Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boutros worked for Avis Rent A Car as a courtesy bus driver at O’Hare Airport. He had worked for Avis before a short stint in the military. After he was honorably discharged for unsatisfactory performance, Avis did not want to rehire him, but did so. One night in May 2008, Boutros informed his supervisor that the fire extinguisher on his bus inexplicably discharged, spraying fire retardant near the driver’s seat. He reported no injury at the time, but the next morning he claimed that chemicals from the discharge had harmed him. Avis launched an investigation and eventually fired Boutros for dishonesty and insubordination in connection with his shifting accounts of the fire-extinguisher accident. Boutros sued, claiming that Avis fired him because of his race and subjected him to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the appeal was frivolous and issuing an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules. View "Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Cook committed a home robbery in 2005 and was arrested nine days later in the apartment of a girlfriend, later his fiancée, Thede. Convicted in a Wisconsin state court of armed robbery, armed burglary, battery, theft of moveable property, mistreatment of an animal resulting in the animal’s (a dog’s) death, and false imprisonment, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Cook filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Marinette County (Wisconsin) Sheriff’s Department detectives arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and seeking $25,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages for the arrest and detention, seizure of personal property that he claims was worth $10,000, and infliction of emotional distress. Thede had testified in Cook’s criminal trial that she had admitted the officers to her apartment, but in the civil case she submitted an affidavit which states that when she had testified that she “let them in” she had meant that she “did not tell them to leave or did not object directly to them, but let them remain.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. At worst the entry was a harmless error because of the existence of a warrant. View "Cook v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Rahn, a white male who earned a PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU. His wife, Regina, was hired as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering for that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in the Department. Rahn applied. Despite her husband’s status as an applicant, Regina was a voting member of the search committee. She claims that one committee member stated that he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority candidates were available. After another applicant was hired, the Rahns alleged reverse discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 701 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and copyright infringement, based on use of teaching notes and slides. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That testimony did not support indicate that an evaluation metric was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A university employer may properly preference academic experience; Rahn did not present evidence that such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description of the position and the preferred qualifications. View "Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1995, Evans, then nine months pregnant, was fatally shot and stabbed in her Addison, Illinois apartment. The assailants cut open her womb and removed the unborn baby, Elijah. Debra had three older children— Samantha (10), Joshua (7), and Jordan (2). Samantha was killed. Elijah and Joshua were taken. Two-year-old Jordan was left behind, alive, with his dead mother and sister. The next day, police found Joshua’s lifeless body in an alley. Police arrested Debra’s former boyfriend, Ward, who was the father of Jordan and Elijah; Ward’s cousin, Williams; and her boyfriend, Caffey. Each was tried separately. Caffey received a sentence of death on the murder convictions and a consecutive 30-year term on the aggravated kidnapping conviction. In 2003, Illinois Governor Ryan commuted Caffey’s death sentence to life without parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Caffey’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the court improperly excluded hearsay statements made by Ward, Williams, and Iacullo (the owner of a typewriter used to prepare a false birth certificate for Elijah) and deprived Caffey of the ability to mount an effective defense; counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce statements by Iacullo and another that had been ruled admissible; and the court improperly admitted Joshua’s hearsay statements naming Caffey. View "Caffey v. Butler" on Justia Law

Dansberry shot and killed 18-year-old Bass during a 1997 attempted armed robbery. An eyewitness saw the crime and Dansberry admitted his culpability. Dansberry entered a “blind” plea of guilty. The court advised Dansberry about the rights he was giving up, the charges, and the range of possible sentences, stating that Dansberry faced a minimum of 20 years in prison up to 90 years, life imprisonment, or death. Dansberry said he understood. The court was incorrect. Dansberry faced a minimum prison term of 26 years, not 20 and a maximum term of 130 years, not 90. The court sentenced him to a total of 80 years. Dansberry later moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was involuntary and unknowing and counsel was constitutionally ineffective. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. The evidence showed that the state had pressed for the death penalty. Dansberry’s main concern, according to counsel, was avoiding execution. After losing his Illinois state-court appeal, Dansberry filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding “harmless error.” It is unlikely, and there was no evidence that Dansberry’s mistaken belief that his minimum sentence was 20 years had any effect on his decision to plead guilty View "Dansberry v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Brown, convicted of raping adult women and diagnosed with paraphilia (specifically, sexual attraction to non-consenting women) and personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits, was civilly committed to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center under Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Brown and 17 others sued the facility’s officials and clinical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that policies restricting their access to movies, video games, and video game consoles violate the First Amendment. Rushville prohibited its residents from watching all R-rated movies and playing M-rated video games (may “contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content and/or strong language”). The policy was later changed to prohibit 353 specific movies and 232 specific games. Rushville subsequently discovered that two residents were using a video game console to access the internet to view forbidden material and banned residents from possessing video game consoles capable of accessing the internet. Brown contended that the new restrictions were retaliation against him for suing. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, finding that the record did not contain a sufficient basis to conclude that the ban on movies and video games is reasonably related to the state’s interests in security and rehabilitation, View "Brown v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Bisluk, a conservative who votes Republican, was a special agent working in Chicago for the Illinois Department of Revenue’s Liquor Control Commission under former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s Democratic administration. She purchased a home in southern Illinois and asked her employer about transferring duty assignments from Chicago to southern Illinois, but failed to submit a transfer request or apply for the job. She did not get a position. She sued several state officials alleging that she was denied a transfer to southern Illinois because of her political association, in violation of the First Amendment and because of her gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The undisputed evidence showed that Bisluk did not receive the transfer because she did not submit the proper transfer paperwork or apply for the job. View "Bisluk v. Hamer" on Justia Law

A deputy noticed paper covering the light above the bed of pretrial detainee Kingsley and ordered him to remove it. Kingsley refused and ignored several subsequent requests. The administrator decided that jail staff would remove the paper and would transfer Kingsley to another cell in the interim. Five officers arrived and ordered Kingsley to back up to the door with his hands behind his back. After being warned to follow the order or be tasered, Kingsley continued to lie face-down on his bunk. The parties dispute what followed, but an officer applied a taser for five seconds. Kingsley was placed on a medical watch, but refused the attention of a nurse. Kingsley, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted defendants partial summary judgment; a claim of excessive force proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Following the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. Kingsley should prevail if he can establish that the officers acted in an unreasonable manner—without regard to subjective intent. The evidence would have supported a finding for him under that theory, but the jury was told that it also had to find the officers had a proscribed intent. View "Kingsley v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Two weeks before her death, Julie Jensen gave a sealed envelope to her neighbors, stating that if anything happened to her, they should give the envelope to the police. It contained a handwritten letter, stating that her relationship with her husband had deteriorated and that “I ... fear for my early demise.” Julie made similarly statements in voicemails left with the police and to others. A search of the Jensens’ home computer yielded internet searches for suicide and poisoning, including a search for “ethylene glycol poisoning.” Ethylene glycol (antifreeze) was found in Julie’s system. The search also revealed that Jensen was having an affair. Jensen was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Experts disagreed about the cause of death. The trial court ruled that Julie’s letter was admissible. After the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, (2004), Jensen moved for reconsideration. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted “a broad forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.” On remand, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Jensen killed Julie, causing her absence from trial, and had forfeited his right to confrontation with respect to the letter. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief: the Wisconsin court’s determination reflected an unreasonable application of the harmless error standard. Rrroneous admission of Julie’s letter and statements to the police had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the guilty verdict. View "Jensen v. Clements" on Justia Law

Religious, not-for-profit organizations challenged the “contraceptive mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), arguing that the ACA’s accommodations for religious organizations impose a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion, and that the ACA and accompanying regulations are not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, in violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The district court entered a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating: It is the operation of federal law, not any actions that the plaintiffs must take, that causes the provisions of services that the plaintiffs find morally objectionable. The accommodation has the legal effect of removing from objectors any connection to the provision of contraceptive services. View "Grace Schools v. Burwell" on Justia Law