Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

JCI is a manufacturing company with its principal place of business in Illinois. The Shein Law Center is a law firm based in Pennsylvania. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett is a law firm based in Texas, with offices in Texas and California; its partners and shareholders are residents of those states. The two firms sued JCI on behalf of their clients in Pennsylvania, California, and Texas state courts. JCI alleges these suits were part of a conspiracy to defraud JCI because the firms concealed information during discovery regarding their clients’ exposure to asbestos from other manufacturers’ products so that they could extract larger recoveries. The other manufacturers are bankrupt. After winning verdicts against JCI, the defendants allegedly filed claims against the bankrupt manufacturers’ trusts. JCI filed lawsuits against the law firms in the Northern District of Illinois alleging fraud, conspiracy, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, The district court dismissed the cases for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The law firms sent allegedly fraudulent communications to JCI through JCI’s local counsel in Texas, Pennsylvania, and California. Those communications were incidental to the litigation, which is the basis of JCI’s claims, so the communications were not enough to establish specific personal jurisdiction in Illinois. View "John Crane, Inc. v. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett" on Justia Law

In July 2014, Allen‐Gregory filed a putative class action alleging that Fortville violated class members’ due process rights by terminating their water service without a hearing. Fortville revised its procedures, instituting a hearing process effective November 2014. In December 2014, the plaintiffs again sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the new procedures did not comport with due process. The parties agreed to a settlement. In September 2015, the court approved the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The settlement stated that its purpose was to “fully, finally, and forever resolve, discharge and settle all claims released herein on behalf of the named plaintiffs and the entire class.” It defined the class as “[a]ll customers of the Town of Fortville ... from July 9, 2012 through October 31, 2014 who had their water service terminated and who paid a reconnection fee,” and included an expansive, global release of all claims. Kilburn‐Winnie, a member of the class, received settlement proceeds. In November 2015, Kilburn‐Winnie filed this case alleging that Fortville disconnected her water service again for failure to timely pay her water bill in March and April of 2015 and that the hearing procedures implemented in November 2014 were so complicated and burdensome that they violated her procedural due process rights. The court granted Fortville summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; res judicata barred the claim because the parties settled a prior class action that involved the same claim. View "Kilburn-Winnie v. Town of Fortville" on Justia Law

Derek Boogaard was a professional hockey player with the Minnesota Wild. Team doctors repeatedly prescribed Derek pain pills for injuries. He became addicted. In 2009 the NHL placed Derek into its Substance Abuse and Behavioral Health Program. Derek was checked into a rehabilitation facility and was later subject to a mandatory “Aftercare Program,” which required him to refrain from using opioids and Ambien and to submit to random drug testing. Derek joined the New York Rangers in 2010 and began asking trainers for Ambien. Derek relapsed. NHL doctors made Derek’s situation worse by violating multiple conditions of the Aftercare Program. Eventually, Derek overdosed and died. Derek’s estate sued, alleging that the NHL had failed to prevent the over-prescription of addictive medications, had breached its voluntarily undertaken duty to monitor Derek’s drug addiction, was negligent in monitoring Derek for brain trauma, and negligently permitted team doctors to inject Derek with an intramuscular analgesic. The court found some of the claims, founded on the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and granted the NHL summary judgment. A second amended complaint was dismissed on grounds that Minnesota law applied and required a wrongful-death action to be brought by a court-appointed trustee. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Boogaards had forfeited their claims by failing to respond to the NHL’s argument that the complaint failed to state a claim under the law of any state. View "Boogaard v. National Hockey League" on Justia Law

Landlord sued in 2005, contending that Joliet had interfered with the way in which it set rents apartments under the mark-to-market program for rates at subsidized apartments and violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601–31. While an appeal was pending, Joliet filed an eminent-domain suit, proposing to add the land to a public park. The Seventh Circuit held that a recipient of federal financing is not immune from the power of eminent domain. The condemnation trial ran for 18 calendar months; compensation was set at $15 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the FHA claim. The district judge dismissed Landlord's original suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Landlord’s argument that the judge should have put the condemnation action on hold, reserving its FHA suit for a jury trial. The Seventh Circuit had directed it to resolve the condemnation suit first because Joliet professed concern about crime and deterioration at the property. Landlord was free to reserve the FHA claim for this suit, where it would have been entitled to a jury trial. Its FHA claim was resolved in a bench trial only because Landlord insisted on presenting it earlier. Landlord wanted the FHA to be treated as a defense to condemnation, and the district court acquiesced. That choice is responsible for the fact that a judge rather than a jury resolved the FHA claim. View "New West, L.P. v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

Prolite Building Supply bought Ply Gem windows, which it resold to Wisconsin builders. Some homeowners were not satisfied with the windows, which admitted air even when closed. Contractors stopped buying from Prolite, which stopped paying Ply Gem. Prolite and homeowners sued. Ply Gem removed the action to federal court and counter-claimed against Prolite for unpaid bills. Additional parties intervened. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Prolite. The court vacated the judgment on the homeowners’ claims for remand to state court. The service agreement between Prolite and Ply Gem requires Prolite to repair the Ply Gem windows in exchange for a discount and needed parts. There was no breach of that agreement. The homeowners’ claims can be resolved under supplemental jurisdiction only if they “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy,” 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The language of the window warranties received by the homeowners and the service agreement did not overlap. Prolite complained that Ply Gem did not do enough to ensure that its customers (the builders) remained willing to purchase Ply Gem windows. The homeowners just wanted to stop drafts and moisture. The nature of the work done differed. View "ProLite Building Supply, LLC v. Ply Gem Windows" on Justia Law

SP operates Dayton International Airport parking facilities and is headquartered in Chicago. Plaintiffs allege that they used these parking lots and received receipts that included the expiration date of their credit or debit cards, violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1). They filed a class-action complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The complaint did not describe any concrete harm that the plaintiffs had suffered. SP removed the action to federal court, arguing that the claim arose under a federal statute, then moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing because the plaintiffs did not allege an injury in fact. Plaintiffs sought remand to state court, arguing that it was SP’s responsibility to establish subject-matter jurisdiction and that, without it, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) required return of their case to state court. Because Article III does not apply in state court, they presumably hoped that their case could stay alive there despite their lack of a concrete injury. The district court denied the motion, determined that plaintiffs could not establish standing by stating only that the defendant had violated statutory requirements, and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered a remand. The case was not removable, because the plaintiffs lack Article III standing—negating federal subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Collier v. SP Plus Corp." on Justia Law

Brokers Webb and Beversdorf were fired by Jefferies. They challenged their termination. As their employment contracts required, they filed claims in the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s arbitration forum. They signed FINRA's required “Arbitration Submission Agreement.” Their dispute proceeded in arbitration for two-and-a-half years. They withdrew their claims before a final decision was rendered. Under FINRA’s rules, that withdrawal constituted a dismissal with prejudice. Webb and Beversdorf then sued FINRA in Illinois, alleging that FINRA breached its contract to arbitrate their dispute with Jefferies by failing to properly train arbitrators, failing to provide arbitrators with appropriate procedural mechanisms, interfering with the arbitrators’ discretion, and failing to permit reasonable discovery. They sought damages in “excess of $50,000” and a declaratory judgment. The district court held that FINRA was entitled to arbitral immunity and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit vacated, concluding that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. 1332, which grants jurisdiction when there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. While Illinois law permits plaintiffs to recover legal expenses as damages in limited circumstances, those circumstances are not present here, so the amount in controversy requirement was not satisfied. View "Webb v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

In Jansen’s bankruptcy case, Gleason brought an adversary proceeding, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A), regarding a default judgment ($400,000) obtained in a case involving a phony investment scheme. Gleason unsuccessfully argued that Jansen was not entitled to relitigate that judgment. A bench trial revealed that Gleason gave $141,000 to Jansen’s company, Baytree, for closing costs in a business acquisition. The deal never closed and Jansen never fully refunded the money. Gleason’s checks, endorsed by “Talcott Financial … D/B/A Baytree,” were deposited, then disappeared. Jansen later pleaded guilty to unrelated money-skimming charges, involving a bank account in the name of Talcott Financial, which was involuntarily dissolved in 1999. Jansen testified that the “Talcotts” were two different businesses with separate accounts. The bankruptcy court credited Jansen’s story and concluded the debt was dischargeable. Meanwhile, Jansen tried to withdraw his guilty plea. Despite a warning that invoking the privilege against self-incrimination could lead to an adverse inference for bankruptcy purposes, Jansen asserted that privilege repeatedly. Gleason filed the “merits appeal,” then found publicly-available records in previous litigation, including bank statements. The bankruptcy court declined Gleason's motion for relief from the judgment, reasoning the evidence, easily found on PACER, was not new. Gleason then filed a “Rule 60 appeal.” After procedural confusion, during which the merits appeal was dismissed, the district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s mistaken assumption that it could reach the merits of the case in the later-filed Rule 60 appeal is not enough to revive the dismissed merits appeal. View "Gleason v. Jansen" on Justia Law

From 2009-2014, Sampra was an FAA field electrical engineer, initially assigned to Chicago’s Midway Airport. She was eventually assigned to oversee technical support services contract work releases, which required little field work, so Sampra spent most of her time in the office. She retained the same job title; her job description continued to require up to 100% travel and field work. While Sampra was on Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) childbirth leave, a new supervisor assigned to himself the work releases that Sampra had overseen. After Sampra’s return, she was reassigned to work on an O’Hare Airport runway overnight. Before she would have had to start the overnight assignment, Sampra requested reassignment to the position of drafting coordinator. Her request was granted. The drafting coordinator position is in a lower pay band than an electrical engineer, but Sampra retained her electrical engineer salary. Sampra filed suit under the FMLA more than two years after her assignment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants without reaching the merits. The suit was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The more forgiving three‐year statute of limitations does not apply because Sampra failed to provide evidence that the department willfully violated her FMLA rights. View "Sampra v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

DaSilva, a Waupan Correctional Institution inmate, received his medication one evening, then became dizzy, vomited, lost consciousness, and fell, hitting his head. DaSilva believes he was given the wrong medication. More than three hours passed before DaSilva was taken to the hospital (only five minutes away), where doctors stapled a deep laceration and diagnosed a serious concussion. DaSilva sued the officer who gave him the medication (Coby), a corrections supervisor, and Nurse DeYoung, under the Eighth Amendment. A magistrate judge concluded that Coby should be dismissed from the case because the distribution of the medication was only a mistake, which fails as a matter of law to reflect deliberate indifference. After discovery, the court, through the magistrate, granted the remaining defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit determined that the matter could proceed to appeal, even though Coby was dismissed before he had an opportunity to consent to the disposition of the case by a magistrate. There was no final judgment until after the state (representing the defendants) filed its consent and Coby was a prison employee who stood in exactly the same position as the other two defendants for purposes of legal representation. View "DaSilva v. Rymarkiewicz" on Justia Law