Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Martinez, Vallejo, and 47 others were indicted for crimes committed while they were members of the Milwaukee chapter of the Latin Kings gang organization. Martinez and Vallejo pled guilty to a RICO offense, 18 U.S.C. 1962, and admitted to engaging in predicate racketeering activities, including a 2003 murder. Vallejo, who was 17 years old at the time, and Martinez, who was 16, each fired several shots at the victim. Martinez also pled guilty to attempted murder of a rival gang member; Vallejo’s plea agreement included two attempted murders. All of the attempted murders occurred while the defendants were under the age of 18. In both cases, the court imposed the “maximum sentence”—life in prison.. Neither Martinez nor Vallejo filed a direct appeal. In 2012, the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juveniles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of their motion to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Martinez and Vallejo’s life sentences were imposed after an individualized sentencing, and not by statutory mandate,and did not violate Miller. View "Vallejo v. United States" on Justia Law

Woods told a coworker at the Berwyn Fire Department that “he wanted to kill somebody, all of them” and that his children were going to “go over there” and “tune them up,” referring to his coworkers and superiors. Chief O’Halloran looked into the statements and eventually recommended termination. A three-member panel for the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducted a hearing. Woods was represented by counsel, who gave opening and closing statements, put on witnesses, cross-examined others, made and won objections, and presented exhibits. After the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Woods based largely on the testimony of the co-worker to whom Woods made the statement. Woods filed suit asserting discrimination and unlawful retaliation and attempted to proceed under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, which applies in employment discrimination cases when a biased subordinate (O’Halloran) who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision-maker (the Board) as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Woods’s claims, noting the full and independent evidentiary hearing and the Board’s almost complete reliance on the co-worker’s testimony. View "Woods v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law

The Centralia state-operated developmental center, one of seven Illinois SODCs, houses approximately 200 severely disabled individuals, some having the mentality of an infant or toddler. Many also have serious aggressive, or self-destructive behavioral disorders. The seven SODCs have, in total, about 1800 residents, while about 10,000 people with severe developmental disabilities live in community-based facilities: houses or apartments in residential settings that accommodate one to eight residents. The state agency provides services (such as housing and medical care) to approximately 25,000 developmentally disabled persons. Another 23,000 or so are on a waiting list; 6000 are considered to be in emergency situations. Since 2012 Illinois has been trying to shift SODC residents to community-based facilities, in accordance with a national trend: community-based facilities are cheaper than SODCs and there is evidence that even persons who are severely disabled mentally or behaviorally or both do better in community-based facilities. A suit, on behalf of the Centralia SODC residents, alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a preliminary injunction to prevent assessment and transfer of those residents, reasoning that the urgency required for emergency relief had not been shown. View "Ill. League of Advocates for Developmentally Disabled v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Burton had been treated for back pain, anxiety, acid reflux, herpes simplex, hyperlipidemia, and depression. In addition to other medications, he was intermittently prescribed an opioid pain medication similar to Vicodin. Burton was diagnosed with avascular necrosis, a loss of blood circulation that causes bone death, and one week before his detention, had core decompression surgery. The detention center confiscated all of his medications. He received medications prescribed by a physicians’ assistant at the detention center and saw medical staff 26 times during 18 months of pretrial detention. Burton told a judge that he was not receiving the medications that he had been prescribed before he was detained and that he was experiencing severe pain. The judge ordered that the sheriff provide an extra mattress and furnish Burton with all medicines prescribed for him. The jail did not comply. Burton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment, rejecting a defense of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that no reasonable jury could find that Burton was deprived of essential medical care or that staff was deliberately indifferent to his serious needs. View "Burton v. Downey" on Justia Law

Officer Stirmell followed a speeding pickup truck and activated his sirens. The driver, Greg, ignored the sirens and continued driving. Stirmell radioed for assistance. Greg drove to his father’s house, ran from his truck, and jumped the fence into his father’s backyard. Stirmell ceased pursuit and began searching Greg’s truck. Springfield Officers Brown, Warnisher, and others arrived and searched the backyard. The officers knew Greg had refused to stop, but were also under the mistaken impression that Greg had an outstanding arrest warrant. Greg’s father, Dawson, went out and, at an officer’s request, called Greg’s cell phone to locate him. Greg did not answer. Dawson remained outside and answered the officers’ questions. He stated that he was 72 years old, and that his son had no involvement in drug dealing. Greg re-appeared, running toward the side door of Dawson’s house. Dawson claims that while the officers were attempting to subdue Greg, Warnisher kicked Dawson and Brown tackled Dawson from behind. The officers dispute his version of events. Dawson was handcuffed and arrested for resisting arrest and obstruction, but was never formally charged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Dawson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, finding that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances. View "Dawson v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010 Manuel was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 51 months in federal prison, with “credit for not less than all the time he has spent in federal custody” since May 24, 2010. That was the date on which, having been arrested earlier in the year by Michigan law enforcement for a parole violation, Manuel was ordered transferred from state to federal custody. After his Michigan parole was revoked, Manual was returned to that state’s custody, from which he was released on May 4, 2013, and transferred to a federal prison to serve his 51-month federal prison term. In calculating the date of his release from federal prison, the Bureau of Prisons had decided that Manuel was entitled to receive credit toward completion of his federal sentence for the five months from May 24 to October 27, 2010, that he had spent in federal custody. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his habeas petition, with his argument that he should have received credit for May 24, 2010 to May 4, 2013, the date of his release from Michigan’s custody. View "Manuel v. Terris" on Justia Law

Arroyo worked as a Volvo material handler, 2005-2011. Arroyo was a member of the U.S. Army Reserve. She deployed twice to Iraq and Kuwait: 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 and took leave for training and other military activities. She received more than 900 days of military leave from Volvo. There is evidence, including internal emails, suggesting that her supervisors were frustrated from the beginning about her absences. After her 2009-2010 deployment Arroyo declined a voluntary severance package and returned to work. Arroyo was diagnosed with PTSD. Arroyo took three months FMLA and disability leave. Volvo granted accommodations, including: a quiet place to meditate; a mentor; time off for counseling; and breaks and support during anxiety attacks. Other requested accommodations—a more flexible schedule, use of earplugs or headphones in both ears, day-to-day guidance, putting all communications in writing, and disability awareness training—were under review when she was terminated for violation of Volvo’s attendance policy. The district court rejected her claims for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to discrimination claims under USERRA and the ADA, stating that Arroyo raised genuine, material factual issues. View "Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

After serving a term in an Illinois state prison for a sex crime, the plaintiff was committed to a Treatment and Detention Facility, pursuant to the civil Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. He had a job in the Facility’s dietary services department. He alleged, in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that he was fired in retaliation for previous lawsuits against staff members. He claims disciplinary charges against him were “trumped-up.” The district judge conducted screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and dismissed the suit with prejudice because it “contained only conclusory allegations. … Plaintiff simply stated he had filed previous lawsuits and assumed people knew about it.” The judge had interviewed the plaintiff by telephone. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that it previously rejected ex parte telephonic interrogation as a method of screening complaints to determine whether they state a claim. It is permissible for the judge to interview a pro se detainee plaintiff to determine, not whether the plaintiff’s case is meritorious, but simply what that case is; the judge must ensure that a transcript or recording of the interview be made to allow appellate review. View "Henderson v. Wilcoxen" on Justia Law

An inmate of a Wisconsin state prison filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Schneider, a guard, had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him. The district court dismissed the complaint at “screening,” 28 U.S.C. 1915A, before any response by the defendants. The magistrate stated that “standing alone, verbal harassment of an inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation.” The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that attempting to draw a categorical distinction between verbal and physical harassment is arbitrary. The alleged pain sufficient to constitute cruel punishment may be physical or psychological. While most verbal harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment, some does. View "Beal v. Foster" on Justia Law

Smith filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Smith, as a pretrial detainee and Army veteran, was enrolled in a special program for veterans. Under that program, Smith worked in the jail laundry and could live in a special wing for veterans, apart from the general population. Smith claimed that he was paid only $3 a day, not the federal minimum wage; that he was subjected to inhumane conditions, required to stand in a “hot, smelly room” several hours each day; and that he had insufficient food, was subjected to rodents and insects, had no mirrors, lacked outdoor recreation, and had to drink filthy water. The court conducted preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1951A) and summarily dismissed Smith’s work- and wage-related claims, finding that Smith had no constitutional right to be paid for his jail job assignment, let alone minimum wage, and that his allegations were insufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court determined that Smith stated colorable conditions of confinement claims, but ultimately dismissed without prejudice, advising Smith of the deficiencies in his pleading and twice instructing him to file an amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed the ultimate dismissal (with prejudice) of the inadequate food and contaminated water claims and remanded, but otherwise affirmed. View "Smith v. Dart" on Justia Law