Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Yeoman attempted to fire a gun during an attempted robbery. He was apprehended minutes later. Yeoman pled “no contest” to attempted first-degree intentional homicide and is serving a 25-year sentence in a Wisconsin prison. On appeal he argued that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Yeoman’s car, that the officers failed to honor Yeoman’s invocation of his right to remain silent, and that the searches of his car and his person were unreasonable. Before filing his federal petition for habeas corpus relief, he exhausted some but not all of his claims in the Wisconsin courts. In state habeas proceedings, he had not raised claims that his post‐conviction lawyer was ineffective. In federal district court, Yeoman requested a stay, to hold his petition in abeyance so that he could return to state court and exhaust his remedies there. The court declined to enter the stay after concluding that Yeoman lacked good cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that, although Yeoman’s claims were not plainly meritless, and he had not engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay, Yeoman’s strategic decision, based on a misapprehension of the law, did not constitute good cause for failure to exhaust. View "Yeoman v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Golla, who has a law degree, alleged, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the Office of the Chief Judge engaged in intentional reverse racial discrimination by paying Taylor, an African‐American male, a significantly higher salary than Golla, a white male, despite working in the same department and performing the same duties under essentially the same title. Golla started working in the Office in 1983. He was fired in 1995 but reinstated 10 months after he filed a complaint with the EEOC. Under a settlement agreement, Golla was reinstated at a pay position and title, Law Clerk I, which he retained until he resigned in 2013. When asked during his deposition whether anyone in the workplace made racial comments toward him, Golla answered, "nothing direct racial." He claimed his African-American supervisor made comments that were demeaning. The district court rejected Golla’s claim, finding no direct evidence of reverse racial discrimination that resulted in the pay disparity and that Golla failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination under the indirect method of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence as a whole was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Golla was paid at a lower pay grade than Taylor because of his race View "Golla v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County" on Justia Law

Around 9:00 p.m., as Mr. White was escorting guests outside, an unknown teenager (Hyles) charged uninvited into the White family’s Chicago home. Minutes later, police officers who were chasing Hyles pushed past White and followed Hyles into the house with guns drawn. White either fell or was pushed down. Officers found Hyles huddled in a basement room and arrested him, but they did not leave the house. Instead, they searched the house. Police claim that Mrs. White signed a consent; she claims she thought she was signing a complaint for trespass. The Whites sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages related to the entry and search of their home. After a trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the officers on three claims. The jury ruled for the defendants on the remaining four claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s credibility determinations concerning whether GPS data supported the police account of the incidents. While finding the admission of the transcript of Hyles’s guilty‐plea proceedings “unusual,” to establish the factual events that supported probable cause, the court noted that the Whites invited error by insisting that the entire transcript be read. View "White v. Hefel" on Justia Law

Armstrong’s Illinois conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed, based on a finding Armstrong’s guilty plea for unlawful restraint did not require him to register. Armstrong sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers who arrested him knew that he was not required to register, ignored and concealed exculpatory evidence, falsified documents, and propelled his prosecution. His previous case, with a nearly identical complaint, filed before his conviction was overturned, was dismissed as untimely and barred by the rule against collateral challenges to convictions. In this case, Armstrong sought leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and recruitment of a lawyer to help him. The court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened Armstrong’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), and concluded that the false-arrest claim already had been litigated and that other allegations did not state a “Brady” claim for a violation of due process or improper withholding of exculpatory evidence. The court dismissed an amended complaint with prejudice without appointing counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis of Armstrong’s request for the assistance of counsel was flawed for failure to ask: has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate the claim himself? View "Armstrong v. Villa Park Police Department" on Justia Law

In 2001, Socha, Leonard, and Holm, each forged a stolen check. Holm admitted his forgery and implicated Leonard. Socha’s name was not mentioned. While Leonard was avoiding the police, Holm and Drews left Leonard at Vincent's (Holm's brother) house, dug a grave, then drove Leonard to the grave, murdered and buried him. Socha was 144 miles away, with Holm’s girlfriend, Mrazik, where they were seen in bars. Drews later bragged about the murder to Mrazik, who told a friend, who informed the police. Holm and Drews were arrested. Months later, Mrazik, Drews, and Holm alleged that Socha was involved in the murder plan and entered into plea agreements. Socha was convicted as a party to first-degree intentional homicide. Meanwhile, the police interviewed Swanson, Holm’s cellmate. The recording and interview transcript were turned given to Holm’s counsel, but Socha was not aware of the interview until after his trial. Swanson discussed his impressions that Holm was lying and that Holm’s accusation of Socha was concocted, but also called Socha “a major player in the murder.” Socha knew about the Swanson interview before he filed his appeal and post-conviction motions. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals characterized the Swanson evidence as “inconsequential” and not “very exculpatory.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding the state court decision “not so outlandish as to be unreasonable.” View "Socha v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Smith, a registered sex offender, was convicted of driving with a revoked license and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment followed by mandatory supervised release. To begin his supervised release, Smith needed the Illinois Department of Corrections to approve a host site. On his release date, Smith submitted two host sites. The Department had not investigated the proposed sites. A parole supervisor ordered Smith’s parole officer, Anderson, to issue a parole violation report rather than release Smith. Anderson’s report contained incorrect statements, claiming that electronic monitoring was a condition of Smith’s supervised release and that the Department had attempted to place Smith at a host site that would allow him to comply with the electronic monitoring requirement. Smith spent another six months in custody before being released on good‐time credit. He sued Anderson under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Anderson. For relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity bars Smith’s claim. No court has held that the Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex offenders who lack lawful and approved living arrangements; lacking these arrangements, their continued detention does not violate clearly established rights. View "Smith v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Bryant was convicted of murdering his stepmother. He was 17 years old at the time of the 2000 killing. Under Indiana law juveniles in police custody have a statutory right to “meaningful consultation” with a parent before waiving their constitutional rights. Bryant met with his mother and made an incriminating statement to her. Detectives surreptitiously recorded their conversation; the incriminating statement was introduced at Bryant’s trial through the testimony of both eavesdropping officers. Bryant’s counsel’s objection to the first officer’s testimony was overruled. On appeal, the state court held that the statement should not have been admitted, but because Bryant’s counsel did not object to the second detective’s testimony about the same statement, the error was unpreserved and effectively harmless. On state postconviction review, Bryant unsuccessfully raised a “Strickland” claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady violation claim stemming from a falsehood in a police report. Bryant then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state appellate court reasonably applied Strickland and Brady, finding no reasonable probability of a different outcome, because any errors were ultimately harmless and the evidence of Bryant’s guilt was plentiful. View "Bryant v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sherman died from gunshot wounds. When police arrived, Sherman lay on the ground with 50-60 people gathered around. Long was tried for first-degree murder. No physical evidence tied Long to the crime. The state presented four witnesses; two recanted at trial. In closing argument, the prosecutor made improper statements, resulting in a new trial. At Long’s second trial, the state again presented the four eyewitnesses. One maintained her identification of Long. Two, having previously recanted, continued to deny having seen Long shoot Sherman, despite their prior videotaped statements. The prosecutor failed to correct Irby when she claimed that she had not previously stated that her identification was coerced; defense counsel impeached that testimony. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made comments that no evidence was presented that another individual committed the crime and referenced the contents of a letter written by Irby that had not been admitted into evidence. The jury found Long guilty. His state court appeals and post-conviction petitions were unsuccessful. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Long’s federal habeas petition, finding the prosecutorial misconduct claims procedurally defaulted and that Long had not shown a reasonable likelihood that Irby’s testimony or the closing argument prejudiced the outcome; and that Long’s ineffective assistance claim was without merit. “[W]hat occurred [Irby's testimony] may well have helped the defense rather than the prosecutor.” View "Long v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Convicted of multiple counts of sex trafficking, conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, and attempted sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) and 1594(c), Sawyer was sentenced to 50 years' incarceration. After unsuccessful appeals, Sawyer sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, stating that “the Government offered the Petitioner a plea offer, which included a term of imprisonment of 15 years” and that counsel advised him to reject it because “the Government’s case against him was weak.” Sawyer attached affidavits from his mother and grandmother, in which they attest to discussing the plea offer with Sawyer. The government argued that Sawyer’s petition failed to provide sufficient evidence that the government made him an offer. The district court denied Sawyer’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, noting that Sawyer did not attach a proposed plea agreement or an affidavit from trial counsel regarding any agreement. The Seventh Circuit vacated. If he is able to prove on remand that the government did offer a plea deal, Sawyer will have to establish that his attorney’s advice was objectively unreasonable and that, with competent advice, he would have accepted the plea deal, but at this point in the proceedings, Sawyer has sufficiently alleged both of those required elements. View "Sawyer v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Saxon was convicted in Illinois state court of the 1995 first-degree murder of a 12-year-old girl, arson, and concealment of homicide. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. After his state appeals were exhausted, Saxon sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state’s case included testimony from 15 witnesses, numerous stipulations and exhibits. The victim’s mother testifed that Saxon was at her house almost every day, and was there the night the girl disappeared. Saxon’s aunt testified that she had lived at the residence with the garage in which the victim’s burned body was found before the fire and that Saxon frequently visited. By the time police obtained a search warrant for a sample of Saxon’s blood in 2000, Saxon was serving a 10-year prison sentence following a conviction for the sexual assault of his nephew. Saxon’s blood sample showed that his DNA matched the DNA profile found on the sperm fraction found on the victim’s body. Eventually, Saxon admitted that he had sex with the victim. The evidence was sufficient to find Saxon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged was not objectively unreasonable. View "Saxon v. Lashbrook" on Justia Law