Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

While he was an inmate, the Pontiac Illinois prison refused to equip Plaintiff with gloves and a hat when he exercised in the prison yard in cold winter weather. His indoor cell was too small for the exercise he needed to prevent his back muscles from atrophying because of arthritis. The refusal was pursuant to a policy that the prison justified on the ground that offenders have placed feces inside gloves and hats and swung them at staff members or offenders from a distance, and have used them to hide dangerous contraband. Plaintiff in discovery requested incident reports to support the justification but was told that the database is searchable only by date of report, so the demand was too burdensome. The district judge agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it is difficult to believe that Pontiac prison has no searchable records of inmates’ assaults on guards and that the defendants should at least be required to present testimony documenting the use of gloves and hats as weapons, but that the suit fails for failure to allege indifference to his need for those items. The court noted that prison personnel had very limited knowledge of Plaintiff’s problem. View "Diaz v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Rowe was diagnosed with reflux esophagitis, (GERD), which may cause esophageal bleeding and can increase the risk of esophageal cancer. The prison physician told him to take Zantac pills. Rowe was permitted to keep Zantac in his cell and take pills when he felt the need, until his pills were confiscated and he was told that he would be allowed to take a Zantac only when a nurse gave it to him or buy it at the commissary. He complained that he needed to take Zantac with his meals. No reason was articulated for forbidding him to keep Zantac given him by prison staff while permitting him to keep Zantac that he bought at the commissary. Zantac is not a narcotic. Rowe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. After he filed suit, he ceased receiving Zantac because his authorization to receive over-the-counter Zantac free of charge lapsed. He was told to purchase the drug from the commissary if he wanted it. Rowe claims he could not afford to buy it. A doctor opined that his condition didn’t require Zantac. The doctor later relented. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, noting contradictory evidence and that the claim is “far from frivolous.” The court urged the court to consider appointing a neutral expert. View "Rowe v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Dunnet, a highway construction company, is prequalified to bid and work on Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) projects and competes for federally assisted highway construction contracts. Dunnet is owned and controlled by two white males. Between 2007 and 2009, its average annual gross receipts were over $52 million. To receive federal-aid funds for highway contracts, IDOT must have a “disadvantaged business enterprise” (DBE) participation program. A DBE is a for-profit small business concern that is at least 51% owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. There is a rebuttable presumption that women and members of racial minority groups are socially and economically disadvantaged, but an individual owner of any race or gender may qualify as “socially and economically disadvantaged.” A firm is not an eligible DBE if the firm (including affiliates) has had average annual gross receipts over its previous three fiscal years, greater than $22.41 million. Illinois has not met its DBE participation goals. Dunnet was denied a goal waiver and was not awarded a major expressway project. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting Dunnet’s claim that IDOT’s DBE Program discriminates on the basis of race, concluding that Dunnet lacked standing to raise an equal protection challenge based on race and that the Program survived the constitutional and other challenges. View "Dunnet Bay Constr. Co. v. Borggren" on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department participated in a reality television program, The Shift. The film crew followed homicide detectives investigating a deadly 2008 home invasion. Police eventually arrested Hart, in the final episode of the program’s first season. After Hart spent nearly two years in jail awaiting trial, the charges were dismissed. The Shift’s audience was not informed. Hart sued detectives and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was arrested without probable cause and that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her probable cause affidavit for his arrest. The court rejected all claims before trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but noted “many troubling aspects of IMPD’s investigation, and this case should warn police departments about having their detectives moonlight as television stars.” A reasonable trier of fact could not find that police lacked probable cause to arrest Hart. Nor could a reasonable jury find that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her affidavit. Four surviving witnesses from the home invasion separately identified Hart as one of the men who attacked them. None of the police had any reason to doubt these identifications when they arrested Hart. View "Hart v. Mannina" on Justia Law

In 1988, Kramer was convicted of conspiring to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846, and engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. 848(b). Based on a motion filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Kramer’s section 846 conviction was vacated in 1998. His section 848 convictionwas affirmed. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a section 846 charge could not be counted as one of the section 848 “continuing series” offenses, but held that any error in allowing the jury to consider the section 846 count was harmless, because Kramer had been charged with many additional drug offenses. In 2014, Kramer filed another motion under section 2255, challenging his CCE conviction. The district court dismissed Kramer’s petition, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Kramer’s claim. It characterized Kramer’s motion as successive and barred by section 2255’s prohibition of subsequent petitions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court’s 1999 holding in Richardson v. United States invalidated the very jury instruction that was employed in Kramer’s case. If Kramer were tried today, the jury would be required to unanimously agree on the three predicate felonies used to make up the “continuing series” of CCE violations, but the district court properly characterized the petition as successive. View "Kramer v. United States" on Justia Law

Wright retired after working 1982-2007 as a caseworker at the Peoria Field Office of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services after the Department ordered her to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation. The order was a response to an incident in which Wright’s comments to a child apparently caused an outbreak of violence at a unit in a psychiatric facility for children. Wright filed suit alleging, that the Department had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), by causing her constructive discharge. A jury found in favor of Wright on the ADA claim but awarded no compensatory damages. The district court granted the Department’s motion for a new trial. During the second trial, the court granted the department judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Wright had failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wright did not establish that the Department’s conduct communicated that her termination was imminent. View "Wright v. Ill. Dept. of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Based on his forcible rape of a 15-year-old, Rengifo was convicted of three counts of first-degree child sexual abuse while armed and one count of second-degree child sexual abuse while armed. After exhausting state remedies, he brought a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The district court denied the petition and did not address the matter of a certificate of appealability. Rengifo filed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. For purposes of habeas corpus relief, Rengifo’s petition must be deemed as seeking relief from a detention “aris[ing] out of process issued by a State court,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability is therefore required before he can pursue an appeal, but a certificate of appealability cannot be granted. Because the legislature defined the unit of punishment as each act of child sexual abuse, Rengifo did not suffer multiple punishments for the same crime, so his sentences did not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause and he raised no substantial constitutional question that could serve as a predicate for a certificate of appealability. View "Sanchez-Rengifo v. J. Caraway" on Justia Law

While working as an employee of a contractor at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Rebecca Riker engaged in a romantic relationship with inmate Vest. When the relationship became known, her employment ended. She later requested to be allowed to visit Vest. Prison officials denied those requests because the institution’s policy prohibits visitation by former employees. Riker and Vest later submitted an application to marry, which prison officials also denied, because Riker was not on the visitors list. Riker filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that prohibiting Riker from visiting Vest was reasonable and that this restriction did not unconstitutionally burden her right to marry. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that, based on the summary judgment record, the defendants failed to adequately justify refusal to permit the marriage. Acknowledging defendants’ arguments that a former employee who previously violated Department policies is more likely to engage in other prohibited acts and that a former employee might share with an inmate confidential information obtained while employed at the prison, the court stated that nothing in the record supported equating general visitation with a single marriage ceremony. View "Riker v. Lemmon" on Justia Law