Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When she arrived at the Kankakee jail on suspicion of conspiring to commit bank fraud, plaintiff was almost eight months pregnant. She experienced pains 11 days later and was taken to a hospital, where she gave birth. Plaintiff claims that the child suffered serious birth defects because of oxygen deprivation attributable to a displacement of the placenta. She was returned to the jail several days after the birth but remained there for only four days before being transferred to another jail. Two months later, having been shifted among several jails, she pleaded guilty. She was sentenced to 50 months in prison. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 two years later, alleging that defendants failed to take a proper medical history when she was first placed in jail; failed to respond to several requests for medical assistance; and failed to react quickly when she went into labor The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies through the correctional system. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if plaintiff had been told upon her return from the hospital that she had only four days to file a grievance, that deadline was unreasonably short for a woman who had just given birth to a severely impaired child. She was effectively prevented from filing a grievance. View "White v. Bukowski" on Justia Law

In 1974, Kelley robbed a sandwich shop of $28, using a gun. He was also charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. Kelley claims to have struck a deal: he would plead guilty and upon successful completion of a seven-year federal sentence, his federal conviction would be expunged under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5021(b) (repealed 1984). Kelley claims that Indiana authorities agreed to “set aside” his robbery conviction. There is no evidence of such an agreement. Kelley was paroled; his federal conviction was set aside. He never served a state sentence. Within a year, he was charged with robbery and with murder in the course of another robbery and was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment for murder. Kelley became aware that the 1975 robbery was still on his record by 1983. Released in 2000, he was convicted in 2003 of felony check fraud, and, in 2005, of felony theft. In 2011, he was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and distribution of a controlled substance. The court enhanced the sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Kelley began attacks on the 1975 conviction, arguing that the state breached the terms of the plea agreement. Unsuccessful in Indiana courts, Kelley sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Indiana did not have an expungement statute until 2013. View "Kelley v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

In 1986, Packer, a Ph.D. in physiology, began work as a post-doctoral fellow at Indiana University’s School of Medicine. She was appointed to the tenure-track position of assistant professor in 1994. Packer’s 1999 application for tenure on the faculty was denied, but Packer successfully grieved the denial, and in 2001, was awarded tenure. Faculty members are evaluated based on teaching, research, and service. A faculty member’s overall performance is deemed satisfactory if she meets the minimum requirements in all three areas or if she is rated excellent in either teaching or research. The University represents that Packer, in the years leading up to her termination, repeatedly failed to meet expectations with respect to publication and external funding. Packer contends that her research performance is better than the University claims; that any deficiency was because the department chairman assigned her insufficient and inappropriate lab spaces and interfered with her efforts to obtain grant money; and that male faculty members whose research performance also fell short of expectations suffered no adverse consequences. In her suit, alleging sex discrimination, the University moved for summary judgment. Packer’s counsel did not properly support the elements of her claims with specific citations to admissible record evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University. View "Packer v. Trs .of Ind. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1996 Gladney was convicted in Wisconsin of murdering Wilson. Wilson died of gunshot wounds, following a struggle for a gun during an argument about money. At trial, Gladney did not dispute that he intentionally killed Wilson, but he argued unsuccessfully that he should not be found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide because he acted in “imperfect self-defense,” which, unlike perfect self-defense, does not serve as a complete defense to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide but instead mitigates that charge down to second-degree intentional homicide. Over a decade later, Gladney filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his due process rights were violated because subsequent state case law cast doubt on whether he was convicted under the correct imperfect self-defense standard and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to interview a witness who would have corroborated his self-defense theory. The court concluded that the petition was untimely, noting Gladney’s 2010 discovery that his lawyer failed to interview that witness and rejecting Gladney’s theory that the statute of limitations did not apply because he had demonstrated actual innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gladney’s federal petition was filed far too late and he did not demonstrate actual innocence. View "Gladney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

In 2012, Harden, a Caucasian, sued the Marion County Sheriff’s Department for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. He alleged that the Sheriff’s Department terminated him in retaliation for testifying on behalf of African-American police officers in a race discrimination investigation. The Department claimed that he was terminated for taking money from a detainee’s wallet. The district granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. Harden now appeals that decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the evidence of harassment after Harden’s testimony says something about the context in which the theft investigation was initiated, without more, it cannot support an inference that Harden’s termination was retaliatory. No reasonable jury could find that the Internal Affairs investigation into the theft was pretextual. View "Harden v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

In 2008 Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. His presentence investigation report classified him as a career offender based on two convictions for assault. Despite the fact that his convictions were for “intentional, knowing, or reckless” assault, counsel did not object. The court sentenced Ramirez as a career offender, treating the Texas convictions as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Ramirez retained new counsel and moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the career-offender designation. The judge denied the motion and, because postconviction counsel failed to keep Ramirez informed about the postconviction proceedings, Ramirez did not timely request a certificate of appealability. He tried filing a late request, but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He moved under FRCP 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment. The district judge denied the motion, on the belief that there is a rigid rule under which there is no right to counsel on collateral review. The Seventh Circuit remanded. noting that the Supreme Court significantly changed its approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at initial review collateral proceedings in 2011 and 2013, so that Ramirez’s argument is cognizable under Rule 60(b), View "Ramirez v. United States" on Justia Law

Stinson spent 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. He was exonerated by DNA evidence and sued the lead detective and two forensic odontologists who investigated the murder and testified at trial. The odontologists were the key prosecution witnesses. They testified that bite marks on the victim’s body matched Stinson’s dentition. In his suit for damages, 42 U.S.C. 1983, Stinson alleged that the odontologists fabricated their opinions, the detective put them up to it, and the three suppressed evidence of the fabrication, in violation of his right to due process. The district court denied the defendants’ claim of absolute or qualified immunity from suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While absolute immunity does not apply because Stinson sued the defendants primarily for their investigative misconduct, not their testimony at trial, the defendants remain protected by qualified immunity, which is lost only if Stinson presents evidence showing that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. He did not do so. Stinson’s evidence, accepted as true, shows at most that the odontologists were negligent; it does not support his claim that they fabricated their opinions. An error in forensic analysis—even a glaring error—is not actionable as a violation of due process. View "Stinson v. Gauger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at Stateville prison in Illinois, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the prison’s medical staff was deliberately indifferent to the results of 11 blood tests, administered over a period of more than five years, that indicated that he was either diabetic or prediabetic, or had progressed from prediabetic to diabetic during the period. He alleges that not until the last of these tests, late in 2010, did he learn that his blood glucose counts were dangerously high The district court dismissed the suit as time-barred. We need to distinguish between two types of glucose blood test—fasting and random. The Seventh Circuit reversed. For the medical staff of a prison to know that an inmate is diabetic or prediabetic, yet not tell him, let alone do nothing to treat his condition, is to be deliberately indifferent. The defendant now knows that he was diabetic or prediabetic in 2007, but plaintiff may not have known of the cause of his distressing symptoms until November 2010, and the two-year statute of limitations would have been tolled during the interval between that discovery and his filing suit because he was exhausting prison administrative remedies. View "Nally v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

D. Stahl claimed she was the victim of vicious, physical bullying by fellow East Porter students. D. complained to school officials. Apart from witnessing the counselor talk to one alleged bully and seeing the principal call another to her office, D. does not know if officials took any action. D. alleges that some teachers and coaches participated or were complicit in the bullying. Eighth Grade girls, preparing to play basketball, taunted D. D’s mother, Debbie came to the school and yelled at the alleged bullies. D.’s father, George, arrived and confronted the principal. Leaving the gym, George and his father confronted alleged bullies. The girls yelled that the men had attacked them. The principal called the police, who did not issue a citation. Superintendent Gardin stated that Debbie and George were banned from East Porter property until they met with him. The Stahls never arranged a meeting. D voluntarily did not return. The Stahls contacted a neighboring school district. George testified that he was advised that the school had “open enrollment." George told the principal about the ban. That evening, the principal informed them that D. would not be permitted to enroll.The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the Stahls’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no genuine issue of material fact under the state-created danger standard. D. did not identify any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently with regard to her attempt to transfer schools. View "D. S. v. East Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp" on Justia Law

Preddie worked as a fifth-grade teacher in the Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation during the 2010–2011 school year. After Preddie was absent 23 times, the BCSC did not renew his contract. Preddie, an African-American, is diabetic, and his son suffers from sickle cell anemia. Preddie filed suit, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and 1991. The case district court granted summary judgment in favor of the BCSC on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except as to Preddie’s FMLA claims. Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law