Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chivalry contracted with Rehtmeyer to develop and manufacture a board game. Chivalry paid Rehtmeyer over $128,000, but the relationship deteriorated. Rehtmeyer never produced the game. Chivalry sued for breach of contract and won a judgment of $168,331.59, plus $621.25 in costs in Illinois state court. Rehtmeyer never paid. Chivalry issued a citation to discover assets. At the citation examination, Rehtmeyer testified that she had no ownership interest in any real estate; securities, stocks, bonds or similar assets; office or electronic equipment; nor a personal checking or savings account. Because Rehtmeryer had not produced required documents, Chivalry continued the citation and filed a motion to compel production, which was granted. She did not comply. The state court twice more ordered her to produce all the documents required by the citation. Months later, Chivalry sought a rule to show cause. The day before the scheduled hearing, Rehtmeyer filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Chivalry appeared to object to the discharge of the debt owed to it, claiming that Rehtmeyer had concealed her assets and income during the citation proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied Chivalry’s objection. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Rehtmeyer concealed assets with the requisite intent. View "Jacobs v. Marcus-Rehtmeyer" on Justia Law

Kipp, an Illinois resident, purchased a chairlift ticket at Devil’s Head Ski Resort in Merrimac, Wisconsin. He claims that as a result of the “unreasonably fast speed” of the lift in the boarding area, he was injured (broken collarbone) as he was attempting to board it. After allowing Kipp to conduct limited discovery, the Illinois district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that the defendant’s only offices are in Wisconsin. The company does not engage in print or broadcast advertising in Illinois, but it does attend a trade show that takes place in Chicago every year. At the show, Ski Enterprise representatives speak with potential customers and obtain their email addresses. The company later sends out “email E blasts” to those contacts. There is also a website, through which customers can reserve rooms at the resort; they cannot purchase lift tickets on the site. The resort offers a vacation package called the “Chicagoland Express,” but the package is not limited to Illinois residents. Approximately 60 to 75 percent of the resort’s clients are from Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, describing defendant’s contacts with Illinois as insubstantial and episodic. View "Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp." on Justia Law

The district court certified a nationwide class action, alleging that Nestlé and Waggin’ Train sold dog treats that injured the dogs. The parties reached a settlement, to which the district court has given tentative approval pending a fairness hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). That hearing is scheduled for June 23, 2015. The order tentatively approving the settlement enjoins all class members from prosecuting litigation about the dog treats in any other forum. One case affected by this injunction has been pending for two years in Missouri, and was certified as a statewide class action before the federal suit was certified as a national class action. Curts, the certified representative of the Missouri class, intervened to protest the injunction, citing 28 U.S.C. 2283, the AntiInjunction Act. The Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction, noting that the district judge did not explain why he entered the injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A) provides that every order issuing an injunction must “state the reasons why it issued.” An injunction that halts state litigation is permissible only if it satisfies section 2283 in addition to the traditional factors. The district judge was silent about everything that matters. View "Adkins v. Nestle Purina PetCare Co." on Justia Law

Iqbal bought a gasoline service station and contracted with S-Mart Petroleum for gasoline. Iqbal then hired Patel to conduct the business, ceding operational control to him. He chose Patel on the recommendation of Johnson, S-Mart’s president. Patel ran the business but did not pay for the gasoline, leading S-Mart to sue. The Indiana state court entered a judgment of more than $65,000 against Iqbal as guarantor. Under a settlement, Iqbal gave S-Mart a note, secured by a mortgage on the business premises. When he still did not pay, a state court entered a second judgment against him, and the property was sold in a foreclosure auction. Iqbal filed a federal suit, alleging that Patel and Johnson acted in cahoots to defraud him out of his business and seeking treble damages under 18 U.S.C. 1964, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it challenged the state court’s judgments. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predated the state litigation and caused injury independently of it. View "Iqbal v. Patel" on Justia Law

Nelson, a former employee of the Lake County Auditor’s office, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Katona, individually and as Lake County Auditor, and Lake County Indiana, claiming that she was unlawfully terminated from her job in retaliation for her political support of Barack Obama. After trial, the court entered judgment against Nelson in accordance with the jury’s verdict. The Seventh Circuit rejected Nelson’s appeal. Nelson failed to move for a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) before the case was submitted to the jury and did not make any motion pursuant to Rule 50(b) or Rule 59 after the verdict. Failure to comply with Rule 50(b) forecloses any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. A post‐verdict motion is necessary because “[d]etermination of whether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.” View "Nelson v. Holinga-Katona" on Justia Law

Maurice Salem was admitted pro hac vice in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in connection with some commercial litigation. Salem represented Trade Well International, a Pakistani company, which was suing United Central Bank for damages and the return of property that was left behind in a hotel that the Bank owned. Problems arose when Salem filed a Notice of Lien on behalf of his client; the Notice stated that there was a lien on the hotel and purported to provide notice of the litigation. The district court, concluding that the Notice was defective in several ways, held Salem in contempt of court, revoked his pro hac vice status, barred him from practicing in the Western District of Wisconsin for three years, and imposed a $500 fine. Salem appealed. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court’s orders should have been set aside: nothing Salem did warranted a finding of contempt, nor these sanctions. View "Salem v. United Central Bank" on Justia Law

National Retirement Fund sought to hold Mezz Lender and Oaktree Capital responsible for multiemployer pension fund withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1381. Oaktree, through Mezz Lender, provided financing for the acquisition of a hotel by Chicago H&S. When H&S defaulted, it was taken into bankruptcy and the hotel was liquidated. NRF contends that the sale of the hotel triggered withdrawal liability on the part of H&S and any other “trade or business” under common control with it, including bot Oaktree and Mezz Lender. Oaktree and Mezz Lender, argued that the claim of withdrawal liability was barred by the bankruptcy reorganization plan pursuant to which the hotel was sold. On motions for summary judgment, the court stated that having decided that Oaktree and Mezz were not jointly and severally liable for H&S’s withdrawal liability, "the Court need not address the parties’ arguments as to [the Oaktree parties’] motion" concerning the bankruptcy. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court decided in the absence of a cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue that it found to be dispositive, and without first giving the unsuccessful movant notice that it was entertaining the possibility of entering summary judgment against it or the opportunity to respond. View "Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. National Retirement Fund" on Justia Law

Jones, a United Airlines flight attendant, was fired for misconduct. He sued his union, claiming that because of racial animus and his complaints about discrimination, the union had not fairly represented him, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2(c), 2000e-3(a). As part of a settlement, the union agreed to challenge his discharge before the System Board of Adjustment. Jones agreed to dismiss his lawsuit with prejudice. The settlement does not provide for continuing federal court jurisdiction. Both signed a stipulation of dismissal (FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)). Two weeks later, Jones filed his first pro se submission: a two-sentence request to discharge Jones’s recruited lawyer and to return his suit to the district judge. Next, he asked that his lawsuit be reinstated and that a “default judgment” be entered against the union, although it was pursuing a grievance, as promised. Finally, Jones submitted his “motion to establish court’s jurisdiction.” The magistrate to whom the case had previously been assigned rejected all three for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, reasoning that Jones’s submission was not part of the litigation covered by the parties’ consents, so the magistrate did not have authority to issue a dispositive ruling. Jones was bringing a new lawsuit. The magistrate could dispose of that new action only if assigned by a district judge and the parties furnished new consents. View "Jones v. Asso'n of Flight Attendants-CWA" on Justia Law

For 13 years Sklyarsky worked as a custodian at a Chicago office building, through different employers. In 2010, new supervisors began disciplining Sklyarsky. He complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights that the company was treating him unfairly because of his Ukrainian national origin. Sklyarsky was fired in 2013, and after exhausting administrative remedies, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2, e-3, e-5(f).1 During discovery Sklyarsky, an experienced pro se litigant, concluded that the building’s management company had been involved in the discrimination and sought leave to join it as a defendant. Judge Kocoras denied that motion, telling Sklyarsky that Means-Knaus had “nothing to do with the employment contract” and that, if he wanted to sue MeansKnaus, he would have to file a separate action. Sklyarsky did that. Judge Gottschall, assigned to the new suit against Means-Knaus, screened Sklyarsky’s pro se complaint and dismissed it sua sponte, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion foreclosed a separate suit. Judge Kocoras refused to reconsider and entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any procedural missteps were harmless. View "Sklyarsky v. Harvard Maint., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff won a judgment in a breach of contract claim. The court’s memorandum opinion and order, held the defendants liable for “$113,500 plus interest accruing and attorneys’ fees.” When entering the judgment on the docket, the court checked the box indicating that no prejudgment interest would be awarded. Plaintiff moved to “quantify interest based on the memorandum opinion and order.” The defendants filed appeals. Because the district court had not quantified prejudgment interest, the Seventh Circuit ordered the parties to file memoranda explaining why the appeals should not be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the district court addressed the motion to quantify, which it construed as a motion to correct the judgment. Explaining that it had checked the wrong box on the judgment, the court directed plaintiff to move the Seventh Circuit for leave to correct the clerical mistake. Plaintiff filed the motion. The Seventh Circuit held that there is no final judgment to appeal. The award of prejudgment interest is part of a plaintiff’s damages and the district court must quantify damages before a judgment can be final. Even if the clerical mistake were corrected, the judgment would not quantify prejudgment interest and the district court did not address how it would quantify the award. View "Dual-Temp of Ill., Inc. v. Hench Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law