Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alden and his ex-wife shared custody of their children. Alden’s ex-wife complained that Alden was trying to turn the children against her. The court-appointed psychologist, Gardner, evaluated the children, concluded that Alden was using “severe alienation tactics,” and recommended that the court limit Alden to supervised visitation and give full custody of the children to their mother. The court terminated Alden’s custody and ordered all of Alden’s visitation to be supervised. The Appellate Court affirmed. After three unsuccessful attempts to change the decision in state court, Alden filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Gardner, challenging the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act as permitting state courts to take parents’ constitutionally-protected speech into consideration when deciding the best interests of the child and treating parents differently based on whether they are divorced. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Alden could challenge the Act in his state custody proceedings. The court stated: “This is abusive litigation. Alden, a lawyer representing himself, seems determined to continue the child-custody litigation in another forum even if that means exposing an innocent person such as Gardner to travail and expense. He concedes—indeed, he trumpets—that he has sued someone who he knows is not responsible for enforcing the state’s child-custody laws” and referred the matter to Illinois authorities for determination of whether Alden’s misuse of the legal process calls into question his fitness to practice law. View "E.A. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Carello is blind. To access online visual content, he uses a “screen reader,” which reads text aloud to him from websites that are designed to support its software. Carello claims that the Credit Union website fails to offer such support. The Illinois Credit Union Act requires that credit union membership be open only to groups of people who share a “common bond,” including “[p]ersons belonging to a specific association, group or organization,” “[p]ersons who reside in a reasonably compact and well-defined neighborhood or community,” and “[p]ersons who have a common employer.” The Credit Union limits its membership to specified local government employees. Membership is required before an individual may use any Credit Union services. Carello is not eligible for, nor has he expressed any interest in, Credit Union membership. He is a tester: he visits websites solely to test Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance, which prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of [their] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations,” and requires them to make “reasonable modifications” to achieve that standard, 42 U.S.C. 12812(a), (b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Carello’s claim. Carello lacked standing to sue because he failed to allege an injury in fact. View "Carello v. Aurora Policeman Credit Union" on Justia Law

Novak was the sole shareholder of CMCG. By 2008, CMCG’s solvency was questionable. In 2012 Novak committed suicide, leaving CMCG to Comess, who filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition weeks later. For four years before the bankruptcy filing, Comess and Hathaway, another friend of Novak’s, had received significant payments from CMCG, though they were not employees. Hathaway received $45,400.81; she runs a small yoga studio and her email correspondence indicated that the payments were personal gifts.The trustee brought an avoidance action and sought discovery sanctions against Hathaway. The bankruptcy judge determined that the women had received money from CMCG while it was insolvent, that Novak typically failed to record the transactions, that CMCG did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange, and that the transfers were voidable under 11 U.S.C. 548 and the Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (IUFTA), which applied under section 544(b)(1) because CMCG had unsecured creditors at the time of the conveyances, the IRS and a credit-card company. The judge declined to impose sanctions for Hathaway’s failure to respond to interrogatories and produce tax returns but imposed sanctions ($11,187.25) for Hathaway’s delay and failure to comply with court orders concerning emails causing the Trustee to expend additional time and resources.The district judge and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning trial exhibits for evaluating CMCG's financial health; challenging the finding that CMCG did not receive reasonably equivalent value; and that CMCG did not have IUFTA “creditors.” The court noted Hathaway's violations of appellate procedure. View "Fox v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

Kiebala owns a luxury car share service, Curvy Road, that allows customers to purchase time‐ownership rights to high‐end automobiles that are owned by “investors.” In 2009, Boris became a Curvy Road “investor” and received a share of the rental revenue when customers drove his Lamborghini Gallardo. In 2010, Boris withdrew his car from the program. Kiebala’s check for Boris's payment did not clear. Boris never received his final payment. Boris posted angry and derogatory statements on various websites. The final posting was made to RipoffReport.com in July 2011; its heading asserted that Kiebala was a “SCAM and FRAUD!” and “Stole Money!” In October 2014, Boris emailed Kiebala that he wanted to give him “a chance to make good ... before I put my review of your company on various websites.” The parties did not reach an agreement. Boris launched a new round of internet postings. In July 2015, on scamorg.com, Boris posted a statement almost identical to his RipoffReport post and “updated” his original 2011 post. Kiebala, representing himself, sued Boris in July 2016, alleging Illinois state law claims. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court abused its discretion in failing to suggest how Kiebala could amend his complaint to avoid dismissal. District judges do not have an affirmative duty to coach parties, even pro se parties, The applicable Illinois statute of limitations bars Kiebala’s libel claim. View "Kiebala v. Boris" on Justia Law

Corbett’s businesses were governed by separate, substantively identical, Auto Driveaway franchise agreements. Each included non‐compete and non‐disclosure clauses and a 2016 expiration date. Those expiration dates passed. Both parties continued dealing as though the agreements were still in place until November 2017, when Auto Driveaway mailed an offer to renew the contracts for another five years. Corbett never responded but continued operating his franchises as before. Auto Driveaway subsequently learned that Corbett was building an app to compete against the app it had hired Corbett to build. Auto Driveaway suspected that Corbett was using its proprietary work product as a starting point. Corbett was set to launch his app through a new company, InnovAuto, in direct competition with Auto Driveaway. Auto Driveaway filed suit. Months later, Auto Driveaway discovered that Corbett had another competitive auto transport business, Tactical. Auto Driveaway obtained a preliminary injunction, stating that Corbett may not engage in any conduct that might violate the non‐compete clause of the franchise agreement. The court required Auto Driveaway to post a $10,000 bond as security for the injunction. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court must revisit the form of the injunction and the amount of security. Nothing covered by the order went beyond the controversy before the court or could have surprised Corbett but it is not a stand-alone separate document that spells out within its four corners exactly what the parties must or must not do. View "Auto Driveaway Franchise Systems, LLC v. Corbett" on Justia Law

Orland Park fired police officer McGreal in 2010. McGreal sued, alleging that his termination was retaliation for remarks he made community board meeting. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that McGreal had advanced only speculation to support his claims. McGreal had more than 70 disciplinary complaints on his record. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for attorney fees and directed McGreal’s attorney, DeRose, to pay the defendants $66,191.75 to the defendants--the cost incurred because DeRose fought the defense's summary judgment motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defense counsel had repeatedly requested that DeRose end the litigation, pointing out the lack of evidence, and had threatened Rule 11 sanctions. DeRose’s summary judgment filings were not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Discovery revealed an utter lack of evidentiary support for McGreal’s claims, but DeRose defended against summary judgment anyway. View "McGreal v. Village of Orland Park" on Justia Law

Fessenden’s employment was terminated after he began receiving short-term disability benefits. He then applied for long‐term disability benefits through his former employer’s benefits plan. The plan administrator, Reliance, denied the claim. Fessenden submitted a request for review with additional evidence supporting his diagnosis of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. When Reliance failed to issue a decision within the timeline mandated by regulations governing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132, he filed suit. Eight days later, Reliance finally issued a decision, again denying Fessenden’s claim. The district court granted Reliance summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. If the decision had been timely, the court would have applied an arbitrary and capricious standard because the plan gave Reliance the discretion to administer it. When a plan administrator commits a procedural violation, however, it loses the benefit of deference and a de novo standard applies. The court rejected Reliance’s argument that it “substantially complied” with the deadline because it was only a little bit late. The “substantial compliance” exception does not apply to blown deadlines. An administrator may be able to “substantially comply” with other procedural requirements, but a deadline is a bright line. View "Fessenden v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Doe, an Iranian national, sought conditional permanent residency using the EB-5 admission category, which offers visas for immigrants who invest in new job-creating enterprises. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) initially approved Doe’s petition but revoked its approval two years later. The revocation notice identified material changes: USCIS discovered information that contradicted evidence in the record, that the project had moved, and that Doe had not provided a business plan or targeted employment area certification for the new location. The record contained no evidence that the center was under construction or would create 10 jobs. Doe sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court concluded that Congress had stripped its jurisdiction to review discretionary revocations of visa petitions (8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).) and dismissed Doe’s suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on Musunuru v. Lynch (2016), in which the Seventh Circuit held that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude judicial review of purely procedural rulings during the adjudication of a visa petition. The Doe ruling was not procedural. Doe challenged the agency’s substantive decision-making and cannot evade a jurisdiction-stripping statute by repackaging his substantive complaints as procedural objections. “Taken to its logical conclusion, Doe’s approach would eviscerate 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Any petitioner dissatisfied with a final agency decision could secure judicial review by alleging that the agency committed a procedural violation by overlooking favorable evidence.” View "Doe v. McAleenan" on Justia Law

Martov participated in a wire fraud scheme in which he collected fraudulently obtained debit card numbers and personal identification numbers and then distributed them to others who used the information to make cash withdrawals from ATMs. The conduct cost the victims approximately $1.2 million. When he was arrested, the government seized Martov’s watch, $4,035 in cash, a car, and nine firearms. In exchange for Martov’s guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. 1343, the government dropped other charges and agreed not to pursue criminal forfeiture. The government initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings, 18 U.S.C. 983, by sending notice to Martov and his attorney. Martov responded to the notice by filing claims for the car and guns. The government denied both claims and declared the property forfeited. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief while noting “reservations with the procedural path that the government took in executing the forfeiture.” The government had missed certain statutory deadlines. Martov, who only argued that the seizure was improper and that the forfeiture action violated his plea agreement, failed to advance any meritorious arguments. View "Martov v. United States" on Justia Law

Debtors sought sanctions against Kreisler, alleging that the law firm violated the automatic stay arising from their bankruptcy petition by filing a lien against Lorraine’s home. The couple had voluntarily dismissed a prior bankruptcy petition just a few months earlier, so the bankruptcy judge denied their motion based on 11 U.S.C. 362(c)(3), which lifts the automatic stay after 30 days in the case of a successive petition. Bankruptcy courts are divided over the proper interpretation of section 362(c)(3), so the judge certified her order for direct appeal but the Debtors never filed a petition for permission to appeal as required by Rule 8006(g) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. Rule 8006(g) is a mandatory claim-processing rule, and if properly invoked, it must be enforced. Because Kreisler properly objected, the appeal must be dismissed. View "Wade v. Kreisler Law, P.C." on Justia Law