Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012 Illinois State Police witnessed and videotaped Addison participating in crack cocaine sales at a drug house in East St. Louis. A jury later found him guilty of possession and distribution of cocaine base. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the evidence against Addison was strong and rejecting Addison’s claim that his right to a fair trial was undermined because the government’s case agent testified that he had never prosecuted the wrong person, that one of Addison’s co-criminals had a firearm, and that the surrounding neighborhood contained no other drug houses. Any error associated with the testimony about the case agent’s record was invited; the gun and neighborhood testimony did not constitute plain error. View "United States v. Addison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a stockholder in DeVry, which operates for-profit colleges and universities, filed a shareholders’ derivative suit against DeVry’s board of directors. A 2005 incentive plan authorized awards of stock options to key employees, including the CEO. The plan limited awards to 150,000 shares per employee per year. Nonetheless, the company granted Hamburger, who became its CEO in 2006, options on 184,100 shares in 2010, 170,200 in 2011, and 255,425 in 2012. DeVry, discovering its mistake, reduced each grant under the 2005 plan to 150,000 shares, but allocated Hamburger 87,910 shares available under the company’s 2003 incentive plan, which held shares that had not been allocated. Only the company’s Plan Committee, not the Compensation Committee, was authorized to grant stock options under the 2003 plan; there was no Plan Committee in 2012. The grant of 87,910 stock options was approved by the Compensation Committee, and then by the independent directors as a whole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The directors who approved the Compensation Committee’s recommendation were disinterested: the recommendation was a valid exercise of business judgment. Administration of the 2003 plan by the Compensation Committee, given the nonexistence of the Plan Committee, was not “a clear or intentional violation of a compensation plan,” View "Donnawell v. Hamburger" on Justia Law

Morady sold life insurance policies. Davis, a former lawyer, approached elderly African-Americans and paid them small amounts to become the nominal applicant-buyers of the policies, with Morady as the insurance agent, and to put the policies into an irrevocable trust, with Davis as trustee. The beneficial interest in the trust would be sold to an investor who would pay the remaining premiums and wait for the death of the insured. The insurer would not have sold the policies had it known that the premiums would be paid by an unrelated third party in the expectation that the policy would be transferred to him; its contracts with agents, including Morady, required them to conform to an “absolute prohibition against participation in any type of premium financing scheme involving an unrelated third party,” but the law allows an investor to purchase the beneficial interest in an existing life insurance policy. The net loss to Ohio National (beyond $120,000 commissions paid to Morady) was $605,000 in litigation expenses to void the policies. The total death benefits specified in the illegal policies amounted to $2.8 million. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Morady’s conduct constituted fraud and a breach of her contract and affirmed summary judgment, with damages of $726,000. View "Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1995 Barrett began work at the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) as an account technician. IDOC employees can be fired if they accumulate 12 unauthorized absences from work; unauthorized absences accrue on an employee’s record but are automatically expunged if the employee has a clean attendance history for a period of 24 consecutive months. Barrett was fired in 2010 after accumulating 12 unauthorized absences over a period of seven years. She claims that three of these absences (in 2003, 2004, and 2005) were for family or medical care and were protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. In 2012 she sued IDOC for violating her rights under the FMLA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that the suit was time-barred. An FMLA suit must be filed “not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” The alleged FMLA violations occurred, and the limitations period began to run, when IDOC denied Barrett’s requests for leave and classified the three contested absences as unauthorized—not, as she claimed, when she was fired years later as a consequence of her overall attendance record. View "Barrett v. Ill. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Two men robbed a Chicago bank. When Warfield was arrested on the day of the robbery, he told the FBI that he had robbed the bank with Hawkins. Hawkins and Warfield were indicted. During Warfield’s proffer session with the government, Warfield recanted his initial statement and, instead of Hawkins, claimed that he had robbed the bank with Brooks, also called “Stank.” (Earlier, Warfield also told a confidential informant in prison that a masked bank robber depicted on television was his “co-defendant” who was called “Stank.”) Warfield pleaded guilty, but refused to identify the other robber during his plea colloquy. Before trial, Hawkins moved to admit Warfield’s proffer statement regarding Brooks’s supposed involvement. Because Warfield intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, Hawkins argued that the statement was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as a statement against penal interest made by an unavailable witness. The court denied Hawkins’s motion, excluding Warfield’s statement on grounds that it was not supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated its trustworthiness. Hawkins was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; viewed as a whole, the circumstances do not “clearly suggest” that Warfield’s statement was trustworthy. View "United States v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

In 2007, Adkins, a detective at a Chicago Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center, installed a hidden surveillance camera in the ceiling of an office used by female officers as a changing area. The camera captured images of female officers dressing and undressing. VA personnel discovered the covert surveillance equipment during a 2009 renovation. Gustafson learned that the camera had captured images of her changing and filed suit against Adkins, alleging an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Adkins’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Adkins’s claims that Gustafson’s Bivens claim was precluded by the “comprehensive remedial scheme[s]” laid out in the Civil Service Reform Act and the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. Supreme Court precedent clearly established the contours of the Fourth Amendment violation Gustafson alleged. View "Gustafson v. Adkins" on Justia Law

In 2005, Martinez, Vallejo, and 47 others were indicted for crimes committed while they were members of the Milwaukee chapter of the Latin Kings gang organization. Martinez and Vallejo pled guilty to a RICO offense, 18 U.S.C. 1962, and admitted to engaging in predicate racketeering activities, including a 2003 murder. Vallejo, who was 17 years old at the time, and Martinez, who was 16, each fired several shots at the victim. Martinez also pled guilty to attempted murder of a rival gang member; Vallejo’s plea agreement included two attempted murders. All of the attempted murders occurred while the defendants were under the age of 18. In both cases, the court imposed the “maximum sentence”—life in prison.. Neither Martinez nor Vallejo filed a direct appeal. In 2012, the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juveniles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of their motion to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Martinez and Vallejo’s life sentences were imposed after an individualized sentencing, and not by statutory mandate,and did not violate Miller. View "Vallejo v. United States" on Justia Law

Woods told a coworker at the Berwyn Fire Department that “he wanted to kill somebody, all of them” and that his children were going to “go over there” and “tune them up,” referring to his coworkers and superiors. Chief O’Halloran looked into the statements and eventually recommended termination. A three-member panel for the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducted a hearing. Woods was represented by counsel, who gave opening and closing statements, put on witnesses, cross-examined others, made and won objections, and presented exhibits. After the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Woods based largely on the testimony of the co-worker to whom Woods made the statement. Woods filed suit asserting discrimination and unlawful retaliation and attempted to proceed under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, which applies in employment discrimination cases when a biased subordinate (O’Halloran) who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision-maker (the Board) as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Woods’s claims, noting the full and independent evidentiary hearing and the Board’s almost complete reliance on the co-worker’s testimony. View "Woods v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law

The Centralia state-operated developmental center, one of seven Illinois SODCs, houses approximately 200 severely disabled individuals, some having the mentality of an infant or toddler. Many also have serious aggressive, or self-destructive behavioral disorders. The seven SODCs have, in total, about 1800 residents, while about 10,000 people with severe developmental disabilities live in community-based facilities: houses or apartments in residential settings that accommodate one to eight residents. The state agency provides services (such as housing and medical care) to approximately 25,000 developmentally disabled persons. Another 23,000 or so are on a waiting list; 6000 are considered to be in emergency situations. Since 2012 Illinois has been trying to shift SODC residents to community-based facilities, in accordance with a national trend: community-based facilities are cheaper than SODCs and there is evidence that even persons who are severely disabled mentally or behaviorally or both do better in community-based facilities. A suit, on behalf of the Centralia SODC residents, alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a preliminary injunction to prevent assessment and transfer of those residents, reasoning that the urgency required for emergency relief had not been shown. View "Ill. League of Advocates for Developmentally Disabled v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Mullins lived in apartment 2 in the complex behind the BigFoot Lounge in Rockford, Illinois. Mullins and Washington (called “T”) used Mullins’s apartment as a stash house for their cocaine and marijuana distribution operation. Winnebago County Sheriff’s Deputy Boomer submitted an affidavit and obtained a search warrant for Mullins’s apartment. The affidavit stated that a confidential informant had told members of the Narcotics Unit that a black male known as T was selling cocaine and marijuana in the area, was storing the drugs in an apartment behind the BigFoot Lounge, and drove a black Cadillac Escalade with Minnesota registration 161EKT when he delivered drugs. Deputy Boomer reported that he had seen the Cadillac Escalade with Minnesota registration 161EKT in the parking lot of the apartment building behind the lounge. The affidavit also described surveillance by the Narcotics Unit and controlled drug buy. Deputies executed the warrant, recovering 626 grams of marijuana, 16 grams of powder cocaine, more than 150 grams of crack cocaine, drug packaging materials, digital scales, and mail addressed to Mullins. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), upholding denial of Mullins’s motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. Factual inaccuracies in the warrant affidavit were immaterial to the probable cause determination. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law