Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) removes sovereign immunity in actions involving personal injury or death resulting from an act of state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. 1605A. Subsection 1610(g) allows plaintiffs with a judgment against a state sponsor of terrorism to attach and execute the judgment against property of the foreign state itself and any agency and instrumentality of the state. The plaintiffs, relatives of men who were kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by al-Qaeda, while working as U.S. military contractors in Iraq, obtained a default judgment under FSIA for $413 million. A month later, the court clerk sent a copy of the default judgment to the Syrian Foreign Ministry via a private delivery service; the delivery was rejected. The next day, Syria filed an appeal challenging the district court’s personal jurisdiction. The court stayed enforcement pending appeal. The District of Columbia Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper and affirmed the default judgment; found that a “reasonable time” had passed after entry of judgment and notice to Syria; and authorized attachment and execution of the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed registration of the judgment in Illinois and the lower court’s issuance of a “turn over” order, rejecting the objections of other claimants of the Syrian assets View "Wyatt v. Gates" on Justia Law

Pendell claimed that a city inspector illegally entered her yard, used information from that unauthorized inspection to swear out an affidavit, and obtained an administrative search warrant. City employees then removed litter and inoperable vehicles and razed her yard with a bulldozer. Pendell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but made little progress with her suit. Her deposition was set for December 2013, but Pendell never appeared. She claimed to have had a stroke, but provided no evidence. The court denied a motion to dismiss, but ordered Pendell to appear for deposition before March 14, 2014, and warned that he would dismiss her case if she failed to appear again. By agreement Pendell’s deposition was reset for April 17, but after 90 minutes of questioning Pendell said that her “brain was fried.” The parties agreed to adjourn and resume on May 9. She did not appear. At a conference two weeks later, the court sua sponte revived and granted the motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pendell put opposing counsel to needless expense and delayed the court’s calendar. Because she lied in asserting that she did not know about the resumed deposition, she gave the court no reason to believe that she would respect the judicial process. View "Pendell v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Bebo is the respondent in an administrative enforcement proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, alleging that she violated federal law by manipulating internal books and records, making false representations to auditors, and making false disclosures to the SEC. Rather than wait for a final decision in the administrative enforcement proceeding, Bebo filed suit in federal court challenging on constitutional grounds the authority of the SEC to conduct the proceeding. She invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the administrative review scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrative law judge assigned to the case is expected to issue an initial decision within the coming months. If the decision is adverse to Bebo, she will have the right to file a petition for review with the SEC. The SEC will then have the power either to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the agency or to grant the petition and conduct de novo review. If the SEC’s final decision is adverse, Bebo will then have the right under 15 U.S.C. 78y(a)(1) to seek judicial review and will be able to raise her constitutional claims. View "Bebo v. Sec. Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

In 2004, Seneca and Tari Adams endured vicious beatings by Chicago police officers and prolonged detentions. Along with their sister, Sicara, they sued the city and the officers. The city admitted its liability to all three plaintiffs for false arrest, excessive force, and race discrimination; it also stipulated that it was liable to Seneca and Tari for malicious prosecution in violation of state law. The jury returned awards of $2.4 million to Seneca, $1 million to Tari, and $300,000 to Sicara. The district court entered an order reducing those amounts to $1.17 million for Seneca, $350,000 for Tari, and $125,000 for Sicara The court did not give the plaintiffs the option of a new trial in lieu of accepting the lower amount. Seneca and Tari appealed. The Seventh Circuit vacated for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict A true remittitur order gives the winning party a choice: he may either accept a specific reduced monetary award or he may opt for a new trial. These plaintiffs never agreed to the reduction in their award and were never offered the option of a new trial; they were entitled to appeal. View "Adams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Barr was a tenure-track journalism professor at Western Illinois University from the fall of 2007 through the spring semester 2010, when the University declined to retain her for the next academic year. Barr contends that the decision was in retaliation for complaints she made in 2008 about racial discrimination at the school. In March she sued the University alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. Service of this suit was never perfected. Weeks later, in June, Barr filed a second lawsuit, against the Board of Trustees, alleging that the decision not to renew her contract was retaliatory and the product of age discrimination. In the meantime, Barr’s first suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During discovery in the second case, the Board of Trustees learned of Barr’s prior lawsuit and raised res judicata as an affirmative defense. The district court rejected Barr’s arguments her first suit didn’t end in a judgment on the merits and the claims differed in the two cases and dismissed The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as an adjudication on the merits,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and Barr’s two suits involved the same parties and core of operative facts. View "Barr v. Bd. of Tr. of W. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

JHM rents commercial laundry machines to Chicago-area apartment buildings. Firestone made four loans to JHM, totaling $254,114.99. JHM defaulted on each. Firestone sued. JHM filed an answer, asserting a counterclaim of promissory estoppel, alleging that after Firestone’s first two loans to JHM, Firestone vice president McAllister had represented that his company “wanted to expand [its] investment in the laundry business,” and that it “would create a $500,000 line of credit” to fund equipment purchases, which “induced JHM into purchasing equipment” that it would not otherwise have purchased and that it was unable to pay for. As a result, JHM’s equipment supplier (Maytag) refused to sell it laundry equipment, resulting in substantial losses. JMH raised affirmative defenses, including promissory estoppel and prior breach of contract. Defense counsel withdrew from the case. JMH did not obtain substitute counsel, so the court granted Firestone default judgment, on grounds that corporations are required to have legal counsel under Illinois law. The court later dismissed the counterclaims as facially implausible and entered summary judgment on a breach of guaranty claim. The Seventh Circuit vacated; the plausibiity standard does not allow a court to question or otherwise disregard nonconclusory factual allegations simply because they seem unlikely. View "Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The IRS assessed deficiencies against Williams in connection with his income tax for 1996-2005, totaling, with interest and penalties, about $1.3 million. He did not pay. The IRS filed tax liens in Clark County, Indiana, where Williams and his wife Leslie jointly own land. The state and county also filed liens. The district court entered an order that specifies how much Williams owes to each of the three taxing bodies, orders the property to be sold and the net receipts applied to these debts, and details how the money will be divided among the United States, the state, the county, and Leslie. The order states that it is the court’s final decision; the Williamses appealed. The mortgage lender argued that foreclosure governed by Illinois law is not final, and not appealable, because the amount of a deficiency judgment depends on the reasonableness of the sale price, and the validity of the sale itself is contestable to determine whether the outcome is equitable. Illinois provides debtors with multiple opportunities to redeem before a transfer takes effect. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The foreclosure sale is governed by 26 U.S.C. 7403(c), which does not provide for deficiency judgments and does not give the taxpayer a right of redemption. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

FRCP 4(c)(3) requires a court to order that service be made by a U.S. marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued former warden Werlinger, for violations of his constitutional rights. The judge allowed him to proceed pro se and, in June 2014, directed the Marshals Service to serve Werlinger. The Marshals replied within days that Werlinger had retired and left no forwarding address. The court directed the Marshals to make another attempt by contacting the Federal Bureau of Prisons or conducting an Internet search of public records, stating that “reasonable efforts do not require the marshal to be a private investigator for civil litigants or to use software available only to law enforcement officers." Two days later, the Marshals replied: Was not able to locate using internet database searches. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal as premature. The “court should not have accepted the responses…. Not that the Service can be expected to do the impossible. If Werlinger changed his name to Siddhārtha Gautama and is now a monk of a Buddhist temple in Tibet, the Marshals Service probably couldn’t find him by efforts proportionate to the importance of finding … plaintiff would be out of luck … the statute of limitations shall be tolled … while the Marshals Service redoubles its efforts to FIND WERLINGER!” View "Williams v. Werlinger" on Justia Law