Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Banking
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Husband and wife operated a mortgage fraud scheme that bought residential properties and sold those properties to nominee buyers at inflated prices. They provided lenders with false information about buyers' finances, sources of down payments, and intentions to occupy the residences. The scheme involved 37 separate transactions and resulted in net loss of more than $700,000 to various lenders. After the scheme collapsed, they went bankrupt but were not immediately prosecuted. Wife worked as a nurse in a pediatric intensive care unit. Husband worked as a installer and technician. They raised their three children and became fully engaged in their community. On the day before the ten-year statute of limitations would have expired, the government charged them with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. They pled guilty to a single count of wire fraud, and were sentenced based on the 2010 USGS, wife to 41 months in prison, and husband to 63 months, and ordered to pay more than $700,000 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the sentencing judge failed to consider adequately unusually strong evidence of self-motivated rehabilitation. For this reason, we vacate their sentences

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Plaintiff complained that defendant told credit agencies that she was behind in payments on a loan in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681s–2(a). The district court dismissed the federal claim on the ground that the statute does not create a private cause of action and held that state common law claims are not preempted. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the state claims should have been dismissed with prejudice. Allowing state common law claims would defeat the purpose of the statute.

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Defendants were convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346) for participating in a fraudulent scheme to obtain mortgage loans. The scheme involved: recruiters, who enlisted buyers to buy properties with fraudulently obtained funds; financiers, who provided funds to buyers to facilitate the transactions; administrators, who bought fake documents to enable buyers to obtain mortgages; loan officers, who prepared fraudulent applications and sent them to lenders. Between 2003 and 2005, the group acquired more than 70 properties for which lenders provided $7.2 million in loans. Most of the properties went into foreclosure, resulting in losses to the lenders of $2.2 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The use of the term "straw buyer" in the confession of a nontestifying co-defendant did not obviously refer to the defendant and violate his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the "Bruton" doctrine. The court properly applied a "sophisticated means" sentence enhancement and gave an "ostrich" instruction concerning defendant's knowledge.

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Plaintiff, a plastics manufacturer, dealt with a container company that filed for bankruptcy in 2002, filed a creditor's claim for more than $7 million, and objected to the sale of assets and lien priorities. The debtor had pledged all of its assets as security for a line of credit with ANB, its primary lender. Plaintiff claimed that there was a fraudulent scheme under which the debtor would produce containers and not pay for them, so that that they would be part of inventory when a successor company, let by insiders, purchased the assets in bankruptcy. After its claims were rejected in the bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff sued ANB and Gateway alleging violation of RICO (18 U.S.C. 1961) and common-law fraud. The district court dismissed as "res judicata" but denied Rule 11 sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, citing collateral estoppel, issue preclusion. The court did not find that the claims were frivolous or designed to harass.

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Plaintiffs, evicted from their home following a state court foreclosure judgment, sought relief in federal court. The district court rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly considered the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and concluded that the doctrine applied to only two of the 22 claims: those that claimed injury caused by the state-court judgment of foreclosure, as opposed to injury caused by the defendants’ actions in enforcing the judgment. Plaintiffs offered no evidence of discriminatory motive with respect to their race or disabilities and did not allege specific facts establishing that there were material facts in dispute.

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Defendant is one of several investors (underwriters) in a mortgage bankers blanket bond issued to plaintiff to insure against financial loss resulting from employee misconduct. One of plaintiff's employees engaged in a scheme by which, for a kickback, he caused plaintiff to fund mortgages below its standards. Not knowing the loans were substandard, plaintiff sold them, warranting that they met its standards. Plaintiff was forced to repurchase the loans. The underwriters denied the claim. The district court dismissed a suit, finding that the bond did not cover the loss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The fidelity bond at issue contains direct-loss causation language. A financial loss resulting from contract liability to third parties is not directly caused by employee misconduct, even if employee misconduct is the source of the contract liability. Plaintiff's loss resulted from its contractual repurchase obligations; the employee misconduct did not directly cause the eventual financial loss. In addition, a specific exclusion in the bond bars coverage for losses resulting from loan-repurchase obligations.

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After the the defendants defaulted on $39 million in loans the bank began post-judgment enforcement proceedings. Defendants were "sluggish" in responding to citations and the bank learned that they had transferred about $20 million to accounts in India. The district court ordered defendants to surrender their passports pending return of the funds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court had the power to impose a minimal seizure on the defendants until they abided by the asset production order or explained why they could not.