Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Idento makes robotic milking machines in the Netherlands. BouMatic, LLC, based in Wisconsin, entered into an agreement for purchasing and reselling those machines in Belgium. BouMatic claims that Idento breached the agreement by selling direct to at least one of BouMatic’s Belgian customers and by failing to provide parts and warranty service. The district court dismissed, ruling that commercial transactions in the European Union do not expose Idento to litigation in Wisconsin even though BouMatic has its headquarters there, the parties exchanged drafts between Wisconsin and the Netherlands, and Idento shipped one machine to Wisconsin. After exploring the nature of the business entities, the Seventh Circuit vacated for consideration of personal jurisdiction in light of the contract language. Litigants cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by agreement or omission, but personal jurisdiction is a personal right that a litigant may waive or forfeit. View "BouMatic LLC v. Idento Operations BV" on Justia Law

In 2009, Sheth, a cardiologist, pled guilty to a single count of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. As agreed by Sheth, the district court entered an order of criminal forfeiture for cash and investment accounts then valued at $13 million plus real estate and a vehicle. The government represented that the forfeited assets represented the proceeds of Sheth’s fraud, calculated to be about $13 million. Sheth’s plea agreement specifies that forfeited assets would be credited against the amount of restitution, which the district court had determined to be $12,376,310. In 2012, before the government had liquidated all of the forfeited assets or disbursed any of the proceeds, it sought more of Sheth’s assets to apply to restitution. Sheth objected. Without resolving the factual dispute, the district court ordered turnover of the assets, which were held by third parties. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the court erred by ordering turnover of the assets without first allowing for discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Sheth" on Justia Law

King was in police custody awaiting a probable cause determination in 2007. After being rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication by jail medical staff, complaining of seizure-like symptoms, and being placed in an isolated cell for seven hours, he was found dead. His estate sued La Crosse County and individual employees. After a remand, six weeks before the trial date, after unsuccessful settlement discussions, King’s counsel asserted in a letter to the defendants that the correct standard for jury instructions in the upcoming trial was one of objective reasonableness, not the deliberate indifference standard that had been used by both parties in the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, the subsequent appeal, and remand pretrial preparations. The assertion was correct as a matter of law, but shortly after receiving the letter, defendants moved that King be precluded from arguing the applicability of the objective reasonableness standard because of her tardiness in asserting the argument. The district court agreed and ordered that the case be tried as scheduled under the deliberate indifference standard. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, acknowledging that King’s long, unexplained delay in asserting the correct standard was puzzling and problematic, but stating that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the defendants would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. View "King v. Kramer" on Justia Law

E.Y., a child, was diagnosed with diplegic cerebral palsy. His mother alleges that E.Y.’s illness resulted from medical malpractice by the federally-funded Friend Family Health Center, where she received her prenatal care, and the private University of Chicago Hospital, where she gave birth. Federal law makes a suit against the Center a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that had to be filed within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the suit was filed about two weeks too late. The mother argued that although she was aware she might have a claim against the University Hospital more than two years before filing this suit, she remained unaware that the Friend Center might be involved until she received a partial set of medical records on December 14, 2006, making her suit timely. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Ms. Wallace the mother was unaware and had no reason to be aware of the Friend Center’s potential involvement in her son’s injuries until less than two years before she filed suit. View "E. Y., v. United States" on Justia Law

Shuffle makes consumer grade automatic card-shuffling equipment. Wolff distributes casino grade gaming equipment. In 2010 the two signed a letter of intent that Shuffle, with financial assistance from Wolff, would develop casino-grade shuffling equipment, and Wolff would become its exclusive distributor. Before development of the new equipment was completed, Shuffle ended the relationship and sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement was not an enforceable contract. Wolff counterclaimed, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Shuffle with respect both to its claim for declaratory relief and to Wolff’s counterclaims, essentially rescinding the agreement. In its complaint, Shuffle acknowledged that it would have to return $124,940 earnest money to Wolff, but the order failed to mention the earnest money. Shuffle ignored Wolff’s request for a refund. Wolff moved, under FRCP 60, that the court order Shuffle to refund the money. The judge entered a post-judgment order requiring the refund, without mentioning Rule 60 or any other ground for amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “if the flaw lies in the translation of the original meaning to the judgment, then Rule 60(a) allows a correction.” The correction just made explicit what the parties must have assumed; that with the draft agreement rescinded the earnest money had to be returned. View "Shuffle Tech Int'l, LLC v. Wolff Gaming, Inc." on Justia Law

On March 28, 2008, while Salata was cleaning property owned by Weyerhaeuser, she slipped and fell, claiming loose floor tiles were the cause. On March 8, 2010, Salata filed suit. The parties attempted voluntary mediation, but when they could not reach a settlement, Salata’s then-attorneys, were allowed to withdraw, and Salata’s current counsel, Elrabadi, took over on March 14, 2012. On February 26, 2013, Weyerhaeuser moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the court’s discovery order under FRCP 37, and for a want of prosecution under Rule 41(b); Weyerhaeuser also requested attorney’s fees. The court held a hearing on the motion. Elrabadi failed to appear. The court declined to impose sanctions, but dismissed the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. On May 9, 2013, Elrabadi filed a Motion to Reinstate. Ultimately, the court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co." on Justia Law

Bokhari is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Pakistan. While living in Wisconsin, Bokhari allegedly conducted a fraudulent scheme with his brothers, bilking a nonprofit entity that administered the E‐Rate Program, a federal project to improve internet and telecommunications services for disadvantaged schools, out of an estimated $1.2 million, by submitting false invoices. In 2001, while the alleged fraud was ongoing, Bokhari moved to Pakistan, where, according to the prosecution, he continued directing the illegal scheme. In 2004, a federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted the brothers for mail fraud, money laundering, and related charges. The brothers pleaded guilty and were sentenced to more than five years in prison. The government submitted an extradition request to Pakistan in 2005. Bokhari contested the request in Pakistani court, and the Pakistani government sent an attorney to plead the case for extradition. In 2007, following a hearing, a Pakistani magistrate declined to authorize extradition. In 2009, the U.S. secured a “red notice” through Interpol, notifying member states to arrest Bokhari should he enter their jurisdiction. In the U.S., Bokhari’s attorneys moved to dismiss the indictment and quash the arrest warrant. The district court denied Bokhari’s motion pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the appeal as an improper attempt to seek interlocutory review of a non‐final pretrial order. View "United States v. Bokhari" on Justia Law

Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, but, on rehearing en banc, reversed, holding that the correct interpretation of “judicial district or similar legal entity” in section 1692i is the smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed. View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Anderson alleges that he was sexually abused by priests and other employees of the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s and that, as a result of the abuse, he requires continuous psychological counseling and spent most of his adult life in penal institutions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint explicitly acknowledged that the claims were barred by the Illinois statute of limitations or statute of repose. A 1991 statute of repose for actions based on childhood sexual abuse requires that all such claims be brought within two years of the date that the victim discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the abuse occurred, “but in no event … more than 12 years after the date on which the person abused attains the age of 18 years,” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b). Although the statute was repealed effective January 1, 1994, the repeal does not avoid the impact as to Anderson because his claims were extinguished prior to the repeal. The court rejected claims of estoppel and waiver. View "Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago" on Justia Law

Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable. View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law