Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Laducer, a truck driver, rear-ended Spinnenweber’s minivan. Spinnenweber refused medical treatment at the scene. He later sought treatment for neck pain, tinnitus, and bouts of short-term memory loss. Spinnenweber sued Laducer and Laducer’s employer, seeking compensatory damages for his physical injuries. He did not seek punitive damages, medical costs, or lost wages, nor did he claim psychological or emotional injuries. Defendants conceded liability. The defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Carney, was the only expert that Spinnenweber relied on. He testified that Spinnenweber “clearly had a whiplash injury” from the crash. “He certainly could’ve had a very mild concussion.” Dr. Carney did not connect the alleged memory loss or the tinnitus to the accident. Spinnenweber’s counsel stated during closing arguments that the purpose of tort law "is to deter bad conduct so it doesn’t repeat.”The jury awarded Spinnenweber $1 million in compensatory damages. The court offered Spinnenweber the choice of accepting $250,000 or a new trial. Spinnenweber declined to accept the remittitur award. His attorney withdrew. After a one-day bench trial, Spinnenweber requested an award of $0 in damages, calling it a “verdict of silence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Spinnenweber’s evidence showed that he potentially suffered just whiplash and a mild concussion or by finding that the $1 million verdict was so outrageous that it warranted remittitur or a new trial. “Spinnenweber was hoisted with his own petard.” View "Spinnenweber v. Laducer" on Justia Law

The Spuhlers incurred medical debts that State Collection sought to collect on behalf of the medical‐care provider. The collector sent the Spuhlers dunning letters that provided the debts’ sums but lacked a statement that interest would accrue on the debts. The Spuhlers, who sought to represent a class of consumers, filed a complaint under the Fair Debt Collection Practices (FDCPA), arguing that the omission of a statement that the debt amounts would increase from the accrual of interest made the letters’ account of the debts was misleading, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2), 1692f. A magistrate granted the Spuhlers summary judgment and certified a class.The Seventh Circuit vacated. At the summary judgment stage of litigation, to demonstrate Article III standing to sue for an alleged violation of the FDCPA, the plaintiffs must “‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts’” demonstrating that they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is both fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely redressable by a judicial decision. The plaintiffs here did not carry that burden. View "Spuhler v. State Collection Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Finance sent Bazile a letter seeking to collect medical debts. The dunning letter stated the date (September 19, 2017) and the total balance of the debt ($92.23), without indicating whether that amount may increase with the accrual of interest. Bazile filed suit, alleging that the letter’s exclusion of information concerning the accrual of interest was a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) because the letter was misleading and did not provide “the amount of the debt,” 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(1), 1692e. The district court concluded that Bazile had Article III standing.The Seventh Circuit remanded for findings of fact. The complaint may survive dismissal as a matter of pleading but that’s not enough for the district court to decide the merits of the action. While Bazile’s allegations support an inference that interest was accruing on the debt, the defendant asserted that interest was not accruing and questioned whether the letter’s omission of information about interest affected Bazile’s response to the correspondence or to the debt. Facts necessary for standing have been called into doubt, requiring further inquiry into whether the court has subject‐matter jurisdiction, requiring an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "Bazile v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

When the Gunn's debt for homeowners' association assessments reached $2,000, the association hired a law firm, which sent the Gunns a letter demanding payment. The letter states: If Creditor has recorded a mechanic’s lien, covenants, mortgage, or security agreement, it may seek to foreclose such mechanic’s lien, covenants, mortgage, or security agreement. The Gunns did not pay. The law firm filed suit in state court, seeking damages for breach of contract rather than foreclosure. The Gunns filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which forbids false or misleading statements in dunning letters, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2), (4), (5) & (10). The Gunns acknowledge that the statement is true but contend that it must be deemed false or misleading because the law firm would have found it too costly to pursue foreclosure to collect a $2,000 debt.The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The contested sentence did not injure the Gunns. They argued that they were annoyed or intimidated but did not contend that the letter was a forbidden invasion of privacy. The association and its law firm were entitled to communicate with them, If annoyance were enough, the very fact that a suit was filed would show the existence of standing. The asserted violation of a substantive FDCPA right does not guarantee standing. There must still be a concrete injury. View "Gunn v. Thrasher, Buschmann & Voelkel, PC" on Justia Law

Convergent sent Brunett a letter demanding repayment of a debt that slightly exceeded $1,000, offering to accept 50% of the balance in satisfaction of the debt. The letter stated that, if the creditor ended up forgiving more than $600, it would be required to report the release of indebtedness to the IRS, because federal law treats as taxable income a loan that is not repaid. Brunett sued, arguing that the statement about the IRS violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e(5), (10), because it threatens action that cannot legally be taken and amounts to a false representation.The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction after noting that the statement was not false. Brunett conceded that the letter had not injured her. She did not pay anything; the statement did not affect her credit rating or discourage anyone from doing business with her. A plaintiff who lacks a concrete injury cannot sue under the FDCPA. The state of confusion is not itself an injury. “If it were, then everyone would have standing to litigate about everything.” That Brunett’s confusion led her to hire a lawyer and that she felt "intimidated" do not change the evaluation. View "Brunett v. Convergent Outsourcing Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs received collection letters from Finance System, seeking payment of medical debts. Represented by the same law firm, they filed materially identical class-action claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, alleging the use of false, deceptive, or misleading representations, or otherwise unfair or unconscionable methods to collect a debt. They cited the letters’ statement that: “You want to be worthy of the faith put in you by your creditor …. We are interested in you preserving a good credit rating with the above creditor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, reasoning that the plaintiffs have not alleged any injury, or even an appreciable risk of harm, from the alleged statutory violations and, therefore, lack standing. View "Sandri v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

Federal judges may release prisoners for compassionate reasons. Previously, that authority required a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. The 2018 First Step Act created a judicial power to grant compassionate release on a prisoner’s own request; the prisoner must first allow the Bureau to review the request and make a recommendation (or let 30 days pass in silence), 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Gunn’s sentence for drug and firearm offenses runs into 2024. She sought release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that, because of her age (62) and medical condition, she faces extra risks should she contract COVID-19.The district court denied relief, citing the requirement ”that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The Sentencing Commission, which lacks a quorum, has not updated its policy statements to implement the Act. The most recent Guidelines Manual refers to a “motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons" and covers only prisoners who suffer from certain medical problems.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Manual lacks an applicable policy statement; any decision is “consistent with” a nonexistent policy. “Consistent with” differs from “authorized by.” While a judge acting on a prisoner’s motion may lack the Director's advice, contemplated by Manual, about whether an “extraordinary and compelling reason” exists, the First Step Act does not muzzle the Director. Until an amended statement is adopted, district judges must operate under the statutory criteria: ”extraordinary and compelling reasons.” View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law

The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act regulates the collection, use, retention, disclosure, and dissemination of biometric identifiers (fingerprints, retina and iris scans, hand scans, and facial geometry). Fox's employer, Dakkota, required employees to clock in and out by scanning their hands on a biometric timekeeping device. Dakkota used third-party software to capture that data, which was stored in a third-party's database. Fox alleges that Dakkota did not obtain her informed written consent before collecting her biometric identifiers, unlawfully disclosed or disseminated her biometric data to third parties without her consent, failed to develop, publicly disclose, and implement a data-retention schedule and guidelines for the permanent destruction of its employees’ biometric identifiers, and failed to permanently destroy her biometric data when she left the company. Fox was represented by a union at Dakkota, The judge dismissed two counts as preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, but remanded the section 15(a) claim to state court.The Seventh Circuit reversed the remand order. Fox’s section 15(a) claim does not allege a mere procedural failure to publicly disclose a data-retention policy but alleges a concrete and particularized invasion of her privacy interest in her biometric data stemming from Dakkota’s violation of its section 15(a) duties to develop, publicly disclose, and comply with data retention and destruction policies. Her allegations plead an injury in fact for purposes of Article III. The invasion of a legally protected privacy right, though intangible, is personal and real, not general and abstract. View "Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

The Network filed suit under the Clean Water Act against Dynegy, the owner of an Illinois power station, claiming that Dynegy’s station was releasing contaminants into groundwater. The district court dismissed the suit concluding that the Act does not regulate groundwater. An appeal focused on whether and how the Act applies to the alleged groundwater contamination after the Supreme Court’s 2020 “County of Maui” decision. Three organizations sought permission to file amicus briefs in support of Dynegy’s position. The Network argued that each brief only parrots Dynegy’s arguments, wasting the court’s time. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a prospective amicus must explain why its brief is desirable and why the matters asserted are relevant. The Seventh Circuit Practitioner’s Handbook adds that the court looks at whether the submission will assist the judges by presenting ideas, arguments, theories, insights, facts, or data that are not found in the parties' briefs.The Seventh Circuit granted the motion, stating that amicus briefs should not serve only to count which interest groups are promoting which outcome. In this case: the Illinois Environmental Regulatory Group briefly presents the history of Illinois groundwater regulation from before the Clean Water Act, lending context to the cited cases; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce provides insight into how an alternative federal scheme would apply, absent Clean Water Act regulation; and the Washington Legal Foundation’s brief offers its own theory for how to best fit "Maui" into the existing federal scheme regulating the pollutants at issue. View "Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC" on Justia Law

Ricci was awarded custody of his daughter in divorce proceedings. Ricci’s daughter receives supplemental security income from the Social Security Administration (SSA). Ricci served as the representative payee to receive and manage her benefits until SSA employees determined that he was not his daughter’s legal guardian. Ricci filed a pro se action in state court.The federal employees removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, then moved to dismiss it under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. They argued that the state court had no jurisdiction over the case when it was originally filed, so the federal court could not hear the case after it was removed. Ricci, with counsel, amended his complaint to invoke federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1361, which applies to mandamus actions against federal employees.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint without prejudice. The derivative jurisdiction doctrine, best understood as a procedural bar to the exercise of federal judicial power, has not been abrogated with respect to the federal officer removal statute at issue. When a defendant timely raises the doctrine, it erects a mandatory bar to the court’s exercise of federal jurisdiction; a plaintiff cannot circumvent that bar merely by filing an amended complaint invoking federal jurisdiction. The court noted that Ricci can file a new complaint in federal court. View "Ricci v. Salzman" on Justia Law