Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Gray and another went to Jones’s home to buy marijuana. Avant, was present and saw the three retire to the rear of the house. The third man returned and robbed Avant.Gray ran past carrying a bag, firing into the rear of the house. Jones died from gunshot wounds. Gray’s convictions were overturned on state post-conviction review. In 2007, Gray was again convicted of felony murder, murder, robbery, attempted murder, and carrying a handgun without a license. During the retrial, the prosecution used four peremptory challenges on black jurors. The prosecution’s case hinged on testimony from Avant and White; both maintained that Gray confessed while they shared a cell. Avant initially asserted that he was not present for the robbery. He struggled to identify the assailants. White was trying to get a lighter sentence. Defense counsel introduced Gray’s similar crime against White to undermine White’s credibility. The jury initially deadlocked. Gray’s state petition for post-conviction relief stopped the one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Gray had until January 11, 2013, to file his federal habeas corpus petition. He filed on April 29, 2013, The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Gray ineligible for equitable tolling, and did not address ineffective assistance of counsel, whether striking the black jurors violated Batson, and the possibility that Gray’s due process rights were violated by inaccurate juror questionnaire answers. View "Gray v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

In 1992, Prevatte was convicted of detonating a pipe bomb that destroyed property and resulted in the death of a bystander, Antkowicz, 18 U.S.C. 844(i). If the bomb had not caused a death, the maximum sentence Prevatte could have received would have been 10 years. The judge found that the bomb did cause the death; Prevatte was sentenced to 44 years’ imprisonment. Prevatte filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2241, claiming that under the Supreme Court’s 2014 “Burrage” decision, the jury, not the judge, should have made the finding that the bomb was the but-for cause of Antkowicz’s death so that his enhanced sentence was illegal and a miscarriage of justice. The district court dismissed Prevatte’s petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Burrage is not about whether a judge or jury makes the “death results” finding, but clarifies that the underlying crime, the detonation of the bomb, must be a but-for cause of death and not merely a contributing factor. Prevatte could have argued that the government did not prove that the bomb was a but-for cause of death at trial, on direct appeal or in his initial section 2255 motion. The unrebutted evidence established that the bomb was the but-for cause of Ms. Antkowicz’s death. Prevatte’s enhanced sentence is neither illegal nor a miscarriage of justice. View "Prevatte v. Merlak" on Justia Law

Police executed a warrant at Harper’s home and recovered a stolen firearm, 109.9 grams of methamphetamine (about 400 individual uses), a digital scale, plastic baggies, and 0.61 grams of heroin in small foil packages. Harper was charged as a habitual offender based on his prior felony convictions for burglary, battery on a minor, theft, and marijuana distribution. Harper also had three misdemeanor convictions; his probation had been revoked three times. On the methamphetamine conviction, Harper faced 20-50 years in prison. The habitual-offender finding allowed the judge to add one-to-three times the advisory sentence for the underlying offense. The judge imposed a sentence of 40 years on the methamphetamine conviction, 15 concurrent years on the heroin conviction, plus two years for receiving stolen property, and a consecutive 30-year habitual-offender enhancement (72 years). Appellate counsel urged the court to reduce the sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). That court affirmed Harper’s sentence, stating that Harper’s “brief [was] devoid of an argument supported by cogent reasoning” and deemed the issue waived. Harper sought state post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The appellate court affirmed denial of relief, holding that the waiver was not prejudicial because Harper’s sentence was not inappropriate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas review relief. The Indiana court reasonably applied Strickland. The argument was really an attack on that court’s resolution of a question of state law embedded within its analysis of a Strickland claim. View "Harper v. Brown" on Justia Law

Simpson, convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1), moved for a new trial, alleging that his counsel was ineffective by: failure to interview and call witnesses with potentially exculpatory evidence (Simpson’s mother, Donna, and Lintzenich and Hoffstot, who previously had accompanied Burdell and Simpson on drug buying trips); failure to effectively cross-examine government witnesses; inaccurate assessment of the government’s case, including advising Simpson to reject a plea bargain; and failure to prepare Simpson to testify. Simpson attached an affidavit asserting that he had told counsel that he wanted the women to testify and notarized letters: Donna stated that Burdell told her at the time of Simpson’s arrest that Simpson was “tak[ing] the rap for [Burdell].” Lintzenich heard Burdell and another say that Simpson took the rap, never saw Simpson sell heroin or buy drugs, and stated he “purchased [h]eroin for personal use only.” Hoffstot stated that he had witnessed “Burdell buying the [h]eroin” on other trips and that Simpson did not “deal[]” heroin. The district court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, finding “no reasonable possibility” that the proposed testimony would have changed the outcome. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Simpson alleged sufficient facts to support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. View "United States v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Clark, who had a long history of alcoholism and depression, committed suicide five days after entering the custody of the Green Lake, Wisconsin, County Jail. The officers on duty at the time of his death did not know that Clark had a high risk of committing suicide. When he entered the jail, however, he was assessed as having a maximum risk of suicide. The intake staff who were aware of that risk—Officer Walker and Nurse Kuehn—had not initiated the jail’s suicide prevention protocol. Clark’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied motions by Walker and Kuehn, seeking qualified immunity. The court found numerous issues of material fact regarding Clark’s suicide risk, the defendants’ knowledge of that risk, and who was responsible for initiating the suicide protocol and stated that it was clearly established that inmates have the right to be free from deliberate indifference to a known risk of suicide. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment. Nurse Kuehn was not entitled to qualified immunity as a private medical contractor. It was clearly established that Clark had a right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious risk of suicide. View "Estate of Clark v. Walker" on Justia Law

Lake County had cash flow of $51 million in 2007. In 2009, it was operating at a deficit; by 2013 its general fund was more than $1 million in the red. The county’s self-insurance fund had a balance of $10 million in 2007; that balance was wiped out by 2013. The county offered retirement incentives to employees age 65 or older. Under one package, retirees were entitled to five years of supplemental health insurance (secondary to Medicare coverage) through Aetna and could return to work, part-time, as at-will employees. In 2013, Aetna informed the county that if retirees working as part-time employees remained on the plan, the plan would no longer qualify for special exemptions under federal law and the county’s costs would skyrocket. The county notified all rehired retirees who were covered by the Aetna supplement that their employment would end. Some sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. The key criterion that distinguished the terminated employees from other county employees was not their age but rather their participation in the Aetna plan. The county’s action was rationally related to a legitimate state interest: preserving supplemental insurance coverage for its retirees while avoiding further financial hardship. View "Carson v. Lake County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were cited for violating Carmel City Ordinance 8-2, which incorporated Indiana’s traffic regulations. Some paid a fine. Some had a default judgment entered against them. Some were convicted; others entered into deferral agreements. None appealed or otherwise challenged the outcome in Indiana’s courts. In a separate case, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the ordinance violated Indiana’s Home Rule laws. Plaintiffs then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights through misuses of the traffic justice system. The district court dismissed, finding that certain plaintiffs lacked standing; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear most of the claims; plaintiffs had abandoned various other claims; and the other claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with respect to plaintiffs who admitted guilt, were convicted, or had default judgments. Federal district courts are not authorized to review state-court decisions unless Congress has passed appropriate legislation. The “deferral agreement” plaintiffs had no constitutional claims. Those alleging injuries arising from traffic stops that preceded and were unrelated to the traffic judgments described damages too speculative or that cannot be separated from the state-court traffic judgment. View "Lennon v. City of Carmel" on Justia Law

Murphy was an inmate in the Illinois Vandalia Correctional Center when correctional officers hit him, fracturing his eye socket, and left him in a cell without medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law theories. The court reduced a jury award of damages to $307,733.82 and awarded attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, rejecting an argument that state-law sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims. The Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to state-law claims against a state official or employee who has violated statutory or constitutional law. The court reversed and remanded the attorney fee award. Under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d), the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award, and the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage. Murphy then sought attorney fees for the appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition. Murphy’s only success on appeal came on a purely state-law issue affecting damages awarded only under state law; a section 1988(b) award is not appropriate for that work. Plaintiff has already won—in the district court—both damages and a fee award for all of his attorney’s successful efforts thus far under federal law. View "Murphy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Davis and Haslip entered a Kansas bank. Davis approached Ashenfelter, requesting change. Haslip approached Anderson’s window, drew a handgun, and demanded money. Davis told Ashenfelter to open the drawers at both teller stations. After Ashenfelter opened the teller drawers, Haslip directed the employees to get into the vault. Davis, according to Ashenfelter, “hung back a little bit.” Haslip closed the vault. The employees pressed an alarm. Haslip and Davis fled in a stolen car but were captured. Police recovered $13,000 and two handguns from the car. Davis proposed a jury instruction regarding liability for aiding and abetting Haslip’s use of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), requiring “knowledge that a gun would be carried or used.” The district court instead provided a general aiding and abetting instruction. Convicted, Davis was sentenced to 322 months’ imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed and his subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion was unsuccessful. The jury instruction was not raised on appeal or collateral attack. In 2014, the Supreme Court held that aiding and abetting in this context requires advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun. Davis sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that he did not have advance knowledge and that Haslip exploited his “diminished capacity.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Davis guilty of aiding and abetting. If a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun was displayed, the jury can infer that he had advance knowledge that the gun would be used. View "Davis v. Cross" on Justia Law

Alamo worked for the Chicago Fire Department. He alleges that in 2009, after a transfer, other firefighters began harassing him, calling him “spic” and “f--king Puerto Rican,” and stealing Alamo’s food. Alamo also alleges that the number of times he was assigned to work at different locations was excessive when compared to assignments given to non-Latino colleagues. His supervisor, Lieutenant Bliss, did not remedy the behavior. At one point, Alamo called 911 about a “chest bump” incident but did not press charges because of pressure from the Chief. The next day, Alamo experienced chest pain, dizziness, and a migraine. A physician diagnosed him with a work-related chest contusion, work-related stress, and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder and ordered medical leave. The Medical Section Chief stated the Department would not pay for treatment. After Alamo had been on medical leave for six months, he obtained written authorization to return to work without restrictions, but the Department required additional documentation. Alamo filed a charge with the EEOC. The Department continued to request additional records. Alamo filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and against Bliss, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims. The complaint describes an investigation into his fitness to work that was so onerous that it could not be completed in four months and sufficiently alleged retaliation. View "Alamo v. Bliss" on Justia Law