Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010 Manuel was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 51 months in federal prison, with “credit for not less than all the time he has spent in federal custody” since May 24, 2010. That was the date on which, having been arrested earlier in the year by Michigan law enforcement for a parole violation, Manuel was ordered transferred from state to federal custody. After his Michigan parole was revoked, Manual was returned to that state’s custody, from which he was released on May 4, 2013, and transferred to a federal prison to serve his 51-month federal prison term. In calculating the date of his release from federal prison, the Bureau of Prisons had decided that Manuel was entitled to receive credit toward completion of his federal sentence for the five months from May 24 to October 27, 2010, that he had spent in federal custody. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his habeas petition, with his argument that he should have received credit for May 24, 2010 to May 4, 2013, the date of his release from Michigan’s custody. View "Manuel v. Terris" on Justia Law

Arroyo worked as a Volvo material handler, 2005-2011. Arroyo was a member of the U.S. Army Reserve. She deployed twice to Iraq and Kuwait: 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 and took leave for training and other military activities. She received more than 900 days of military leave from Volvo. There is evidence, including internal emails, suggesting that her supervisors were frustrated from the beginning about her absences. After her 2009-2010 deployment Arroyo declined a voluntary severance package and returned to work. Arroyo was diagnosed with PTSD. Arroyo took three months FMLA and disability leave. Volvo granted accommodations, including: a quiet place to meditate; a mentor; time off for counseling; and breaks and support during anxiety attacks. Other requested accommodations—a more flexible schedule, use of earplugs or headphones in both ears, day-to-day guidance, putting all communications in writing, and disability awareness training—were under review when she was terminated for violation of Volvo’s attendance policy. The district court rejected her claims for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to discrimination claims under USERRA and the ADA, stating that Arroyo raised genuine, material factual issues. View "Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

After serving a term in an Illinois state prison for a sex crime, the plaintiff was committed to a Treatment and Detention Facility, pursuant to the civil Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. He had a job in the Facility’s dietary services department. He alleged, in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that he was fired in retaliation for previous lawsuits against staff members. He claims disciplinary charges against him were “trumped-up.” The district judge conducted screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and dismissed the suit with prejudice because it “contained only conclusory allegations. … Plaintiff simply stated he had filed previous lawsuits and assumed people knew about it.” The judge had interviewed the plaintiff by telephone. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that it previously rejected ex parte telephonic interrogation as a method of screening complaints to determine whether they state a claim. It is permissible for the judge to interview a pro se detainee plaintiff to determine, not whether the plaintiff’s case is meritorious, but simply what that case is; the judge must ensure that a transcript or recording of the interview be made to allow appellate review. View "Henderson v. Wilcoxen" on Justia Law

An inmate of a Wisconsin state prison filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Schneider, a guard, had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him. The district court dismissed the complaint at “screening,” 28 U.S.C. 1915A, before any response by the defendants. The magistrate stated that “standing alone, verbal harassment of an inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation.” The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that attempting to draw a categorical distinction between verbal and physical harassment is arbitrary. The alleged pain sufficient to constitute cruel punishment may be physical or psychological. While most verbal harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment, some does. View "Beal v. Foster" on Justia Law

Smith filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Smith, as a pretrial detainee and Army veteran, was enrolled in a special program for veterans. Under that program, Smith worked in the jail laundry and could live in a special wing for veterans, apart from the general population. Smith claimed that he was paid only $3 a day, not the federal minimum wage; that he was subjected to inhumane conditions, required to stand in a “hot, smelly room” several hours each day; and that he had insufficient food, was subjected to rodents and insects, had no mirrors, lacked outdoor recreation, and had to drink filthy water. The court conducted preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1951A) and summarily dismissed Smith’s work- and wage-related claims, finding that Smith had no constitutional right to be paid for his jail job assignment, let alone minimum wage, and that his allegations were insufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court determined that Smith stated colorable conditions of confinement claims, but ultimately dismissed without prejudice, advising Smith of the deficiencies in his pleading and twice instructing him to file an amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed the ultimate dismissal (with prejudice) of the inadequate food and contaminated water claims and remanded, but otherwise affirmed. View "Smith v. Dart" on Justia Law

Boutros worked for Avis Rent A Car as a courtesy bus driver at O’Hare Airport. He had worked for Avis before a short stint in the military. After he was honorably discharged for unsatisfactory performance, Avis did not want to rehire him, but did so. One night in May 2008, Boutros informed his supervisor that the fire extinguisher on his bus inexplicably discharged, spraying fire retardant near the driver’s seat. He reported no injury at the time, but the next morning he claimed that chemicals from the discharge had harmed him. Avis launched an investigation and eventually fired Boutros for dishonesty and insubordination in connection with his shifting accounts of the fire-extinguisher accident. Boutros sued, claiming that Avis fired him because of his race and subjected him to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the appeal was frivolous and issuing an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules. View "Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Cook committed a home robbery in 2005 and was arrested nine days later in the apartment of a girlfriend, later his fiancée, Thede. Convicted in a Wisconsin state court of armed robbery, armed burglary, battery, theft of moveable property, mistreatment of an animal resulting in the animal’s (a dog’s) death, and false imprisonment, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Cook filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Marinette County (Wisconsin) Sheriff’s Department detectives arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and seeking $25,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages for the arrest and detention, seizure of personal property that he claims was worth $10,000, and infliction of emotional distress. Thede had testified in Cook’s criminal trial that she had admitted the officers to her apartment, but in the civil case she submitted an affidavit which states that when she had testified that she “let them in” she had meant that she “did not tell them to leave or did not object directly to them, but let them remain.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. At worst the entry was a harmless error because of the existence of a warrant. View "Cook v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Rahn, a white male who earned a PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU. His wife, Regina, was hired as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering for that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in the Department. Rahn applied. Despite her husband’s status as an applicant, Regina was a voting member of the search committee. She claims that one committee member stated that he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority candidates were available. After another applicant was hired, the Rahns alleged reverse discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 701 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and copyright infringement, based on use of teaching notes and slides. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That testimony did not support indicate that an evaluation metric was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A university employer may properly preference academic experience; Rahn did not present evidence that such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description of the position and the preferred qualifications. View "Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1995, Evans, then nine months pregnant, was fatally shot and stabbed in her Addison, Illinois apartment. The assailants cut open her womb and removed the unborn baby, Elijah. Debra had three older children— Samantha (10), Joshua (7), and Jordan (2). Samantha was killed. Elijah and Joshua were taken. Two-year-old Jordan was left behind, alive, with his dead mother and sister. The next day, police found Joshua’s lifeless body in an alley. Police arrested Debra’s former boyfriend, Ward, who was the father of Jordan and Elijah; Ward’s cousin, Williams; and her boyfriend, Caffey. Each was tried separately. Caffey received a sentence of death on the murder convictions and a consecutive 30-year term on the aggravated kidnapping conviction. In 2003, Illinois Governor Ryan commuted Caffey’s death sentence to life without parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Caffey’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the court improperly excluded hearsay statements made by Ward, Williams, and Iacullo (the owner of a typewriter used to prepare a false birth certificate for Elijah) and deprived Caffey of the ability to mount an effective defense; counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce statements by Iacullo and another that had been ruled admissible; and the court improperly admitted Joshua’s hearsay statements naming Caffey. View "Caffey v. Butler" on Justia Law

Dansberry shot and killed 18-year-old Bass during a 1997 attempted armed robbery. An eyewitness saw the crime and Dansberry admitted his culpability. Dansberry entered a “blind” plea of guilty. The court advised Dansberry about the rights he was giving up, the charges, and the range of possible sentences, stating that Dansberry faced a minimum of 20 years in prison up to 90 years, life imprisonment, or death. Dansberry said he understood. The court was incorrect. Dansberry faced a minimum prison term of 26 years, not 20 and a maximum term of 130 years, not 90. The court sentenced him to a total of 80 years. Dansberry later moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was involuntary and unknowing and counsel was constitutionally ineffective. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. The evidence showed that the state had pressed for the death penalty. Dansberry’s main concern, according to counsel, was avoiding execution. After losing his Illinois state-court appeal, Dansberry filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding “harmless error.” It is unlikely, and there was no evidence that Dansberry’s mistaken belief that his minimum sentence was 20 years had any effect on his decision to plead guilty View "Dansberry v. Pfister" on Justia Law