Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After serving a term in an Illinois state prison for a sex crime, the plaintiff was committed to a Treatment and Detention Facility, pursuant to the civil Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. He had a job in the Facility’s dietary services department. He alleged, in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that he was fired in retaliation for previous lawsuits against staff members. He claims disciplinary charges against him were “trumped-up.” The district judge conducted screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and dismissed the suit with prejudice because it “contained only conclusory allegations. … Plaintiff simply stated he had filed previous lawsuits and assumed people knew about it.” The judge had interviewed the plaintiff by telephone. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that it previously rejected ex parte telephonic interrogation as a method of screening complaints to determine whether they state a claim. It is permissible for the judge to interview a pro se detainee plaintiff to determine, not whether the plaintiff’s case is meritorious, but simply what that case is; the judge must ensure that a transcript or recording of the interview be made to allow appellate review. View "Henderson v. Wilcoxen" on Justia Law

Philos Tech, an Illinois company, sent equipment to Korea for delivery to P&D in connection with an alleged joint venture between the companies. The nature and origins of the joint venture are disputed. Defendant Don-Hee Park visited Illinois twice and met with Philos. Philos Tech filed suit in Illinois in 2008, alleging that P&D, Don-Hee and Jae-Hee unlawfully converted that equipment by refusing to return it after failing to increase Philo’s shares in P&D. The parties presented the court with competing translations of the documents, all of which are in Korean. There were transfers of funds and equipment between Korea and Illinois, but the purpose and details are unclear. The district court granted Philos Tech default judgment and awarded damages. After Philos Tech attempted to enforce this judgment in Korea, Defendants moved to vacate the judgment under FRCP 60(b)(4), asserting that the Illinois court’s judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that the request was untimely, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. Following a remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and denial of Philos Tech’s motion asking the court to vacate its judgment on account of the Parks’ alleged fraud. View "Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc." on Justia Law

A Cook County Jail pretrial detainee was attacked and stabbed. He cried out for help but was ignored by an unidentified guard standing 10-15 feet from him. The plaintiff regained consciousness three days later in a hospital, having suffered nerve damage and a fracture of an eye socket that may eventually cause blindness. He filed suit, alleging failure to create or enforce policies necessary to protect prisoners from attacks by fellow prisoners. Defense counsel sent the plaintiff, several letters, demanding that he sign a release to permit access to all of plaintiff’s health records since his 1977 birth, including records—of no apparent relevance to his case—relating to venereal disease, AIDS and HIV, and permitting disclosure to parties not connected with the attack, injuries, or resulting medical treatments. Although plaintiff suggested limiting the release to the hospital at which he was treated and that time period, the defense moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Without waiting for a reply and without any explanation, the court dismissed with prejudice and denied plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel as moot. The motion had been pending for two months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, calling the dismissal “a miscarriage of justice.” View "Reyes v. Dart" on Justia Law

Dr. Meinders sued United Healthcare in Illinois state court, alleging that in 2013, United sent him and a number of similarly-situated persons an unsolicited “junk fax” advertising United’s services, which violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and amounted to common law conversion. United removed the case to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(3), claiming that Meinders had entered into a “Provider Agreement” with a United-owned entity, ACN, in 2006, which bound him to arbitrate his “junk fax” claims in Minnesota. Meinders unsuccessfully moved to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply addressing the assumption theory and declaration. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the district court premised its dismissal order on law and facts to which Meinders did not have a full and fair opportunity to respond. View "Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Secrease sued his former employer and some of its supervisors, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2 and 2000e–3(a). The employer moved to dismiss the suit as untimely, arguing that Secrease had tried to make his Title VII claims look timely by attaching to his complaint a charge of discrimination, filed with the EEOC in April 2013, but mismatched to a right-to-sue letter dated March 2014 that addressed a different EEOC charge. Secrease had filed three charges of discrimination with the EEOC. In response, Secrease submitted a document that he claimed was his employment contract and that contained an arbitration clause. After examining the employer’s evidence that the document had been falsified, the district court dismissed his suit with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the fraud finding was not clearly erroneous and the sanction of dismissal was appropriate. View "Secrease, v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) removes sovereign immunity in actions involving personal injury or death resulting from an act of state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. 1605A. Subsection 1610(g) allows plaintiffs with a judgment against a state sponsor of terrorism to attach and execute the judgment against property of the foreign state itself and any agency and instrumentality of the state. The plaintiffs, relatives of men who were kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by al-Qaeda, while working as U.S. military contractors in Iraq, obtained a default judgment under FSIA for $413 million. A month later, the court clerk sent a copy of the default judgment to the Syrian Foreign Ministry via a private delivery service; the delivery was rejected. The next day, Syria filed an appeal challenging the district court’s personal jurisdiction. The court stayed enforcement pending appeal. The District of Columbia Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper and affirmed the default judgment; found that a “reasonable time” had passed after entry of judgment and notice to Syria; and authorized attachment and execution of the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed registration of the judgment in Illinois and the lower court’s issuance of a “turn over” order, rejecting the objections of other claimants of the Syrian assets View "Wyatt v. Gates" on Justia Law

Pendell claimed that a city inspector illegally entered her yard, used information from that unauthorized inspection to swear out an affidavit, and obtained an administrative search warrant. City employees then removed litter and inoperable vehicles and razed her yard with a bulldozer. Pendell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but made little progress with her suit. Her deposition was set for December 2013, but Pendell never appeared. She claimed to have had a stroke, but provided no evidence. The court denied a motion to dismiss, but ordered Pendell to appear for deposition before March 14, 2014, and warned that he would dismiss her case if she failed to appear again. By agreement Pendell’s deposition was reset for April 17, but after 90 minutes of questioning Pendell said that her “brain was fried.” The parties agreed to adjourn and resume on May 9. She did not appear. At a conference two weeks later, the court sua sponte revived and granted the motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pendell put opposing counsel to needless expense and delayed the court’s calendar. Because she lied in asserting that she did not know about the resumed deposition, she gave the court no reason to believe that she would respect the judicial process. View "Pendell v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Bebo is the respondent in an administrative enforcement proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, alleging that she violated federal law by manipulating internal books and records, making false representations to auditors, and making false disclosures to the SEC. Rather than wait for a final decision in the administrative enforcement proceeding, Bebo filed suit in federal court challenging on constitutional grounds the authority of the SEC to conduct the proceeding. She invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the administrative review scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrative law judge assigned to the case is expected to issue an initial decision within the coming months. If the decision is adverse to Bebo, she will have the right to file a petition for review with the SEC. The SEC will then have the power either to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the agency or to grant the petition and conduct de novo review. If the SEC’s final decision is adverse, Bebo will then have the right under 15 U.S.C. 78y(a)(1) to seek judicial review and will be able to raise her constitutional claims. View "Bebo v. Sec. Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law