Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Singmuongthong describes himself as a tan-colored, Asian man of Laotian national origin. He worked as a correctional officer at Sheridan from 1998-2013, when he became a lieutenant at Sheridan. In 2016, he was promoted and became assistant warden of operations at a new facility, Kewanee. Singmuongthong received a five percent increase in his salary. Kewanee’s warden, Williams, was investigated in 2018 for inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature with subordinate staff and was terminated. That investigation also concluded that Singmuongthong had difficulty making good administrative decisions, had failed to report inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature, and spent too much time at bars with subordinate staff. Singmuongthong informed the regional deputy chief, Funk, that he was interested in the warden position. He was not chosen for the position because of his relationship with Williams and concerns about his judgment. Following a subsequent investigation of a separate allegation of sexual harassment, Singmuongthong was terminated from employment.Singmuongthong alleged discrimination based on his race, color, and national origin, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Singmuongthong appealed only his pay disparity and failure to promote claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. View "Singmuongthong v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Nichols, charged with sex trafficking, faced a life sentence. Two attorneys with extensive experience were appointed as defense counsel. Months later, Nichols filed a pro se motion, challenging their representation. The judge warned Nichols about the perils of self-representation and stated: I am not giving you another lawyer. After an extended conversation, the attorneys were appointed standby counsel. Nichols objected, stating: “Courts are forcing me to go pro se.” At Nichols's request, the court ordered a competency evaluation. Dr. Goldstein spent 14 hours with Nichols and found Nichols competent to stand trial and to proceed pro se, indicating that his disorders are behavioral, not mental. Nichols twice refused to appear. The court repeatedly reviewed why Nichols should not represent himself but held that Nichols had constructively waived the right to counsel. A second expert, Dr. Fields, was unable to complete any test because of Nichols’s obstreperous behavior and relied on an interview with Nichols to conclude that Nichols’s competency was “not diminished by a severe emotional disorder.” It was Fields’s “clinical sense” that Nichols’s “lack of willingness to work” with counsel rendered him incompetent. At a competency hearing, the government introduced recorded jail calls in which Nichols indicated that he was delaying the proceedings. The court found Nichols competent. Nichols stated, “I’m not working with anybody.”Nichols was convicted and accepted the assistance of counsel before sentencing. A third competency evaluation concluded that Nichols was competent. The court imposed a within-Guidelines life sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: “District courts are not permitted to foist counsel upon competent defendants.” View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

The Kailins called the Gurnee Police Department to report that their daughter had been the victim of possible criminal conduct. Officer Greer arrived at their house around 8 p.m. to follow up. Six seconds after Kailin opened the door, Greer shot the Kailins’ dog, Timber, on their neighbor’s lawn. The Kailins sued, asserting illegal seizure, 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Officer Greer, a “Monell” claim of municipal liability, and a claim for indemnification by the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court noted the Kailins’ assertions, “that Timber never barked nor growled at Greer” and that Timber was "simply playing” but concluded that the video from the body-worn camera controlled and eliminated any dispute of fact.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The question of what Timber was doing and how she was behaving is key to determining the reasonableness of Greer’s actions and therefore to liability on all claims. This is not the rare case where the video definitively demonstrates what occurred. There is no audio to reveal whether Timber was growling or barking as Greer alleged. The entire video lasts only six seconds; it is disputable whether the dog can be seen at any time in the video until she has been shot. View "Kailin v. Village of Gurnee" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Sherwood and Doyle lost their jobs because of the COVID-19 pandemic and applied for unemployment benefits. They never received those benefits, however, and still have not received notice of the denial of their claims or an opportunity for a hearing. Sherwood and Doyle filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES), asserting equal protection and procedural due process claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Under the “Young doctrine,” which provides an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, private parties may sue individual state officials for prospective relief to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law. Even if these plaintiffs had standing to bring the equal protection claims, sovereign immunity bars them; the Young exception does not apply when federal law has been violated only at one time or over a period of time in the past. The plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury to pursue their procedural due process claims and can invoke the Young exception to sovereign immunity but mandamus provides an adequate state-law remedy in this case. View "Sherwood v. Marchiori" on Justia Law

Whitfield was scheduled for discharge from Menard Correctional Center in January 2010, to begin a term of mandatory supervised release. On that day, prison officials handed Whitfield only the signature page of a document called the “Electronic Detention Program Agreement.” That page stated that “the following conditions of the Program apply only to sex offender cases.” Whitfield was not a sex offender and objected to signing the Agreement without an explanation from a prison official clarifying why he, a non-sex offender, had to sign a form designed exclusively for sex offenders. Whitfield’s objections were rejected. Four times, clinical services supervisor Spiller directed Whitfield to sign the form. After his continued refusal, she issued a disciplinary ticket for failure to follow a direct order. Whitfield was transferred to disciplinary segregation; the Illinois Prisoner Review Board held a hearing and found he had violated the terms of his supervised release. His eligibility for supervised release was revoked. Whitfield remained in custody for another 18 months.Whitfield sued Spiller, other Menard officials, and Board members, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The case has narrowed to Whitfield’s claims against Spiller and then-warden Gaetz for First and Eighth Amendment violations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly granted the defendants summary judgment on some claims, but that Whitfield has sufficient evidence that Spiller’s conduct violated his First Amendment rights. View "Whitfield v. Cowan" on Justia Law

Prude, serving an 80-year sentence, helped a friend and fellow inmate file a successful civil rights lawsuit against their Wisconsin prison. According to Prude, his friend, grateful for the help, sent him $10,000 of his $40,000 damages award to help Prude retain an attorney for his own appeal. The prison’s Security Director, Meli, characterized the check as the product of an illegal business arrangement, seized the funds as contraband, and launched an investigation, after which he charged Prude with violations of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, including lying, unauthorized use of the mail, threats, and enterprises and fraud. Prude had a disciplinary hearing and was found guilty; the $10,000 was permanently seized. Although Meli was an investigating officer who should have recused himself from the hearing process, Prude claims he controlled the hearing and directed the actions of the hearing officer, Westra, to ensure a finding of guilt and to prevent Prude from ever getting his money.“Despite statements from Meli and Westra before and during the hearing suggesting a predetermined outcome,” the district court dismissed Prude's claims against Westra at the screening stage and later granted Meli summary judgment on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the evidence in the record plausibly supports a due process violation. View "Prude v. Meli" on Justia Law

In 2017, Elion pleaded guilty to three counts of distributing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The Probation Office classified him as a career offender, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), 4B1.2(b), yielding a heightened Guidelines range, 151–188 months, rather than 70-87 months. Elion’s attorney did not challenge the enhancement. Elion appealed his 167-month sentence, but his attorney moved to withdraw. Elion voluntarily dismissed his appeals. Months later, Elion filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Elion argued that had trial counsel objected to the career offender designation, he would have received a lower Guidelines range and a much-reduced sentence. Elion’s prior convictions were a 1999 Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of a look-alike substance within 1,000 feet of public housing property, a 2000 Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of a look-alike substance, and a 2006 federal conviction for distribution of a cocaine base.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Elion’s motion. The Illinois look-alike statute punishes conduct more broadly than the Guidelines controlled substance offense, and it is indivisible. Elion should not have been sentenced as a career offender. The district court must examine whether his attorney’s performance was deficient under the Strickland standard. View "Elion v. United States" on Justia Law

Kinney worked as the hospital's director of imaging services. Her employer approved her 2018 request for intermittent medical leave due to anxiety. Kinney began working remotely in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. When safety protocols were developed, her coworkers returned to work in person. Kinney kept working remotely without asking permission. She asserts that she could not wear a mask in compliance with the hospital’s COVID-19 protocol because face coverings exacerbate her anxiety. When her absences led to complaints, hospital management told Kinney that she had to work on-site several days each week. Management denied her request for accommodations.Kinney resigned and sued the under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (alleging a hostile workplace, discrimination based on her sex in failing to select her for promotions, and constructive discharge), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 (retaliation). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the hospital. No reasonable juror could find that Kinney could perform certain essential functions of her job without being present in the department that she oversaw; Kinney was not a qualified individual for the job under the ADA and her accommodation request was not reasonable. Her resignation was not a constructive discharge. Kinney did not raise a genuine factual issue as to whether she was similarly or better qualified for the position than the chosen male candidate. View "Kinney v. St. Mary's Health, Inc." on Justia Law

The Bail Project, a nonprofit organization, advocates for the abolition of cash bail and pays cash bail for thousands of individuals across the country to show that conditioning a pretrial defendant’s release upon the payment of money is not necessary to secure appearances at future court dates. Indiana House Enrolled Act 1300 requires charitable bail organizations to register with the state and limits for whom such organizations can pay cash bail.The Project sought to enjoin Indiana’s Department of Insurance from enforcing the law, arguing that HEA 1300 (which had not yet gone into effect) would violate its First Amendment right to free speech and its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The district court held that The Project had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The payment of cash bail is not protected by the First Amendment. Although The Project pays bail with the intent to communicate its message and to further its advocacy, a reasonable observer would not understand the conduct itself as communicating any message without additional explanatory speech. HEA 1300 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is rationally related to Indiana’s legitimate interest in regulating the pretrial detention of criminal defendants. View "The Bail Project, Inc. v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Insurance" on Justia Law

Bureau Chief Korza received a complaint regarding Snowden’s handling of a claim. Korza found discrepancies in Snowden’s records. Korza and a division administrator met with Snowden and her union representative and gave Snowden copies of the records. Korza continued his review and found many additional problems. Korza consulted with the Department’s Labor Relations office. Korza lacked the authority to discharge anyone and was advised that discharge was an appropriate penalty for the falsification of records. Korza summarized his findings for the director of the Division and recommended termination. At a later pre-disciplinary meeting, Snowden and her union representative were given a statement of charges. Korza stated that the discipline was undetermined because Snowden had not had an opportunity to respond, but that the charged violations were subject to discipline including discharge. Snowden’s written rebuttal did not contest the factual basis for the charges but noted arguable shortcomings in the investigation. At a final meeting, Korza advised Snowden that she was being placed on suspension pending discharge. Director Hoffman later signed a form terminating Snowden. Snowden pursued a grievance, which resulted in Snowden being allowed to resign without reinstatement rights.Snowden filed suit, asserting due process violations, claiming that Korza had decided to discharge her before the pre-disciplinary meeting and was not the impartial decision-maker. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit. Korza was not the decision-maker. Snowden was given notice and the opportunity to respond before that decision was made, plus a post-discharge grievance process. View "Snowden v. Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law