Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Indiana law allows 13 categories of voters, including “elderly” voters—those 65 or older--to vote by mail. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana Election Commission extended absentee-voting privileges to all registered Indiana voters for the June 2020 primary but did not renew that order for the November general election. Indiana voters who were allowed to vote absentee in the primary, but who do not otherwise qualify for absentee voting, unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction requiring Indiana to permit unlimited absentee voting, citing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Weeks before the 2020 general election, the Seventh Circuit (Tully I) affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits in light of Supreme Court precedent holding that the right to vote does not include a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.Returning to the district court, the plaintiffs abandoned their Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court concluded that Tully I constituted controlling authority. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. Given the circumstances under which Tully I was issued, that decision does not constitute the law of the case and is not binding. Considering the merits anew, the court held that Indiana’s granting the opportunity to vote by mail to elderly voters does not abridge the right to vote of those under 65 and does not violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. View "Tully v. Okeson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Coleman was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Coleman was sentenced to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment based on having at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense,” section 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Coleman’s pro se motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserted that his appointed counsel, Vaupel, was ineffective for failing to inform him of the government’s pretrial 21 U.S.C. 851 Notice of Enhancement, indicating its intention to seek life imprisonment based on his prior Illinois cocaine-related convictions. According to Coleman, had Vaupel shown him this notice, he never would have agreed to go to trial. Vaupel responded that he had repeatedly informed Coleman that he faced a mandatory life sentence and that the government was unwilling to waive the enhancement. Coleman moved to amend his petition to argue that Vaupel was ineffective by failing to argue that Coleman’s convictions did not qualify as “felony drug offenses” because Illinois defined “cocaine” more broadly than federal law. The district court denied Coleman’s section 2255 motion, and his motion to amend as not relating back to his initial pleading and untimely.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court must determine whether Vaupel considered a possible categorical challenge to Coleman’s predicate offenses and, if he did consider it, his reasons for not raising it. Coleman has established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s purportedly deficient performance. View "Coleman v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Forro children attended St. Augustine, a self-identified Catholic school in Hartford, Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides transportation benefits for parents who send their children to private sectarian schools, Wis.Stat. 121.54. The school district and the state superintendent of public instruction denied the Forros' request because transportation was being provided to St. Gabriel, another Catholic school in the area. The law stipulates that only one school from a single organizational entity in each “attendance area” may qualify for benefits. While both claim an affiliation with Catholicism, the two schools are not affiliated with one another in other significant ways. St. Augustine and the Forros sued. Several years of litigation ensued, including a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, two published Seventh Circuit opinions, and a Supreme Court of Wisconsin opinion, after which the Seventh Circuit concluded that the denial of transportation benefits violated Wisconsin law because it rested on an improper methodology for determining affiliation between two schools of similar faith.After noting that certain state law claims had been waived and that the federal constitutional issues did not require resolution, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a declaratory judgment remains in effect against the Superintendent and the School District. The district court may decide what attorneys’ fees the plaintiffs should be awarded, if any, given that they have prevailed only in obtaining declaratory relief under state law. View "St. Augustine School v. Underly" on Justia Law

Gunter and Grommet participated in a conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, including a controlled purchase of actual methamphetamine from Gunter by law enforcement agents. A September 17, 2019 indictment charged Gunter and Grommet of conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Gunter was arrested on July 2, 2020. The court set an initial trial date of August 31, 2020. Over the next 23 months, the trial was repeatedly rescheduled. Gunter first requested continuances; later continuances were at the request of Grommet, who was evaluated for competency and whose lawyer subsequently died. When Gunter eventually (unsuccessfully) sought severance, he did not cite Speedy Trial Grounds.Days before trial, Gunter unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Gunter’s conviction after considering the length of and reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice the defendant suffered. Although Gunter first moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of his right to a speedy trial immediately before trial, he opposed motions for continuances and asserted his desire for a speedy trial numerous times. The delays could not be attributed to the government. Gunter made no argument that he experienced any prejudice from the delay, and no strong showing of prejudice is obvious in the record. View "United States v. Gunter" on Justia Law

Gonzales had an altercation at a bar, then got into a car with Pedro (driving) and fired several shots from the car’s window toward the men, hitting one in the leg. Charged under state law with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, with a 40-year maximum sentence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gonzales was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to recklessly endangering safety and unlawful possession of a firearm for a recommended ten-year sentence. After conferring with his attorney, Frost, Gonzales rejected the plea deal and requested a speedy trial. Frost predicted that the state would have trouble with its witnesses. One had absconded from probation; all had lengthy felony records, had been drunk, and gave inconsistent accounts.All the state’s witnesses were located for trial and testified that Gonzales was the shooter. Frost continued to pursue acquittal rather than focusing on the reckless-endangerment count. The jury convicted Gonzales of the more serious crime. Gonzales received a 25-year sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Frost testified that it “never even crossed [her] mind” to argue for the lesser-included offense. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that Frost’s performance did not fall below the “constitutional line,” without reaching the issue of prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, stating that it was “deeply troubled by the performance of defense counsel” but could not “say that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland or relied on unreasonable determinations of fact.” View "Gonzales v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Malhotra subleased a room in a fraternity house while attending the University of Illinois in 2021. The University prohibited students from permitting underage drinking in their residences. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the University then restricted the number of people who could attend social gatherings. According to Malhotra, days after he moved in, the other residents threw a party. Malhotra was not involved in planning or hosting the party. During the event, Malhotra was wearing noise-canceling headphones and studying in his room when his roommate alerted him to loud noises. Malhotra discovered a large group of people partying, including a young woman who was visibly intoxicated. The party ended when officers arrived at the house.The University charged Malhotra and the other residents with violating the University’s code of conduct. Malhotra met with the University’s Assistant Dean of Students and subsequently appeared at a hearing before the “Subcommittee on Undergraduate Student Conduct,” which found Malhotra guilty and suspended him for two semesters. Dean Die explained that Malhotra had been held responsible because he was a signatory on the fraternity house’s lease. Malhotra, however, had not signed the lease; he had merely subleased a room. He appealed, attaching the lease as evidence. The suspension was upheld. Malhotra filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Malhotra did not allege a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest as required under the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Malhotra v. University of Illinois at Urbana" on Justia Law

In 2015, Indiana charged Crowell with 13 felony counts: four counts of Class A felony child molesting, four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, two counts of Level 5 felony incest, and one count each of Class C felony incest, Class C felony child molesting, and Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor. Unbeknownst to Crowell, the statute of limitations had run on the four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Class C felony child molesting. Crowell’s appointed attorney failed to inform him or the prosecution that Crowell had a statute-of-limitations defense. Crowell pled guilty to three charges (including one that was time-barred) under a binding plea agreement.Crowell sought federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Indiana Court of Appeals had rejected Crowell’s claim because he had not shown that if he had been properly advised, he would have rejected the plea bargain and insisted on going to trial on the timely charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Crowell, v. Sevier" on Justia Law

Singmuongthong describes himself as a tan-colored, Asian man of Laotian national origin. He worked as a correctional officer at Sheridan from 1998-2013, when he became a lieutenant at Sheridan. In 2016, he was promoted and became assistant warden of operations at a new facility, Kewanee. Singmuongthong received a five percent increase in his salary. Kewanee’s warden, Williams, was investigated in 2018 for inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature with subordinate staff and was terminated. That investigation also concluded that Singmuongthong had difficulty making good administrative decisions, had failed to report inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature, and spent too much time at bars with subordinate staff. Singmuongthong informed the regional deputy chief, Funk, that he was interested in the warden position. He was not chosen for the position because of his relationship with Williams and concerns about his judgment. Following a subsequent investigation of a separate allegation of sexual harassment, Singmuongthong was terminated from employment.Singmuongthong alleged discrimination based on his race, color, and national origin, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Singmuongthong appealed only his pay disparity and failure to promote claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. View "Singmuongthong v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Nichols, charged with sex trafficking, faced a life sentence. Two attorneys with extensive experience were appointed as defense counsel. Months later, Nichols filed a pro se motion, challenging their representation. The judge warned Nichols about the perils of self-representation and stated: I am not giving you another lawyer. After an extended conversation, the attorneys were appointed standby counsel. Nichols objected, stating: “Courts are forcing me to go pro se.” At Nichols's request, the court ordered a competency evaluation. Dr. Goldstein spent 14 hours with Nichols and found Nichols competent to stand trial and to proceed pro se, indicating that his disorders are behavioral, not mental. Nichols twice refused to appear. The court repeatedly reviewed why Nichols should not represent himself but held that Nichols had constructively waived the right to counsel. A second expert, Dr. Fields, was unable to complete any test because of Nichols’s obstreperous behavior and relied on an interview with Nichols to conclude that Nichols’s competency was “not diminished by a severe emotional disorder.” It was Fields’s “clinical sense” that Nichols’s “lack of willingness to work” with counsel rendered him incompetent. At a competency hearing, the government introduced recorded jail calls in which Nichols indicated that he was delaying the proceedings. The court found Nichols competent. Nichols stated, “I’m not working with anybody.”Nichols was convicted and accepted the assistance of counsel before sentencing. A third competency evaluation concluded that Nichols was competent. The court imposed a within-Guidelines life sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: “District courts are not permitted to foist counsel upon competent defendants.” View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

The Kailins called the Gurnee Police Department to report that their daughter had been the victim of possible criminal conduct. Officer Greer arrived at their house around 8 p.m. to follow up. Six seconds after Kailin opened the door, Greer shot the Kailins’ dog, Timber, on their neighbor’s lawn. The Kailins sued, asserting illegal seizure, 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Officer Greer, a “Monell” claim of municipal liability, and a claim for indemnification by the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court noted the Kailins’ assertions, “that Timber never barked nor growled at Greer” and that Timber was "simply playing” but concluded that the video from the body-worn camera controlled and eliminated any dispute of fact.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The question of what Timber was doing and how she was behaving is key to determining the reasonableness of Greer’s actions and therefore to liability on all claims. This is not the rare case where the video definitively demonstrates what occurred. There is no audio to reveal whether Timber was growling or barking as Greer alleged. The entire video lasts only six seconds; it is disputable whether the dog can be seen at any time in the video until she has been shot. View "Kailin v. Village of Gurnee" on Justia Law