Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gupta joined Morgan Stanley and signed an employment agreement containing an arbitration clause; an employee dispute resolution program (CARE) applied to all U.S. employees. The CARE program did not then require employees to arbitrate employment discrimination claims but stated that the program “may change.” In 2015, Morgan Stanley amended its CARE program to compel arbitration for all employment-related disputes, including discrimination claims, and sent an email to each U.S. employee, with links to the new arbitration agreement and a revised CARE guidebook. The email attached a link to the arbitration agreement opt-out form and set an opt-out deadline, stating that, if the employee did not opt-out, continued employment would reflect that the employee agreed to the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook and that opting out would not adversely affect employment status. Gupta did not submit an opt-out form or respond to the email. He continued to work at Morgan Stanley for two years until, he alleges, the company forced him to resign because of military leave. Gupta sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301–35. The court agreed with that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence as acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so; based on pretrial evidence, Gupta could not dispute he received the email. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, finding the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of that agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate. View "Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed class and collective actions against her former employer for wage and hour violations, the district court compelled arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the parties. The district court also struck as unlawful a waiver clause that appeared to forbid class or collective arbitration of plaintiff's claims. The arbitrator awarded more than $10 million in damages and fees to plaintiff and 174 similarly situated employees.The Seventh Circuit held that the availability of class or collective arbitration is a threshold question of arbitrability. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court, rather than the arbitrator, to evaluate plaintiff's contract with her employer to determine whether it permitted class or collective arbitration. View "Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GC Services, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of GC Services' motion to compel arbitration and held that the company waived any right to arbitrate. In this case, GC Services did not discover the existence of the arbitration agreement for eight months, and then the company did not notify the court or move to compel arbitration for another five months. Furthermore, none of the explanations offered for the delays were adequate, and GC Services' decision to litigate the merits of plaintiff's legal theory and request for class certification was inconsistent with a desire to arbitrate. View "Smith v. GC Services LP" on Justia Law

The employer sought review by the federal district court and obtained a judicial order vacating an award on the ground that the arbitrator improperly applied external law to contradict the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and upheld the arbitrator's award, holding that the text of the CBA permitted the arbitrator to look to external law in interpreting the agreement. The court held that the language contained in the preamble of the CBA suspended any part of the CBA that either the company or union believed to conflict with state law. In this case, while the court would have preferred that the arbitrator cite to that language before applying the Concealed Carry Act to reinstate the employee, the extraordinarily deferential standard of review compelled the court to uphold the award. View "Ameren Illinois Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers" on Justia Law

When Goplin began working at WeConnect, he signed the “AEI Alternative Entertainment Inc. Open Door Policy and Arbitration Program,” which referred to AEI throughout; it never mentioned WeConnect. Goplin brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. WeConnect moved to compel arbitration, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), attaching an affidavit from its Director of Human Resources stating, “I am employed by WeConnect, Inc.—formerly known as Alternative Entertainment, Inc. or AEI.” Goplin claimed that WeConnect was not a party to the agreement and could not enforce it. He cited language on WeConnect’s website: WeConnect formed when two privately held companies, Alternative Entertainment, Inc. (AEI) and WeConnect Enterprise Solutions, combined in September 2016… we officially became one company. WeConnect asserted that WeConnect and AEI were two names for the same legal entity, stating: This was a name change, not a merger. The court held that WeConnect did not establish that it was a party to the agreement or otherwise entitled to enforce it. The court rejected subsequently-submitted corporate-form documents and affidavits, stating that new evidence cannot be introduced in a motion for reconsideration unless the movant shows “not only that [the] evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goplin v. WeConnect, Inc." on Justia Law

Brokers Webb and Beversdorf were fired by Jefferies. They challenged their termination. As their employment contracts required, they filed claims in the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s arbitration forum. They signed FINRA's required “Arbitration Submission Agreement.” Their dispute proceeded in arbitration for two-and-a-half years. They withdrew their claims before a final decision was rendered. Under FINRA’s rules, that withdrawal constituted a dismissal with prejudice. Webb and Beversdorf then sued FINRA in Illinois, alleging that FINRA breached its contract to arbitrate their dispute with Jefferies by failing to properly train arbitrators, failing to provide arbitrators with appropriate procedural mechanisms, interfering with the arbitrators’ discretion, and failing to permit reasonable discovery. They sought damages in “excess of $50,000” and a declaratory judgment. The district court held that FINRA was entitled to arbitral immunity and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit vacated, concluding that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. 1332, which grants jurisdiction when there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. While Illinois law permits plaintiffs to recover legal expenses as damages in limited circumstances, those circumstances are not present here, so the amount in controversy requirement was not satisfied. View "Webb v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

Credit One repeatedly called A.D.’s (a minor) cell phone about payments owed on her mother’s account. A.D., by and through her mother, Serrano, brought a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A), seeking compensation for telephone calls placed by Credit One to her telephone number in an effort to collect a debt that she did not owe. During discovery, Credit One realized that its caller ID capture system had added A.D.’s phone number to its database when Serrano used A.D.’s phone to access her account. A.D. had apparently used the card, once, at her mother’s request, when she was 14 years old, in 2014. Credit One moved to compel arbitration and to defeat A.D.’s motion for class certification based on a cardholder agreement between Credit One and Serrano. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration but certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether A.D. is bound by the cardholder agreement. The Seventh Circuit reversed the order compelling arbitration. A.D. is not bound by the terms of the cardholder agreement to arbitrate and has not directly benefited from the cardholder agreement such that equitable principles require the application of the arbitration clause against her. View "A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Credit One repeatedly called A.D.’s (a minor) cell phone about payments owed on her mother’s account. A.D., by and through her mother, Serrano, brought a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A), seeking compensation for telephone calls placed by Credit One to her telephone number in an effort to collect a debt that she did not owe. During discovery, Credit One realized that its caller ID capture system had added A.D.’s phone number to its database when Serrano used A.D.’s phone to access her account. A.D. had apparently used the card, once, at her mother’s request, when she was 14 years old, in 2014. Credit One moved to compel arbitration and to defeat A.D.’s motion for class certification based on a cardholder agreement between Credit One and Serrano. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration but certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether A.D. is bound by the cardholder agreement. The Seventh Circuit reversed the order compelling arbitration. A.D. is not bound by the terms of the cardholder agreement to arbitrate and has not directly benefited from the cardholder agreement such that equitable principles require the application of the arbitration clause against her. View "A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2006, Warciak’s mother signed an agreement with T-Mobile to begin cell phone service. In 2012, she signed another agreement when she purchased a new phone. Each agreement contained an arbitration clause. Although Warciak uses a phone on his mother’s plan and is an authorized user who can make changes to the account, he never signed either agreement nor is he otherwise a party to them. In 2016, Warciak received a spam text message promoting a Subway sandwich. He sued Subway under federal and state consumer protection statutes. Subway moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements between T-Mobile and Warciak’s mother. In the district court, Subway argued that federal estoppel law required Warciak to arbitrate under his mother’s contracts. Warciak countered that under Illinois law he is not bound by his mother’s contracts. The district court applied federal law. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that state law applies and that Subway cannot claim estoppel because it cannot show detrimental reliance. View "Warciak v. Subway Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

Hyatt and Shen Zhen entered into an agreement providing that Shen Zhen would renovate a Los Angeles hotel and operate it using Hyatt’s business methods and trademarks. Two years later Hyatt declared that Shen Zhen was in breach. An arbitrator concluded that Shen Zhen owes Hyatt $7.7 million in damages plus$1.3 million in attorneys’ fees and costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of enforcement, upholding the arbitrator’s refusal to issue a subpoena to Cadwalader, who represented Shen Zhen during the contract negotiations. The dispute arose two years after Cadwalader stopped working for Shen Zhen. The contract has an integration clause that forecloses resort to the negotiating history as an interpretive tool. The arbitrator also declined to disqualify Hyatt’s law firm, which Cadwalader joined about three years after the contract was signed, finding that the firm’s ethics screen ensured that no confidential information would reach Hyatt's lawyers. The court also rejected an argument that the award disregarded federal and state franchise law and should be set aside under 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4), which covers situations in which “the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” View "Hyatt Franchising, L.L.C. v. Shen Zhen New World I, LLC" on Justia Law