Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Richard and Kathryn are the beneficiaries of their parents’ multi‐million dollar trust, which is administered by Richard, Kathryn, and a corporate trustee. When their father died, the two fell into “irreconcilable” disputes. Kathryn hired Oxford to advise her. The trust paid Oxford’s fees. Oxford advised Kathryn to create one trust for Kathryn and her children, and another for Richard and his. Richard agreed. They moved the trust's situs from Indiana to South Dakota. Ultimately, they could not agree on the terms. When Kathryn refused to sign Richard’s proposed agreement, he unsuccessfully petitioned a South Dakota state court to order the trust's division. Richard alleges that he suffered financial losses and that his sister refused to sign the agreement because she received negligent advice from Oxford. Richard sued Oxford on behalf of the trust, asserting his capacity as a beneficiary and a co‐trustee. The complaint identified Kathryn as an “involuntary plaintiff.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Richard lacks capacity to bring suit on behalf of the trust under either Illinois or South Dakota law, which prohibits a trust beneficiary from suing a third party on behalf of a trust (absent special circumstances that were not alleged). State law and the trust agreement require a majority of trustees to consent to such a suit; that consent was missing. View "Doermer v. Oxford Financial Group, Ltd." on Justia Law

Richard and Kathryn are the beneficiaries of their parents’ multi‐million dollar trust, which is administered by Richard, Kathryn, and a corporate trustee. When their father died, the two fell into “irreconcilable” disputes. Kathryn hired Oxford to advise her. The trust paid Oxford’s fees. Oxford advised Kathryn to create one trust for Kathryn and her children, and another for Richard and his. Richard agreed. They moved the trust's situs from Indiana to South Dakota. Ultimately, they could not agree on the terms. When Kathryn refused to sign Richard’s proposed agreement, he unsuccessfully petitioned a South Dakota state court to order the trust's division. Richard alleges that he suffered financial losses and that his sister refused to sign the agreement because she received negligent advice from Oxford. Richard sued Oxford on behalf of the trust, asserting his capacity as a beneficiary and a co‐trustee. The complaint identified Kathryn as an “involuntary plaintiff.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Richard lacks capacity to bring suit on behalf of the trust under either Illinois or South Dakota law, which prohibits a trust beneficiary from suing a third party on behalf of a trust (absent special circumstances that were not alleged). State law and the trust agreement require a majority of trustees to consent to such a suit; that consent was missing. View "Doermer v. Oxford Financial Group, Ltd." on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Springfield’s zoning code allows “family care residence[s],” defined as: A single dwelling unit occupied on a relatively permanent basis in a family-like environment by a group of no more than six unrelated persons with disabilities, plus paid professional support staff provided by a sponsoring agency either living with the residents on a 24-hour basis or present whenever residents with disabilities are present. Such residences must be “located upon a zoning lot which is more than 600 feet from the property line of any other such facility.” IAG is a non-profit organization that provides services in Community Integrated Living Arrangements in residences rented by disabled clients. The Noble home, in a Springfield residential district that allows family care residences, resembles other neighborhood dwellings. After its owners completed significant renovations, three disabled individuals moved into the Noble home. Unbeknownst to the owners, IAG, or its clients, Sparc had been operating a family care residence across the street for 12 years. The property lines are separated by 157 feet. The city notified the owners that the Noble residents would be evicted unless they obtained a Conditional Permitted Use. Their application was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction to prevent eviction, finding that plaintiffs possessed a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits in their suit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601–31, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–213, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). View "Valencia v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Montes owns houses in California and in Wisconsin. After filing suit, Cunningham arranged for service of process at the Wisconsin address. No one answered the door. The process server called Montes, who refused to provide his current location. The judge authorized service by publication. Cunningham published notice in periodicals that circulate only in the Midwest. When Montes did not answer, the court entered a default. After learning about the case, Montes unsuccessfully asked the court to set aside the default. The judge wrote that “Montes has rather persistently sought to evade service in both California and Wisconsin" but did not describe what Montes has done to evade service. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Wis. Stat. 801.11(1), states that when “reasonable diligence” has not succeeded in producing service in hand, a court may authorize service by publication. The court did not explain why the “reasonable diligence” standard was satisfied when service was attempted at only one of a defendant’s known residences. Cunningham knew Montes’s California address. Wisconsin requires a plaintiff who knows or readily can learn that a defendant has multiple addresses to attempt to serve the defendant at each address. Given the lack of any effort to serve Montes in California, however, it would be difficult to make a finding that he is evading service in this case. View "Cunningham v. Montes" on Justia Law

Montes owns houses in California and in Wisconsin. After filing suit, Cunningham arranged for service of process at the Wisconsin address. No one answered the door. The process server called Montes, who refused to provide his current location. The judge authorized service by publication. Cunningham published notice in periodicals that circulate only in the Midwest. When Montes did not answer, the court entered a default. After learning about the case, Montes unsuccessfully asked the court to set aside the default. The judge wrote that “Montes has rather persistently sought to evade service in both California and Wisconsin" but did not describe what Montes has done to evade service. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Wis. Stat. 801.11(1), states that when “reasonable diligence” has not succeeded in producing service in hand, a court may authorize service by publication. The court did not explain why the “reasonable diligence” standard was satisfied when service was attempted at only one of a defendant’s known residences. Cunningham knew Montes’s California address. Wisconsin requires a plaintiff who knows or readily can learn that a defendant has multiple addresses to attempt to serve the defendant at each address. Given the lack of any effort to serve Montes in California, however, it would be difficult to make a finding that he is evading service in this case. View "Cunningham v. Montes" on Justia Law

Jaworski provided construction services to Master Hand, an Illinois general contractor, over several years. Some of these services went unpaid. Jaworski alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, and the Employee Classification Act, which makes it unlawful for construction firms to misclassify an employee as an independent contractor. The Classification Act presumes that the complainant is an employee unless the contractor proves otherwise; a misclassified employee is entitled to double “the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to the person by reason of the violation.” The judge held that Master Hand had misclassified Jaworski and was entitled to the compensation guaranteed by the Minimum Wage Law and Wage Payment and Collection Act without having to prove that he is an employee. Those statutes do not include the presumption that plaintiffs are employees. The judge rejected Master Hand’s insolvency defense and ordered Master Hand to pay $200,000 in damages, plus $150,000 in attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, adding attorneys’ fees for the frivolous appeal. The court declined to review the rulings challenged by Master Hand, as a sanction for failure to follow court rules. View "Jaworski v. Master Hand Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

Vexol, a Mexican company that provides plastic and shrink wrap to end users in Mexico, filed suit in the Southern District of Indiana against Berry Plastics, a Delaware corporation that allegedly does business in Mexico through its subsidiary, Pliant, Vexol alleged that Pliant sold shrink wrap to Vexol and that Vexol’s customers complained about the quality and returned their purchases to Vexol. Vexol sought to return the unsatisfactory product to Pliant, which would not issue a refund, but claimed that Vexol owed it money pursuant to a fabricated “pagare,” the Mexican equivalent of a promissory note. Pliant allegedly caused another Mexican entity, Aspen, to enforce the pagare in the Mexican Mercantile Court. Vexol alleged that Pliant also filed a criminal complaint against Vexol for fraud. Vexol claimed violation of Indiana tort law and Mexico’s Federal Civil Code. Citing choice‐of‐law principles, the district court dismissed with prejudice the Indiana law claims and dismissed without prejudice the Mexican law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint "plainly" does not describe anything that Berry did in Mexico. Plaintiffs alleging fraud must state particularly “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the circumstances. Vexol’s complaint satisfied none of those requirements. View "Vexol S.A. de C.V. v. Berry Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

The district court ordered Jackson to pay Cooke the death benefit on her husband’s life insurance policy and to reimburse Cooke’s legal expenses. The court concluded that her husband died before the end of a grace period allowed for late premium payments and that Jackson should have expedited the litigation by attaching documents to its answer and by making some arguments sooner. The court’s order granted Cooke summary judgment but stated: This case is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the final-decision rule, 28 U.S.C. 1291. The order is contradictory and does not provide relief. It states that a motion has been granted and an award made, but it does not say who is entitled to what; it “transgresses almost every rule applicable to judgments.” A second document avoided the internal contradiction but lacked vital details and the judge’s signature. The court later entered an order specifying that Jackson must pay $191,362.06 on the insurance policy, plus 10% per annum simple interest, which Jackson paid, but did not specify the amount of attorneys’ fees. A declaration of liability, including an award of attorneys' fees, lacking an amount due is not final and cannot be appealed. View "Cooke v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law