Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rojas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Cicero fired him because he supported a political opponent of the town president. A jury awarded him $650,000 in damages, but the judge granted a new trial, concluding that Kurtz, Rojas’s lawyer, had engaged in misconduct by making misleading statements, eliciting hearsay responses to prejudice the defendants even though the judge would strike them, arguing in a way that informed the jury about excluded evidence, and undermining the credibility of a defense witness by asking questions that presented him in a bad light, without a good-faith basis for the questions. The parties settled, providing Rojas with $212,500 compensation for the discharge and Kurtz with fees of $287,500. The settlement did not resolve motions for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927, which authorizes sanctions against lawyers who needlessly multiply proceedings, and under FRCP 26(g)(3) based on not revealing bankruptcy proceedings that could have affected whether Rojas was a proper plaintiff. The judge denied sanctions, reasoning that Rojas and Kurtz lost about $400,000 apiece when the settlement replaced the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to section 1927, but vacated with respect to the rule, which does not afford judges the same discretion. View "Rojas v. Town of Cicero" on Justia Law

Kuznar left Poland and moved to the United States, leaving his wife, Emilia, and son Thomas. In the U.S., he married Anna without divorcing Emilia. Anna collected spousal pension benefits after his 1995 death. In 1997, Thomas, now living in the U.S., opened probate in Illinois state court, on his mother’s behalf. The probate court ordered Anna to pay Emilia the amount she had collected from Mitchell’s pension fund. Emilia died before judgment entered; the Appellate Court remanded. In 2011 Thomas opened administration of Emilia’s estate and renewed his motion for summary judgment in the 1997 case, on behalf of Emilia’s estate. Anna filed notice of removal. Thomas filed notice of voluntary dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Anna then argued that she had removed the 1997 case, not the 2011 case, and that no dismissal could be valid unless it dismissed the 1997 case entirely. The district judge reasoned that Anna’s submissions indicated that she was attempting to remove a “new action” filed in the 2011 probate case. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal was effective. Thomas was entitled to accept Anna’s “doubtful” characterization of his motion and voluntarily dismiss the supposed “new action” rather than dispute Anna’s shifting characterization of his filings. View "Kuznar v. Kuznar" on Justia Law

Jonas and his wife purchased life insurance: each owned the policy on his or her life, with the other as beneficiary. When they divorced, the court reassigned ownership: Troy owned the policy on Jennifer’s life. Each policy provided that change in ownership “does not change the Beneficiary Designation.” Troy thought it unnecessary to redesignate himself as beneficiary. Jennifer died. Troy claimed the proceeds ($1 million). State Farm did not pay, concerned that the proceeds might belong to the children (named secondary beneficiaries) or to Jennifer’s estate under Tex. Family Code 9.301, which provides that if a divorce occurs after one spouse has designated the other as beneficiary of an insurance policy, the designation lapses. Texas law requires an insurer to pay within 60 days of receiving a claim and provides for “damages” at 18% a year plus reasonable attorneys’ fees. An insurer that receives “notice of an adverse, bona fide claim” may defer payment and file an interpleader action not later than the 90th day. State Farm did not receive any other claim, but filed an “interpleader” before the 60 days had run. The district court treated concerns about the potential rights of the children and Jennifer’s estate as equivalent to a claim and disbursed the money to Troy, who argued on appeal that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees and interest at 18%. The Seventh Circuit vacated for dismissal. When the litigation began, there was no justiciable controversy. View "State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Jonas" on Justia Law

Morjal sued Chicago and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, conspiracy, false imprisonment, assault and malicious prosecution. Morjal accepted an offer of judgment under FRCP 68(a), which provided that the “Defendants offer to allow judgment to be taken against them … [$10,001.00] … plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs accrued to date.” The parties were unable to reach agreement as to the amount of attorneys’ fees. Morjal sought $22,190.50. After contentious litigation the district court awarded $17,205.50. Morjal then sought additional attorneys’ fees of $16,773.00 for time spent in litigating the fee petition. The defendants responded that Morjal was bound by the terms of the offer of judgment, which limited fees to those “accrued to date.” The district court concluded that, in some instances opposition to fees was “overly aggressive” and “arbitrary with no objective standard provided,” but awarded only $2,000 “to compensate for time spent responding to challenges to the fees that were unsupported and improper.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the court had authority to award fees under section 1988, and did so only as to conduct of the defendants that fell outside the provisions of the offer of judgment. View "Morjal v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Stuhlmacher’s parents purchased a ladder from Home Depot so that their son, Kurt, a millwright technician, could work on the roof of a cabin he was building for them in Indiana. Kurt was using the ladder for the first time when it fell, causing him to fall. Kurt sued Home Depot and the ladder’s manufacturer, Tricam. The Stuhlmachers’ expert, Dr. Conry, testified that the ladder was defective, likely causing Kurt to sense instability and involuntarily shift his weight. The magistrate judge struck Dr. Conry’s testimony, finding that his explanation of how the accident occurred did not “square” with Kurt’s testimony that the ladder shot out to his left. Because the testimony was stricken, the Stuhlmachers did not have any evidence showing causation, so the judge entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An expert’s testimony qualifies as relevant under Rule 702 so long as it assists the jury in determining any fact at issue in the case. Experts are allowed to posit alternate models to explain their conclusions. View "Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

A Marion, Indiana small claims court entered a judgment against Kevin about $1,000. He did not pay, although he had agreed to the judgment’s entry. Almost 20 years later Steel, claiming to represent the judgment creditor, asked the court to garnish Harold’s wages. It entered the requested order, which Harold moved to vacate, contending that Steel had misrepresented the judgment creditor’s identity (transactions after the judgment’s entry may or may not have transferred that asset to a new owner) and did not represent the only entity authorized to enforce the judgment. He did not contend that the request was untimely. A state judge sided with Steel and maintained the garnishment order in force. Instead of appealing, Harold filed a federal suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, contending that Steel and his law firm had violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e by making false statements. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it contested the state court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 1692e forbids debt collectors to tell lies but does not suggest that federal courts are to review state-court decisions about whether lies have been told. View "Harold v. Steel" on Justia Law

Parker asserted that “Scheck Industries” had fired him after just a few months on the job because of his race and several complaints he made to management about workplace discrimination. The EEOC issued Parker a right-to-sue letter, explaining that the agency had investigated but was unable to confirm his allegations. The agency’s letter did not suggest that “Scheck Industries” never employed Parker or that an entity with that name did not exist. In fact, Parker’s employer apparently used that name in dealing with the EEOC, since the agency’s letter to Parker was copied to “Scheck Industries.” Parker drafted a pro se complaint. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of service but explained that the company’s liability insurer failed to file an answer after misidentifying the complaint; that Scheck Mechanical never employed Parker; and that Parker’s claims under Title VII were untimely. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting Scheck Mechanical’s position, that Parker sued only Scheck Mechanical; the complaint included multiple references to Scheck Industrial. It may not matter which company employed Parker if, as Parker asserts, the line between the companies is blurred. View "Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp." on Justia Law

A Catholic school in Fort Wayne, Indiana, discharged a language-arts teacher because she underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order was not final and that the case did not qualify for collateral order review. View "Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend" on Justia Law

Several people interrogated by the infamous Jon Burge and other officers he trained or influenced sought damages under 42 U.S.C.1983. Between 1972 and 1991, while employed by Chicago’s police force, Burge regularly tortured people to extract statements. After the statute of limitations for prosecuting Burge about that misconduct expired, he was convicted of lying about his practices. The last interrogation about which any of the five plaintiffs complains occurred in 2004, and the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Illinois is two years. The last adverse event that might have been influenced by the interrogations was Freeman’s conviction in 2009, more than two years before the suit was filed and more than three years before Freeman joined the suit. The others are in prison following convictions for serious crimes; each conviction is supported by evidence independent of confessions induced by misconduct during interrogation. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs waited on the sidelines hoping that the acts of others would tarnish Burge’s reputation and make a suit easier to win. That is not the sort of diligence required to establish equitable tolling. View "Estate of Jones v. Burge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Chicago police officer, is black, and claimed racially motivated harassment, and retaliation for complaining about the harassment, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. While that suit was pending, he was fired. He claims retaliation for the internal complaints about harassment that he had made before he filed suit. Rather than amend his state court complaint to add a charge concerning his firing, he filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district judge stayed the federal suit while the state suit was pending. Brown dismissed the state case without prejudice. The district judge dismissed one count, alleging state claims, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and the other claims, retaliation and racial discrimination, on the merits, as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit modified to place dismissal of the first claim on the district court’s supplemental state-law jurisdiction, acknowledging that it may be so similar to the state law claims as to merit dismissal, but reversed with respect to the dismissal of the due process claim in that count. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Brown v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law