Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Cook County Jail pretrial detainee was attacked and stabbed. He cried out for help but was ignored by an unidentified guard standing 10-15 feet from him. The plaintiff regained consciousness three days later in a hospital, having suffered nerve damage and a fracture of an eye socket that may eventually cause blindness. He filed suit, alleging failure to create or enforce policies necessary to protect prisoners from attacks by fellow prisoners. Defense counsel sent the plaintiff, several letters, demanding that he sign a release to permit access to all of plaintiff’s health records since his 1977 birth, including records—of no apparent relevance to his case—relating to venereal disease, AIDS and HIV, and permitting disclosure to parties not connected with the attack, injuries, or resulting medical treatments. Although plaintiff suggested limiting the release to the hospital at which he was treated and that time period, the defense moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Without waiting for a reply and without any explanation, the court dismissed with prejudice and denied plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel as moot. The motion had been pending for two months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, calling the dismissal “a miscarriage of justice.” View "Reyes v. Dart" on Justia Law

Dr. Meinders sued United Healthcare in Illinois state court, alleging that in 2013, United sent him and a number of similarly-situated persons an unsolicited “junk fax” advertising United’s services, which violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and amounted to common law conversion. United removed the case to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(3), claiming that Meinders had entered into a “Provider Agreement” with a United-owned entity, ACN, in 2006, which bound him to arbitrate his “junk fax” claims in Minnesota. Meinders unsuccessfully moved to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply addressing the assumption theory and declaration. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the district court premised its dismissal order on law and facts to which Meinders did not have a full and fair opportunity to respond. View "Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Secrease sued his former employer and some of its supervisors, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2 and 2000e–3(a). The employer moved to dismiss the suit as untimely, arguing that Secrease had tried to make his Title VII claims look timely by attaching to his complaint a charge of discrimination, filed with the EEOC in April 2013, but mismatched to a right-to-sue letter dated March 2014 that addressed a different EEOC charge. Secrease had filed three charges of discrimination with the EEOC. In response, Secrease submitted a document that he claimed was his employment contract and that contained an arbitration clause. After examining the employer’s evidence that the document had been falsified, the district court dismissed his suit with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the fraud finding was not clearly erroneous and the sanction of dismissal was appropriate. View "Secrease, v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) removes sovereign immunity in actions involving personal injury or death resulting from an act of state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. 1605A. Subsection 1610(g) allows plaintiffs with a judgment against a state sponsor of terrorism to attach and execute the judgment against property of the foreign state itself and any agency and instrumentality of the state. The plaintiffs, relatives of men who were kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by al-Qaeda, while working as U.S. military contractors in Iraq, obtained a default judgment under FSIA for $413 million. A month later, the court clerk sent a copy of the default judgment to the Syrian Foreign Ministry via a private delivery service; the delivery was rejected. The next day, Syria filed an appeal challenging the district court’s personal jurisdiction. The court stayed enforcement pending appeal. The District of Columbia Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper and affirmed the default judgment; found that a “reasonable time” had passed after entry of judgment and notice to Syria; and authorized attachment and execution of the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed registration of the judgment in Illinois and the lower court’s issuance of a “turn over” order, rejecting the objections of other claimants of the Syrian assets View "Wyatt v. Gates" on Justia Law

Pendell claimed that a city inspector illegally entered her yard, used information from that unauthorized inspection to swear out an affidavit, and obtained an administrative search warrant. City employees then removed litter and inoperable vehicles and razed her yard with a bulldozer. Pendell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but made little progress with her suit. Her deposition was set for December 2013, but Pendell never appeared. She claimed to have had a stroke, but provided no evidence. The court denied a motion to dismiss, but ordered Pendell to appear for deposition before March 14, 2014, and warned that he would dismiss her case if she failed to appear again. By agreement Pendell’s deposition was reset for April 17, but after 90 minutes of questioning Pendell said that her “brain was fried.” The parties agreed to adjourn and resume on May 9. She did not appear. At a conference two weeks later, the court sua sponte revived and granted the motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pendell put opposing counsel to needless expense and delayed the court’s calendar. Because she lied in asserting that she did not know about the resumed deposition, she gave the court no reason to believe that she would respect the judicial process. View "Pendell v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Bebo is the respondent in an administrative enforcement proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, alleging that she violated federal law by manipulating internal books and records, making false representations to auditors, and making false disclosures to the SEC. Rather than wait for a final decision in the administrative enforcement proceeding, Bebo filed suit in federal court challenging on constitutional grounds the authority of the SEC to conduct the proceeding. She invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the administrative review scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrative law judge assigned to the case is expected to issue an initial decision within the coming months. If the decision is adverse to Bebo, she will have the right to file a petition for review with the SEC. The SEC will then have the power either to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the agency or to grant the petition and conduct de novo review. If the SEC’s final decision is adverse, Bebo will then have the right under 15 U.S.C. 78y(a)(1) to seek judicial review and will be able to raise her constitutional claims. View "Bebo v. Sec. Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

In 2004, Seneca and Tari Adams endured vicious beatings by Chicago police officers and prolonged detentions. Along with their sister, Sicara, they sued the city and the officers. The city admitted its liability to all three plaintiffs for false arrest, excessive force, and race discrimination; it also stipulated that it was liable to Seneca and Tari for malicious prosecution in violation of state law. The jury returned awards of $2.4 million to Seneca, $1 million to Tari, and $300,000 to Sicara. The district court entered an order reducing those amounts to $1.17 million for Seneca, $350,000 for Tari, and $125,000 for Sicara The court did not give the plaintiffs the option of a new trial in lieu of accepting the lower amount. Seneca and Tari appealed. The Seventh Circuit vacated for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict A true remittitur order gives the winning party a choice: he may either accept a specific reduced monetary award or he may opt for a new trial. These plaintiffs never agreed to the reduction in their award and were never offered the option of a new trial; they were entitled to appeal. View "Adams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Barr was a tenure-track journalism professor at Western Illinois University from the fall of 2007 through the spring semester 2010, when the University declined to retain her for the next academic year. Barr contends that the decision was in retaliation for complaints she made in 2008 about racial discrimination at the school. In March she sued the University alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. Service of this suit was never perfected. Weeks later, in June, Barr filed a second lawsuit, against the Board of Trustees, alleging that the decision not to renew her contract was retaliatory and the product of age discrimination. In the meantime, Barr’s first suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During discovery in the second case, the Board of Trustees learned of Barr’s prior lawsuit and raised res judicata as an affirmative defense. The district court rejected Barr’s arguments her first suit didn’t end in a judgment on the merits and the claims differed in the two cases and dismissed The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as an adjudication on the merits,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and Barr’s two suits involved the same parties and core of operative facts. View "Barr v. Bd. of Tr. of W. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law