Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brown, convicted of raping adult women and diagnosed with paraphilia (specifically, sexual attraction to non-consenting women) and personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits, was civilly committed to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center under Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Brown and 17 others sued the facility’s officials and clinical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that policies restricting their access to movies, video games, and video game consoles violate the First Amendment. Rushville prohibited its residents from watching all R-rated movies and playing M-rated video games (may “contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content and/or strong language”). The policy was later changed to prohibit 353 specific movies and 232 specific games. Rushville subsequently discovered that two residents were using a video game console to access the internet to view forbidden material and banned residents from possessing video game consoles capable of accessing the internet. Brown contended that the new restrictions were retaliation against him for suing. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, finding that the record did not contain a sufficient basis to conclude that the ban on movies and video games is reasonably related to the state’s interests in security and rehabilitation, View "Brown v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Bisluk, a conservative who votes Republican, was a special agent working in Chicago for the Illinois Department of Revenue’s Liquor Control Commission under former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s Democratic administration. She purchased a home in southern Illinois and asked her employer about transferring duty assignments from Chicago to southern Illinois, but failed to submit a transfer request or apply for the job. She did not get a position. She sued several state officials alleging that she was denied a transfer to southern Illinois because of her political association, in violation of the First Amendment and because of her gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The undisputed evidence showed that Bisluk did not receive the transfer because she did not submit the proper transfer paperwork or apply for the job. View "Bisluk v. Hamer" on Justia Law

A deputy noticed paper covering the light above the bed of pretrial detainee Kingsley and ordered him to remove it. Kingsley refused and ignored several subsequent requests. The administrator decided that jail staff would remove the paper and would transfer Kingsley to another cell in the interim. Five officers arrived and ordered Kingsley to back up to the door with his hands behind his back. After being warned to follow the order or be tasered, Kingsley continued to lie face-down on his bunk. The parties dispute what followed, but an officer applied a taser for five seconds. Kingsley was placed on a medical watch, but refused the attention of a nurse. Kingsley, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted defendants partial summary judgment; a claim of excessive force proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Following the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. Kingsley should prevail if he can establish that the officers acted in an unreasonable manner—without regard to subjective intent. The evidence would have supported a finding for him under that theory, but the jury was told that it also had to find the officers had a proscribed intent. View "Kingsley v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Two weeks before her death, Julie Jensen gave a sealed envelope to her neighbors, stating that if anything happened to her, they should give the envelope to the police. It contained a handwritten letter, stating that her relationship with her husband had deteriorated and that “I ... fear for my early demise.” Julie made similarly statements in voicemails left with the police and to others. A search of the Jensens’ home computer yielded internet searches for suicide and poisoning, including a search for “ethylene glycol poisoning.” Ethylene glycol (antifreeze) was found in Julie’s system. The search also revealed that Jensen was having an affair. Jensen was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Experts disagreed about the cause of death. The trial court ruled that Julie’s letter was admissible. After the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, (2004), Jensen moved for reconsideration. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted “a broad forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.” On remand, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Jensen killed Julie, causing her absence from trial, and had forfeited his right to confrontation with respect to the letter. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief: the Wisconsin court’s determination reflected an unreasonable application of the harmless error standard. Rrroneous admission of Julie’s letter and statements to the police had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the guilty verdict. View "Jensen v. Clements" on Justia Law

Religious, not-for-profit organizations challenged the “contraceptive mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), arguing that the ACA’s accommodations for religious organizations impose a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion, and that the ACA and accompanying regulations are not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, in violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The district court entered a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating: It is the operation of federal law, not any actions that the plaintiffs must take, that causes the provisions of services that the plaintiffs find morally objectionable. The accommodation has the legal effect of removing from objectors any connection to the provision of contraceptive services. View "Grace Schools v. Burwell" on Justia Law

When she arrived at the Kankakee jail on suspicion of conspiring to commit bank fraud, plaintiff was almost eight months pregnant. She experienced pains 11 days later and was taken to a hospital, where she gave birth. Plaintiff claims that the child suffered serious birth defects because of oxygen deprivation attributable to a displacement of the placenta. She was returned to the jail several days after the birth but remained there for only four days before being transferred to another jail. Two months later, having been shifted among several jails, she pleaded guilty. She was sentenced to 50 months in prison. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 two years later, alleging that defendants failed to take a proper medical history when she was first placed in jail; failed to respond to several requests for medical assistance; and failed to react quickly when she went into labor The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies through the correctional system. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if plaintiff had been told upon her return from the hospital that she had only four days to file a grievance, that deadline was unreasonably short for a woman who had just given birth to a severely impaired child. She was effectively prevented from filing a grievance. View "White v. Bukowski" on Justia Law

In 1974, Kelley robbed a sandwich shop of $28, using a gun. He was also charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. Kelley claims to have struck a deal: he would plead guilty and upon successful completion of a seven-year federal sentence, his federal conviction would be expunged under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5021(b) (repealed 1984). Kelley claims that Indiana authorities agreed to “set aside” his robbery conviction. There is no evidence of such an agreement. Kelley was paroled; his federal conviction was set aside. He never served a state sentence. Within a year, he was charged with robbery and with murder in the course of another robbery and was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment for murder. Kelley became aware that the 1975 robbery was still on his record by 1983. Released in 2000, he was convicted in 2003 of felony check fraud, and, in 2005, of felony theft. In 2011, he was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and distribution of a controlled substance. The court enhanced the sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Kelley began attacks on the 1975 conviction, arguing that the state breached the terms of the plea agreement. Unsuccessful in Indiana courts, Kelley sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Indiana did not have an expungement statute until 2013. View "Kelley v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

In 1986, Packer, a Ph.D. in physiology, began work as a post-doctoral fellow at Indiana University’s School of Medicine. She was appointed to the tenure-track position of assistant professor in 1994. Packer’s 1999 application for tenure on the faculty was denied, but Packer successfully grieved the denial, and in 2001, was awarded tenure. Faculty members are evaluated based on teaching, research, and service. A faculty member’s overall performance is deemed satisfactory if she meets the minimum requirements in all three areas or if she is rated excellent in either teaching or research. The University represents that Packer, in the years leading up to her termination, repeatedly failed to meet expectations with respect to publication and external funding. Packer contends that her research performance is better than the University claims; that any deficiency was because the department chairman assigned her insufficient and inappropriate lab spaces and interfered with her efforts to obtain grant money; and that male faculty members whose research performance also fell short of expectations suffered no adverse consequences. In her suit, alleging sex discrimination, the University moved for summary judgment. Packer’s counsel did not properly support the elements of her claims with specific citations to admissible record evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University. View "Packer v. Trs .of Ind. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1996 Gladney was convicted in Wisconsin of murdering Wilson. Wilson died of gunshot wounds, following a struggle for a gun during an argument about money. At trial, Gladney did not dispute that he intentionally killed Wilson, but he argued unsuccessfully that he should not be found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide because he acted in “imperfect self-defense,” which, unlike perfect self-defense, does not serve as a complete defense to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide but instead mitigates that charge down to second-degree intentional homicide. Over a decade later, Gladney filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his due process rights were violated because subsequent state case law cast doubt on whether he was convicted under the correct imperfect self-defense standard and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to interview a witness who would have corroborated his self-defense theory. The court concluded that the petition was untimely, noting Gladney’s 2010 discovery that his lawyer failed to interview that witness and rejecting Gladney’s theory that the statute of limitations did not apply because he had demonstrated actual innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gladney’s federal petition was filed far too late and he did not demonstrate actual innocence. View "Gladney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

In 2012, Harden, a Caucasian, sued the Marion County Sheriff’s Department for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. He alleged that the Sheriff’s Department terminated him in retaliation for testifying on behalf of African-American police officers in a race discrimination investigation. The Department claimed that he was terminated for taking money from a detainee’s wallet. The district granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. Harden now appeals that decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the evidence of harassment after Harden’s testimony says something about the context in which the theft investigation was initiated, without more, it cannot support an inference that Harden’s termination was retaliatory. No reasonable jury could find that the Internal Affairs investigation into the theft was pretextual. View "Harden v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law