Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
Davis v. Allen
Trevor Davis filed a lawsuit against Deputy Christopher Allen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Allen violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during his arrest. Davis had several outstanding warrants for violent felonies, and when officers arrived to arrest him, he fled into a trailer. Deputy Allen used his police dog, Koda, to locate Davis inside the trailer. Despite Davis lying face-down with his hands over his head, Koda bit him, causing severe injury. Davis alleged that Allen failed to recall Koda after Davis had surrendered.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied Deputy Allen’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that there were material disputes of fact regarding the circumstances and timing of the use of the police dog, which precluded a finding of qualified immunity at this stage. Specifically, the court noted that a jury could find that a reasonable officer would have known that Davis had surrendered and that continuing to allow Koda to bite him constituted excessive force.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court noted that the district court’s denial of qualified immunity was based on disputed facts, which are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the reasonableness of Deputy Allen’s actions depended on resolving these factual disputes, such as whether Davis was visibly unarmed and compliant. The court concluded that it could not address the merits of the qualified immunity claim without first resolving these factual issues, which must be done by a jury. View "Davis v. Allen" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights
Overwell Harvest, Limited v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.
Overwell Harvest, Ltd. invested millions in Neurensic, Inc., which soon faced severe financial difficulties. Neurensic's management, led by CEO David Widerhorn and COO Paul Giedraitis, sought to sell the company. Trading Technologies International, Inc. emerged as a potential buyer. Before the shareholders' vote on the sale, Overwell made a competing offer, prompting Trading Technologies to increase its offer, which Neurensic's board accepted. The shareholders approved the sale to Trading Technologies. Overwell then sued Trading Technologies, alleging it aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duties by Neurensic's management.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected Overwell's jury demand, ruling that its aiding and abetting claim was equitable, despite seeking legal relief. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of Trading Technologies, concluding that Overwell failed to prove any fiduciary breaches by Widerhorn and Giedraitis that Trading Technologies could have aided and abetted. Overwell appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying a jury trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Overwell that it had a right to a jury trial because it sought legal relief. However, the court found that the district court's error was harmless. The appellate court concluded that Trading Technologies would have been entitled to a directed verdict because Overwell failed to establish that Trading Technologies knowingly participated in any fiduciary breaches by Neurensic's management. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Overwell Harvest, Limited v. Trading Technologies International, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Civil Procedure
Next Millennium Telecom Co. v. American Signal Corporation
Next Millennium Telecom Co. (Nextel), a Saudi Arabian corporation, was contracted by the Saudi Arabian government to install an emergency siren system. Nextel paid American Signal Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, approximately $11 million for the sirens and related components. After installation, the sirens failed to operate correctly, and American Signal refused to repair or replace the defective parts or refund the payment. Consequently, Nextel sued American Signal in federal court for breach of contract, among other claims.The case was heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The litigation was marked by Nextel's uncooperative behavior, which hindered the discovery process. At the final pretrial conference, the district court noted the lack of progress on key factual issues and ordered Nextel to take specific steps, including obtaining local counsel, conferring with American Signal, and filing a plan for testing the sirens and securing visas for witnesses. Nextel's failure to comply with these orders led the district court to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. The appellate court found that Nextel's conduct, including its failure to facilitate inspections, schedule depositions, adhere to local rules, and comply with the court's pretrial order, justified the dismissal. The court emphasized that the responsibility to move the case forward rested with Nextel, and its pattern of delay and non-compliance supported the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal and did not address Nextel's argument regarding remote testimony for its witnesses. View "Next Millennium Telecom Co. v. American Signal Corporation" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Contracts
Cielak v. Nicolet Union High School District
Joel Cielak and Barron Hodges were sexually abused by David Johnson, a teacher at Nicolet High School (NHS), in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Hodges reported the abuse in 1983, leading the school board to confront Johnson but keep him employed under supervision. Johnson ceased abusing Hodges but continued to abuse Cielak, who had graduated in 1982. Both plaintiffs sued NHS, the school district, and board members under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights and a conspiracy to violate their equal protection rights. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend the complaint.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state claims based on Johnson's abuse predating Hodges's 1983 allegation. The court also found that Hodges's claims were time-barred and that Cielak's allegations of post-allegation harms did not amount to violations of his substantive due process or equal protection rights. The court denied the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, deeming it futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Hodges's claims were time-barred as he knew of his injuries and their cause in the fall of 1983. In contrast, the court found that it was unclear when Cielak knew or had reason to know that his post-allegation injuries were connected to actions by the defendants, making it improper to dismiss his claims on statute of limitations grounds at this stage. However, the court concluded that Cielak failed to plausibly plead a violation of his substantive due process or equal protection rights because Johnson's post-allegation abuse was not under color of state law. The court also upheld the denial of leave to amend, noting that the plaintiffs failed to explain how they would cure the complaint's defects. View "Cielak v. Nicolet Union High School District" on Justia Law
Taylor v. The Salvation Army National Corporation
Five former participants in the Salvation Army's residential rehabilitation program filed a lawsuit alleging that the organization subjected them to forced labor. The plaintiffs, who participated in the program to address issues such as homelessness and substance abuse, were required to work approximately forty hours per week in exchange for food, clothing, and housing. They claimed that the work was not therapeutic but rather a coercive labor arrangement benefiting the Salvation Army financially. The plaintiffs included both individuals who voluntarily enrolled in the program and those referred by courts or parole/probation departments.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that the justice-referred plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as they were allegedly compelled to participate by state court orders. For the walk-in plaintiffs, the court concluded that the threats of losing food, clothing, and shelter were not sufficiently serious to constitute forced labor under federal law. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the Salvation Army acted with the requisite intent to compel labor through threats of serious harm. The district court denied the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint, leading to an immediate entry of judgment for the Salvation Army.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the justice-referred plaintiffs' claims, as their participation was not compelled by state court orders but by parole or probation officers. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' allegations did not plausibly indicate that the Salvation Army violated the forced labor provisions. The walk-in plaintiffs were free to leave the program at any time, and the justice-referred plaintiffs did not adequately demonstrate how the conditions of their participation constituted forced labor. The court also agreed that the proposed second amended complaint would not cure the deficiencies of the original complaint. View "Taylor v. The Salvation Army National Corporation" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Upchurch v. O’Brien
Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law
Li v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC
Lanlan Li, a 51-year-old woman of Chinese descent, worked as a senior scientist at Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC. In 2019, she developed back pain and eye strain, which led her to take various types of leave. Despite accommodations, her back injury persisted, and she could not return to her position. Consequently, Fresenius terminated her employment. Li sued the company for disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), as well as for national origin and age discrimination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Fresenius on all claims. The court found that Li failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her age and national origin claims, as she did not include a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR). The court also held that her disability and retaliation claims failed on the merits, noting that Li was not a qualified individual under the ADA because she could not perform the essential functions of her job, including bench work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Li was not a qualified individual under the ADA and that Fresenius had provided reasonable accommodations. The court also found that Li failed to present evidence of age or national origin discrimination and that her retaliation claim lacked a causal connection between her EEOC charges and her termination. Therefore, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Fresenius. View "Li v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Peshek v. Johnson
Brian Threlkeld, after serving a prison sentence for sexually assaulting a minor, was civilly committed by the State of Wisconsin as a sexually violent person in 2008. In 2020, the state agreed he was eligible for supervised release, contingent on finding suitable housing in Kenosha County. However, Kenosha County has not been able to identify compliant housing, leaving Threlkeld still committed. Frustrated, Threlkeld filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the state’s housing criteria violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought to enjoin the enforcement of these criteria.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin abstained from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, citing ongoing state proceedings to identify suitable housing for Threlkeld. The court emphasized that these proceedings were civil enforcement actions, making federal intervention inappropriate. Additionally, the court noted that Threlkeld could raise his constitutional claims in the state court proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Younger abstention was appropriate due to the ongoing state efforts to find compliant housing. Moreover, the court identified a fundamental flaw in Threlkeld’s federal lawsuit: he named the Wisconsin Secretary of Health Services as the defendant, who does not have the authority to provide the relief sought. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the housing criteria, making the lawsuit against her improper under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Peshek v. Johnson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law
Ray v. Tabriz
Pearl Ray and Andrew Ray, Sr. sued medical providers in Illinois state court for medical malpractice, which allegedly injured Pearl and caused Andrew to suffer a loss of consortium. They settled with all but one defendant. Pearl was enrolled in a federal health benefits plan, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) was the plan’s carrier. Under the plan, BCBSA sought reimbursement from the settlement for benefits paid to Pearl. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reduce BCBSA’s reimbursement by their attorney’s fees and costs under Illinois’s common fund doctrine.The case was removed to federal court by BCBSA, arguing federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the remand motion but later reconsidered and remanded the entire case, concluding it lacked federal question jurisdiction. BCBSA appealed, asserting federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that federal question jurisdiction was not present, as federal common law did not govern the reimbursement dispute, following the precedent set by Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois v. Cruz. However, the court found that BCBSA met the requirements for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as it was acting under a federal agency (OPM) and had a colorable federal defense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded, instructing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the motion for adjudication while remanding the rest of the case to state court. View "Ray v. Tabriz" on Justia Law
Farina v. Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc.
A group of employees sued their employer, Metalcraft of Mayville, for not paying them for time spent working just before or after their shifts. The employees alleged that Metalcraft's timekeeping system, which allowed clocking in up to 15 minutes before and after shifts, did not accurately reflect the time they worked. They claimed that adjustments to their clock-in times were made even when they performed compensable work during these periods.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin decertified the collective action in April 2020, leading to 24 additional cases being filed and consolidated. Nine cases were dismissed for various reasons, and the district court granted summary judgment to Metalcraft in the four selected cases, ruling that the employees' evidence was speculative and insufficient. The remaining 12 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their cases, acknowledging that the summary judgment ruling likely determined their claims. Metalcraft then moved for sanctions against the plaintiffs' counsel, arguing that the lawsuits were frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court's denial of sanctions. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had enough factual and legal support for their claims to avoid sanctions. The court noted that FLSA claims can be based on reconstructed memories when an employer's record-keeping is inadequate. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' legal arguments regarding the Portal-to-Portal Act and the de minimis doctrine were not baseless. The appellate court emphasized that the standard for summary judgment is different from the standard for Rule 11 sanctions and that the plaintiffs' failure to win on summary judgment did not make their cases frivolous. Therefore, the denial of sanctions was affirmed. View "Farina v. Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law