Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

West Side Christian Church applied to the City of Evansville, Indiana, for a permit to set up its “Cross the River” display, consisting of 31 six-foot tall decorated crosses on four blocks of public Riverfront. After Evansville approved the application, residents sought an injunction, claiming that the display violated their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed. The City did not appeal, but West Side, which was an intervenor in the district court, did. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, finding that West Side did not have standing to appeal. The court could not redress any injury West Side might have suffered because Evansville was not party to this appeal and could prohibit the display regardless of any order issued. Any First Amendment injury West Side might have suffered from the injunction was not fairly traceable to, or caused by, Evansville. View "Cabral v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

Parmalat, a large Italian food and dairy company, entered bankruptcy in Italy and Bondi was appointed “extraordinary commissioner,” the equivalent of a bankruptcy trustee. In 2004 Bondi instituted, in New York, a proceeding under the since-repealed section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to enjoin any action against Parmalat with respect to property involved in the Italian bankruptcy, to consolidate claims against the company. Months later, Bondi filed suit in Illinois, against Thornton, an accounting company, claiming that Thornton contributed to the collapse of Parmalat by conducting fraudulent audits of in violation of Illinois tort law. The case was removed to federal court. The New York district court declined to abstain in light of the Illinois suit and granted Thornton summary judgment, on the ground that the doctrine of in pari delicto barred Parmalat’s claim against the accounting company. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand to Illinois state court. The Illinois district court declined to remand to state court and upheld the in pari delicto ruling. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court was required to remand to the state court, but noted that the New York litigation remained unresolved. View "Bondi v. Grant Thornton Int'l" on Justia Law

Spaine was a seasonal employee from 2008 until 2011, helping low-income and disabled persons register for housing assistance. Spaine alleges that she was harassed and unfairly disciplined because of her race and that she was told, when her 2011 employment ended, that instead of being reinstated automatically as in the past, she would have to reapply the next year. Spaine interpreted this as termination. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 alleging that she was harassed and eventually fired because she is African American. Months after filing that complaint, Spaine filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code. Spaine was represented by counsel in the discrimination suit, but was without a lawyer in the bankruptcy case. On a schedule of personal property, Spaine was required to list contingent and unliquidated claims of all types. She listed nothing. In the separate financial statement, Spaine was required to list lawsuits to which she was party within the preceding year. She listed two eviction suits, but did not list her discrimination suit. A transcript of the creditors’ meeting shows that Spaine told the bankruptcy trustee about her discrimination lawsuit at the first opportunity after filing her incomplete schedules. Spaine also subsequently filed an affidavit indicating that she told the bankruptcy judge about the suit. The employer alleged that Spaine was trying to conceal the suit. Spaine successfully moved to reopen her bankruptcy. The discrimination suit was dismissed on estoppel grounds. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that material facts remained in dispute. View "Spaine v. Kane-Richards" on Justia Law

Freed and Weiss were the sole managing members of a legal practice, CLG. Freed claims to have provided CLG’s operating capital through loans of $12 million. Under the partnership agreement between the two, Freed was entitled to repayment before CLG could make distributions to other members. According to Freed, shortly after he received partial repayment from CLG in 2011, Weiss began taking steps to terminate Freed’s control of CLG and to create a new limited liability company without him, by moving CLG funds held by Chase into other accounts, to which Freed lacked access. Freed demanded that Chase freeze CLG accounts. Freed contends that Chase employees informed Weiss, who then removed all funds from Chase. Freed sued Weiss in state court, alleging improprieties primarily regarding access to records and funds, breach of fiduciary duties and of the partnership agreement, and seeking a declaration of voluntary termination of CLG. Weiss counterclaimed, seeking to expel Freed from CLG. Freed sued Chase claiming that Chase facilitated Weiss’s unauthorized transfer, tortious interference with contractual rights, and aiding Weiss’s breaches of fiduciary duties. The suit was removed to federal court and Chase brought third-party claims for indemnity or contribution. Freed filed suit in federal court against Weiss, his father, and CLG, asking the court to force CLG to purchase Freed’s distributional interest. The district court found that abstention in the federal court cases was proper and stayed both pending the outcome of the state court proceedings. The Seventh Circuit agreed.View "Freed v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Montanez sued the City of Chicago and Officers Fico and Simon, alleging that Fico used excessive force while arresting him for drinking on a public way and Simon failed to intervene. He sustained minor injuries and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law. The state-law claims were dismissed as time-barred. The city conceded its obligation to indemnify, so the section 1983 claims proceeded to trial. Fico was found liable, Simon was cleared, and the jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Montanez’s lawyers submitted a bill for more than $426,000 in attorneys’ fees and about $6,500 in costs and expenses. The judge scrutinized the bill line-by-line, discounted entries where more than one partner oversaw the same activities, or where the lawyers researched or drafted motions that were never filed, excluded hours spent on a full-day mock trial and entries related to matters that were essentially administrative matters, and reduced the hourly billing rates. After these and other reductions, the final award of costs was $3,051.94 and the court awarded $108,350.87 in fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the city’s “scorched-earth” defense strategy and the need for trial judges to exercise their broad discretion to adjust bloated bills for attorney’s fees after the fact and case-management authority during the litigation. View "Montanez v. Simon" on Justia Law

Arnold, a former officer of two corporate defendants, held significant stock in each. In 1999, Arnold sued both in Illinois state court, claiming shareholder oppression. In 2006, the parties allegedly agreed to settle, but never executed settlement documents. The defendants have not paid any of the $207,500 purportedly required. The court dismissed without deciding whether the case had been settled. A month later, Arnold agreed to sell his stock to KJD for $290,000. KJD advanced $100,000; Arnold represented that he had good title. KJD notified the defendants that it had purchased the stock and wished to inspect the corporate books. They did not respond, but moved to vacate the dismissal, alleging that, under the alleged settlement, Arnold had transferred his stock to the corporations. They also filed suit before a different judge, resulting in a default judgment ordering Arnold to execute settlement papers and comply with the agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed. KJD was never joined as a party. The court stayed proceedings in the original action. Arnold filed a FRCP Rule 22 interpleader action, naming the corporations and KJD, stating that he made no claim to continued ownership and was willing to transfer the stock to whichever defendant the court determined to have superior right. Invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court dismissed, but ordered Arnold to return the $100,000 advance payment. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the interpleader action does not attack the state court judgment itself, so further proceedings are necessary.View "Arnold v. KJD Real Estate, LLC" on Justia Law

PepperBall is a projectile ball filled with a pepper-spray-like irritant. Police departments, private security firms, and comparable organizations are its primary consumers. Advanced Tactical brought a trademark infringement claim against Real Action and its president, Tran. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Real Action, which preserved its objection. There was no evidence that Real Action had the necessary minimum contacts with Indiana to support specific jurisdiction. View "Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc." on Justia Law

The underlying suit began 28 years ago and has been to the Supreme Court three times. Defendants who did not settle prevailed and applied for costs under 28 U.S.C. 1920 and were awarded most of what they sought after a district judge held the request under advisement for three years and then retired. The newly assigned judge awarded $63,391.45, less than $2,300 per year of litigation. On appeal, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants took too long to request costs; did not establish that transcripts and copies were “necessarily obtained for use in the case” under 28 U.S.C. 1920; and did not nudge the original judge to rule before he retired. The Seventh Circuit rejected the arguments, stating that the obligation to render timely rulings rests on the judiciary, not the parties. “This litigation has lasted far too long. At last it is over.” View "Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler" on Justia Law

Banks sued her former employer, the Board of Education, and her former supervisor, Gonzales, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and related violations of federal and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims; 29 after the district court entered judgment, Banks filed “a motion to alter the entry of summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),” which the district court denied six days later. Banks then filed a notice of appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Because Banks missed that deadline, her motion was not effective as a Rule 59(e) motion that could have tolled the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. Treating her post‐judgment motion as a Rule 60(b) motion that did not toll the time to appeal the summary judgment, her notice of appeal was timely only as to the district court’s denial of her post‐judgment motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion. View " Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

A class action complaint, filed in state court, alleged that Pushpin acted as an unlicensed debt collector in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and filed 1100 Illinois small‐claims suits, all fraudulent, but that the class (defendants in those suits) sought “no more than $1,100,000.00 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000.00 in punitive damages,” and would ‘incur attorneys’ fees of no more than $400,000.00,” below the $5 million threshold for removal of a state‐court class action to a federal district court under the Class Action Fairness Act. Pushpin removed the case to federal court under the Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453(b), but the district court remanded to state court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the plaintiff did not irrevocably commit to obtaining less than $5 million for the class, and Pushpin’s estimate that the damages recoverable by the class could equal or exceed that amount may be reliable enough to preclude remanding the case to the state court. The lower court’s reasoning that most of the claims were barred by the Rooker‐Feldman rule was a mistake as was a statement that “there is a strong presumption in favor of remand” when a case has been removed under the Class Action Fairness Act. View "Pushpin Holdings, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law