Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff reached an oral agreement to settle a litigation arising out of a home mortgage loan, but the defendants insisted that as part of the settlement he would have to release any claims he had against another bank, and against a trust company, neither of which had been a party to the litigation. The district judge agreed with the defendants’ position. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for a factual inquiry, noting that it has not been proved that anyone had told the plaintiff during the settlement conference that by agreeing to the settlement he would also be releasing any claim he might have against the two nonparties to the litigation. View "Chancellor v. Select Portfolio Servicing" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency designated Williamson County, Illinois, as a nonattainment area for national air quality standards for sulfur dioxide. The rule is not limited to Williamson County; it makes attainment designations for 61 geographic areas spanning 24 states. Southern Illinois Power Cooperative sought judicial review. The EPA moved to dismiss or transfer the petition to the D.C. Circuit under the terms of the judicial-review provision of the Clean Air Act, which designates that circuit as the exclusive venue for review of “nationally applicable” agency actions. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The Seventh Circuit agreed that the challenged rule is nationally applicable and transferred the petition to the D.C. Circuit. The court noted that its decision conflicts with its 1993 decision, Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. EPA, which it overruled. View "Southern Illinois Power Cooperative v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Seventh Circuit Rules 3(c)(1) and 28(a) require the same jurisdictional information for docketing and briefing. With an exception for pro se submissions, the court screens all filed briefs to ensure that they include all required information about the jurisdiction of both the district court (or agency) and the court of appeals. FRAP 28(b) allows the appellee to omit the jurisdictional statement “unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the appellant’s statement.” In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit found the jurisdictional statements inadequate and stated that the appellee cannot simply assume that the appellant has provided a jurisdictional statement that complies with the rules. The appellee must review the appellant’s jurisdictional statement to see if it is both complete and correct. If the appellant’s statement is not complete, or not correct, the appellee must file a “complete jurisdictional summary.” It is not enough simply to correct the misstatement or omission and “accept” the balance of the appellant’s statement. In one case, the Attorney General stated: “Mr. Baez‐Sanchez’s jurisdictional statement is correct,” saying nothing about completeness, so the brief must be returned to the Department of Justice. The other jurisdictional statement states “Appellants’ jurisdictional statement provides a complete jurisdictional summary.” The court stated: Fine, but what about correctness? View "Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law

From 2003-2006, while employed as Director of Application for the American Hospital Association (AHA), Sayyed directed overpriced contracts to companies in exchange for kickbacks. Sayyed eventually pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the AHA $940,450.00 restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. 18 U.S.C. 3663A. As of November 2015, Sayyed still owed $650,234.25. In post‐conviction proceedings, the government sought to enforce the restitution judgment under 18 U.S.C. 3613, which permits such enforcement “in accordance with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment.” The government served citations to Vanguard and Aetna to discover assets in Sayyed’s retirement accounts, then sought turnover orders alleging that the companies possessed retirement accounts with approximately $327,000 in non‐exempt funds. Sayyed argued that his retirement accounts were exempt “earnings” subject to the 25% garnishment cap of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The district court granted the government’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that because Sayyed, who was 48‐years‐old at the time, had the right to withdraw the entirety of his accounts at will, the funds were not “earnings.” The CCPA garnishment cap only protects periodic distributions pursuant to a retirement program. View "United States v. Sayyed" on Justia Law

Nightingale provided home health care and received Medicare reimbursements. The Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) visited Nightingale’s facility and concluded that Nightingale had deficiencies that placed patients in “immediate jeopardy.” ISDH recommended that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), terminate Nightingale’s Medicare agreement. ISDH conducted a revisit and concluded that Nightingale had not complied. Before CMS terminated the agreement, Nightingale filed a petition to reorganize in bankruptcy and commenced sought to enjoin CMS from terminating its provider agreement during the reorganization, to compel CMS to pay for services already provided, and to compel CMS to continue to reimburse for services rendered. The bankruptcy court granted Nightingale relief. While an appeal was pending, ISDH again found “immediate jeopardy.” The injunction was dissolved. A Medicare ALJ and the Departmental Appeals Board affirmed termination. After failing to complete a sale of its assets, Nightingale discharged patients and closed its Indiana operations by August 17, 2016. On September 16, 2016, the district court concluded that the bankruptcy court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the injunction and stated that the government could seek restitution for reimbursements for post-injunction services. CMS filed a claim for restitution that is pending. Nightingale separately initiated a civil rights action, which was dismissed. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit vacated the decisions. The issue of whether the bankruptcy court properly granted the injunction was moot. Nightingale’s constitutional claims were jurisdictionally barred by 42 U.S.C. 405(g). View "Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

On June 15, 2013, Johnson was shot by police while running down a Chicago alley. He died of his injuries. On March 23, 2015, Johnson’s mother, Liberty, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, naming the city and unknown police officers, and claiming false arrest, excessive force, and violation of due process. She argued that the city adopted policies that permit police to use excessive force, and failed to properly train and supervise the officers. Her attorney, Mulroney, served a subpoena on the city one week after filing the complaint, requesting the production of reports pertaining to the incident. On May 21, Mulroney advised the city that the documents were needed to identify the unknown officers. On May 26, the city’s counsel emailed Mulroney reports that identified the officers who shot Johnson. On June 24, Liberty sought leave to file an amended complaint. The city did not object. An amended complaint, filed July 6, 2015, named the officers. Liberty failed to respond to the city’s motion to dismiss; the district court granted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the officers as time‐barred. Liberty’s claims began to accrue on June 16, 2013; the limitations period expired on June 16, 2015, eight days before she sought leave to amend. Liberty is not entitled to equitable tolling or equitable estoppel; she had the information essential to amending her complaint. View "Liberty v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Leonard was appointed to defend Ogoke, who was charged with wire fraud. Ogoke’s codefendant, Okusanya entered into a cooperation plea agreement. Based on the government's motion in limine, Judge Guzmán entered an order that “unless there is a showing that the missing witness is peculiarly within the government’s control, either physically or in a pragmatic sense, Defendant is precluded from commenting on the government’s failure to call any witness.” It was the government’s theory that Ogoke and Okusanya were coconspirators in the fraud. Okusanya appeared on the government’s witness list, but the government did not call him during trial. During his closing argument, Leonard made several references to Okusanya’s failure to testify. Judge Guzmán sustained an objection and struck that portion of the argument. Before the jury returned a verdict, Judge Guzmán issued an order to show cause as to why Leonard should not be held in contempt. The jury found Ogoke not guilty. The government declined to participate in the contempt proceeding, Leonard was represented by counsel, but no prosecutor was appointed. Leonard stated that he had not realized he violated the ruling, but later acknowledged his “huge mistake.” Judge Guzmán issued an order holding Leonard in contempt, 18 U.S.C. 401, and ordering him to pay a fine, finding Leonard’s explanation “incredible” given his extensive experience as a defense attorney. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction as supported by sufficient evidence, rejecting procedural and due process arguments. View "United States v. Ogoke" on Justia Law

Workers in Waupaca foundries alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, by not treating the time that workers spend changing clothes and showering on-site after a shift to be compensable “work” time. They alleged that they end their shifts covered in a layer of “foundry dust,” which can irritate the skin and cause lung disease if inhaled. FLSA authorizes collective actions by employees on behalf of “similarly situated” employees. Unlike class actions under FRCP 23, collective actions under FLSA require would-be members to opt in (voluntarily join). The district judge ruled that he would “conditionally certify” the class since the plaintiffs showed a “reasonable basis” for believing that all the class members were similarly situated. After discovery, the judge would determine whether plaintiffs who had opted in were actually similarly situated. After several hundred current and former employees from three states opted in, Waupaca moved to decertify the class. The plaintiffs, deciding to proceed with only Waupaca’s Wisconsin employees, moved to certify a Rule 23 class just for Wisconsin state-law claims, and did not oppose the decertification of Indiana and Tennessee employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Waupaca’s request to decertify the entire FSLA class; division of the FLSA class into three subclasses and their transfer to district courts in their respective states; and Rule 23 ceritfication of the Wisconsin claims. View "DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc." on Justia Law

Fulton received an unsolicited fax from Bisco and sued for damages under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Before Fulton moved for class certification, Bisco tried to moot its claim by tendering an offer ($3,005 plus costs) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 that, Bisco claimed, gave Fulton all possible individual relief. Two days after Bisco’s offer, the Supreme Court held that “an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case.” Fulton rejected the offer. Bisco then moved to deposit $3,600 with the court under Rule 67. The court dismissed the suit, concluding that Bisco’s maneuver mooted Fulton’s individual claim and disqualified it from serving as a class representative. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding dismissal premature. Bisco’s payment did not moot the case; the court’s registry does not function as plaintiff’s account. An unaccepted offer to settle a case, accompanied by a payment intended to provide full compensation into the registry of the court under Rule 67, is no different in principle from an offer of settlement made under Rule 68. It is not clear, as a matter of law, that the unaccepted offer was sufficient to compensate Fulton for its loss of the opportunity to represent the putative class. View "Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc." on Justia Law

Ijbara owned a strip mall in Oak Lawn, Illinois, but defaulted on his mortgage payments, precipitating a foreclosure. He blamed Oak Lawn officials for waging a campaign of regulatory harassment that included frivolous inspections and citations for nonexistent or trumped-up building-code violations, which cost him money and scared off prospective tenants. In December 2013, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that this abuse of power violated his right to equal protection of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit as time-barred. Ijbara’s claim accrued when the foreclosure action was filed, or at the very latest, when the judge presiding in that action appointed a receiver to take control of the mall on April 22, 2011. Ijbara’s suit, filed almost three years later, missed the two-year limitations deadline. The court rejected an argument that his claim did not accrue until the state court entered final judgment in the foreclosure action. “Ijbara confuses the eventual consequences of a constitutional violation with the constitutional injury that starts the limitations clock. Ijbara was well aware of his injury and its cause long before the entry of final judgment in the foreclosure proceeding.” View "Amin Ijbara Equity Corp v. Village of Oak Lawn" on Justia Law