding that he had not shown any “special circumstances” necessitating relief before exhausting state remedies. The court noted that Jackson had been convicted on the Wisconsin charges, was currently serving a sentence there, and could pursue his claims on appeal or in a post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. Jackson was no longer a pre-trial detainee when the district court ruled on the merits of his petition, so relief under section 2241 was no longer available to him. View "Jackson v. Clements" on Justia Law

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s hearsay statement; and that his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The hearsay evidence was not sufficiently reliable to require Indiana courts to disregard long-established rules against using ex parte witness interviews as substantive evidence at trial. His able trial counsel tried hard to have the statement admitted; they were not successful but also were not constitutionally ineffective. As for the waiver of counsel claim, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim in a careful discussion tailored to the facts of this case. Its rejection of the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law

When the Chicago Board of Education deems a school to be deficient, it implements a reconstitution, replacing all administrators, faculty, and staff. A school may be subject to turnaround if it has been on probation for at least one year and has failed to make adequate progress . Under the collective bargaining agreement, tenured teachers are placed in a pool where they continue to receive a full salary and benefits for one school year. If a tenured teacher does not find a new position within that year, she is honorably terminated. Others are eligible for the cadre pool where they can receive substitute assignments, paid per assignment. From 2004-2011, the Board reconstituted 16 schools. In 2011, the Board identified 74 schools by removing schools that met the objective criteria related to standardized test scores and graduation rates. Brizard chose the final 10 schools. All were in areas where African Americans make up 40.9% of tenured teachers. No schools were selected from the north side, where only 6.5% of tenured teachers are African American. Of the teachers displaced, 51% were African American, despite comprising just 27% of the overall CPS teaching population. Teachers and the Union filed suit. The court declined to certify a class of: All African American persons … teacher or para-professional staff … subjected to reconstitution. The court found that the plaintiffs had not met established a common issue and had not adequately shown that common questions of law or fact predominated over individual claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the class can be certified under both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

At Carter’s trial, for possessing between five and 15 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, an officer testified about his work with an informant who had said Carter was involved in distributing drugs and that he heard the informant call Carter to order cocaine. Carter’s lawyer did not object to the testimony about the informant’s out-of-court statements and actions. During closing argument, the state referred to the informant’s statements and actions, again without objection. Carter sought post-conviction relief, citing the Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected both claims, finding that the testimony was offered not to show the truth of what the informant said but to explain why the police investigated Carter. Carter filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting the same theories. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial. While there is a good argument that Carter’s lawyer should have objected to some of the testimony about the informant and its use during closing argument, Carter did not show prejudice. The court noted Carter’s dramatic efforts to flee and then to dispose of the bags in view of officers. View "Carter v. Douma" on Justia Law