Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

Mitchell, physically a man, psychologically a woman, sought to compel her probation officers to alter conditions of her probation, by allowing her to reside with her family rather than in the men’s homeless shelter, allowing her to dress as a woman, and referring her to treatment programs for her gender dysphoria. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on grounds that she hadn’t complied with rules governing injunctive relief, that the requested injunctive relief was unrelated to the merits of her claims against prison doctors (the only claims that had survived screening of her complaint), and that she had failed to demonstrate either that she was likely to prevail on the underlying claims or would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was denied. While the appeal was pending, Mitchell was returned to custody, after pleading guilty to theft, prostitution, and resisting an officer. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal of denial of an injunction as moot. Mitchell still has claims pending against the doctors, unaffected by the denial of the preliminary injunction, and should she be released from jail during the litigation and again placed on probation she can renew her objections to the terms of her probation. View "Mitchell v. Wall" on Justia Law

Lawyer Spicer represented plaintiff Egan in a case that alleged sex discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment. The complaint included allegations that Egan, at her deposition, emphatically denied. Spicer conceded that the allegations in the paragraph were false and claimed “proofreading error.” The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district judge imposed a $5,000 sanction on Spicer for “bad faith” misconduct/ The Seventh Circuit affirmed, calling Spicer’s excuses “pathetic” and noting that it took six months for Spicer to correct the complaint. View "Egan v. Pineda" on Justia Law

Alliance for Water Efficiency engaged Fryer to analyze how water agencies’ programs affect elasticity of water demand during droughts. Fryer prepared a draft report. Alliance was dissatisfied, and sued to prevent Fryer from publishing the report. The California Department of Water Resources, a project sponsor, wanted to present his findings under its auspices. After negotiations, Fryer promised to remove Alliance’s name from his report, issue it under California’s sponsorship, and provide his data to Alliance, which would issue a separate report. After a magistrate concluded that a binding settlement had been reached, acrimony resumed. Complete written agreement was never reached. Alliance protested when Fryer circulated a new draft report that identified, as providers of data and assistance, some organizations that had participated through a committee that Alliance had organized. Fryer claimed that the organizations wish to be identified and that a consultant is entitled to name sponsors and collaborators. The magistrate concluded that Fryer must remove any reference to entities that worked with him through or in connection with Alliance, unless those entities take the initiative to contact him and say that he can mention their names. Fryer challenged the order as a prior restraint, violating the First Amendment. Declining to address the constitutional issue, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction as going beyond what the parties agreed. View "Alliance for Water Efficiency v. Fryer" on Justia Law

Defendants are national securities exchanges registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and operate as self‐regulatory organizations that regulate markets in conformance with securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a. Plaintiffs are securities firms and members of the defendant exchanges. They compete for customer order flow by displaying buy and sell quotations for particular stocks. Between at least January 2004 and June 2011, each defendant charged “payment for order flow” (PFOF) fees. Each defendant exchange imposes PFOF fees when a trade is made for a customer; however, these fees are not imposed for proprietary “house trades,” where a firm trades on its own behalf. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit, in which they sought to recover PFOF fees they claim were improperly charged. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the SEC. View "Citadel Sec., LLC v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc." on Justia Law

Several multi-employer health and welfare funds filed this suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act seeking approximately $70,000 in alleged delinquent contributions. The assertedly delinquent employer, Con-Tech Carpentry, did not file an answer within the statutory period and was found in default. The district court subsequently entered a judgment in the funds’ favor and awarded damages. Con-Tech subsequently filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, which also invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The judge denied the Rule 60(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that because Con-Tech made a deliberate decision to disregard the pending suit, there was no reason for the district judge to excuse Con-Tech’s conduct in retrospect. View "Mid-Central Illinois Reg’l v. Con-Tech Carpentry, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has a neurological disorder, tardive dyskinesia. Plaintiff’s involuntary movements include tongue thrusting, pursing of the lips, choking, and side-to-side chewing of the jaw. She becomes mute, screams or makes non-verbal sounds, particularly under stress. She also suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, with severe anxiety. Shortly after plaintiff was diagnosed with TD, a personal injury suit that she had filed went to trial. She had no lawyer. Before trial, she sought accommodations of her medical problems, and was permitted to have a friend and a family member take notes, was given a podium, and was allowed to take occasional recesses. She was denied other requested help—a microphone, an interpreter, and a jury instruction explaining her disorder, lest the jurors think she was just acting up. She was hectored by the judge, who told the jury that the plaintiff has a “speech impediment.” She suffered other embarrassments in front of the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act yet had been denied reasonable accommodations. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that plaintiff was denied a full and fair opportunity to vindicate her claims. View "Reed v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

In 2014, two people were killed when a Seattle news helicopter crashed. The National Transportation Safety Board investigated, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1), “to ascertain measures that would best tend to prevent similar accidents or incidents in the future.” NTSB “does not engage in traditional agency adjudications, nor does it promulgate or enforce any air safety regulations. Rather, it simply analyzes accidents and recommends ways to prevent similar accidents.” No part of an NTSB accident report may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages. In 2015, the Board released a Factual Report concerning its investigation of the Seattle crash; it has not yet released an analysis of the likely cause of the accident. The Illinois company that owned and operated the helicopter involved in the crash asserted that the Report “omits significant information that will make it impossible for the Board to reach an accurate determination of Probable Cause” and unsuccessfully requested that NTSB rescind the Report and refrain from releasing its Probable Cause Report until “errors in the Factual Report are addressed.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition seeking an order requiring NTSB to rescind or withhold reports. The court concluded that the Board’s reports are not final orders subject to review. View "Helicopters, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd." on Justia Law

After serving a term in an Illinois state prison for a sex crime, the plaintiff was committed to a Treatment and Detention Facility, pursuant to the civil Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. He had a job in the Facility’s dietary services department. He alleged, in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that he was fired in retaliation for previous lawsuits against staff members. He claims disciplinary charges against him were “trumped-up.” The district judge conducted screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and dismissed the suit with prejudice because it “contained only conclusory allegations. … Plaintiff simply stated he had filed previous lawsuits and assumed people knew about it.” The judge had interviewed the plaintiff by telephone. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that it previously rejected ex parte telephonic interrogation as a method of screening complaints to determine whether they state a claim. It is permissible for the judge to interview a pro se detainee plaintiff to determine, not whether the plaintiff’s case is meritorious, but simply what that case is; the judge must ensure that a transcript or recording of the interview be made to allow appellate review. View "Henderson v. Wilcoxen" on Justia Law

Philos Tech, an Illinois company, sent equipment to Korea for delivery to P&D in connection with an alleged joint venture between the companies. The nature and origins of the joint venture are disputed. Defendant Don-Hee Park visited Illinois twice and met with Philos. Philos Tech filed suit in Illinois in 2008, alleging that P&D, Don-Hee and Jae-Hee unlawfully converted that equipment by refusing to return it after failing to increase Philo’s shares in P&D. The parties presented the court with competing translations of the documents, all of which are in Korean. There were transfers of funds and equipment between Korea and Illinois, but the purpose and details are unclear. The district court granted Philos Tech default judgment and awarded damages. After Philos Tech attempted to enforce this judgment in Korea, Defendants moved to vacate the judgment under FRCP 60(b)(4), asserting that the Illinois court’s judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that the request was untimely, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. Following a remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and denial of Philos Tech’s motion asking the court to vacate its judgment on account of the Parks’ alleged fraud. View "Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc." on Justia Law