Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005 the Army Corps of Engineers invited bids on a federal reservoir project in Illinois. One of the successful bidders was Slurry, which leased from Pileco a trench cutter made by Bauer. Slurry was a prime contractor on the Corps of Engineers’ project; the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131, requires prime contractors on some government construction projects to post bonds. Slurry used Fidelity as surety. The bond insured against a failure by Slurry to pay subcontractors, such as Pileco. Contending that the cutter was defective, Slurry refused to pay the agreed rental price. Pileco sued Slurry and Fidelity, asserting breach of contract that Fidelity violated the Miller Act by failing to reimburse Pileco for costs associated with Slurry’s reneging on its obligation to pay. Slurry counterclaimed. A second trial resulted in a verdict in Pileco’s favor except for a $357,716 equitable adjustment in favor of Slurry, based on time that cutter was inoperable because of a defect attributable to Pileco. The net result was that Pileco was awarded $2.23 million against Slurry for breach of contract and the same amount against Fidelity for the Miller Act violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the denial of prejudgment interest and costs. View "Pileco, Inc. v. Slurry Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Chapman’s sales of heroin and cocaine were recorded by an undercover informant wearing a Hawk recording device, which captured audio-video recordings of each transaction. The recordings were introduced at trial. Following his conviction, Chapman was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial by both refusing to grant him a third expert witness to examine the informant’s recordings and by denying his motion to subpoena one of his earlier expert witnesses. The court upheld admission of the recordings at trial; denial of motion for acquittal based on a defense of entrapment; and the sentence. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sherman was shot and died from multiple gunshot wounds. When an officer arrived, Sherman lay on the ground with 50-60 people gathered around. Long was tried for first degree murder. No physical evidence tied Long to the crime. The state presented four witnesses. Two witnesses named Long as the shooter during the investigation, but recanted at trial. In closing argument, the prosecutor made improper statements, resulting in reversal of Long’s conviction and a new trial. At Long’s second trial, the state again presented the four eyewitnesses. One maintained her identification of Long. The two witnesses who recanted during the first trial continued to deny having seen Long shoot Sherman, despite their prior videotaped statements. The fourth witness, Irby, gave inconsistent testimony. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made comments that no evidence or theory was presented that another individual committed the crime, referred to the movie “Gone with the Wind,” and referenced the contents of a letter written by Irby that had not been admitted into evidence. The jury found Long guilty. His state court appeals and post-conviction petitions were unsuccessful. The district court dismissed Long’s federal habeas petition, finding the prosecutorial misconduct claims procedurally defaulted and that Long had not shown a reasonable likelihood that Irby’s testimony or the closing argument prejudiced the outcome; that Long’s ineffective assistance claim was without sufficient merit to overturn the state court; and that his post-conviction counsel ineffective assistance claim was procedurally barred. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state’s failure to correct Irby’s denial of her recantation prejudiced Long. View "Long v. Butler" on Justia Law

Bour and Natisha met on seven or eight occasions for Bour to molest Natisha’s younger daughter, “Jane,” then four to 18 months old. Bour sexually touched Jane, penetrated her mouth and genitals, and filmed at least two encounters with her. He also photographed the genitals of Natisha’s older daughter, then three to five years old. After an acquaintance informed the FBI that Bour was paying Natisha to molest the girls, Bour pleaded guilty to purchasing a child for the production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251A(b)), three counts of producing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(a)), and possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)). At his sentencing hearing, he unsuccessfully objected to the sentencing memorandum’s discussion of homemade videos, which show him masturbating as prejudicial, irrelevant, and not offense conduct. Bour was sentenced to life for purchasing a child for the production of pornography and to 1,020 consecutive months (85 years) on the remaining counts. The judge also imposed lifetime supervised-release conditions, and, 235 days after sentencing, ordered Bour to pay $75,000 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order, the sentence, and supervised conditions. View "United States v. Bour" on Justia Law

Navarro pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. In the plea agreement, the government and Navarro both agreed to refrain from seeking a departure from the sentencing guidelines and to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range as determined by the court. At sentencing, the court rejected an aggravated role enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 and determined that the applicable guidelines range was 188 to 235 months in prison. The government then argued in favor of an upward departure suggested in Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b) for defendants “who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who, nevertheless, exercised management responsibility over the property, assets or activities of a criminal organization” and recommended an above-guidelines sentence of 320 months. Navarro voiced no objection. The district court departed upward and imposed a sentence of 262 months. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding that the government’s breach of the plea agreement constituted plain error. View "United States v. Navarro" on Justia Law

Chinese farmworker Wang married in 1988. His wife gave birth to a daughter. Government officials required his wife to have an intrauterine device implanted. Five years later the IUD “fell off,” and she got pregnant. Officials forced her to abort the pregnancy. In 2000, they had another child, a son. Months later, officials went to their house and threatened to sterilize either Wang or his wife. Wang protested; the officials pushed him to the floor, kicked him, and beat him with batons. They forced his wife to have a contraceptive, “Norplant,” surgically inserted into her arm. His wife became ill and they had no more children. Nine years later Wang entered the U.S. on a business visitor’s visa, procured from a snakehead. More than a year after his entry, he sought asylum and withholding of removal, contending that he had been persecuted for resisting official demands to sterilize him or his wife. An IJ found that Wang did not testify credibly. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the denial of relief; the IJ misunderstood Wang’s testimony about the procedure his wife received and erred by concluding that Wang could not show past persecution because he resisted only his wife’s forced contraceptive implant as opposed to forced abortion or sterilization. View "Wang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2008, Armour was sentenced to 51 months in prison and three years of supervised release after he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. After he was released from prison in 2012, Armour violated the conditions of his supervised release several times, including a conviction of aggravated battery for beating his eight-year-old son. The district court then sentenced Armour to 24 months in prison followed by one year of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to conditions of supervised release prohibiting Armour from: using, possessing, distributing, or being present at places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered; and possessing weapons or ammunition; interacting with known felons. The conditions also required certain reports to the probation officer, that the probation officer be allowed to visit Armour’s home, and that Armour comply with any probation department order to participate in a substance abuse treatment program. View "United States v. Armour" on Justia Law

Hooper, a family practice physician, was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2000. He must regularly see a psychologist to maintain his Illinois medical license. In 2009, Proctor hired Hooper to work in its Peoria outpatient clinics. In 2010 Hooper revealed his bipolar disorder for the first time to Proctor and inquired about Proctor’s long term disability benefit. Hooper had experienced an incident and believed he needed time off. He was granted immediate paid medical leave. Hooper determined he was not eligible for long term disability, because his condition was preexisting. Hooper did not return to work after he was cleared by a psychiatrist, repeatedly told that the psychiatrist had cleared him, and warned that if he did not contact Proctor by a certain date regarding his return, he would be fired. His employment was terminated. Hooper sued Proctor under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Proctor. Hooper’s complaint failed to mention any facts to put Proctor on notice that he was pursuing a failure to accommodate claim, which would fail even when considered on the merits because Hooper did not require accommodations. Hooper failed to create an issue of fact that would raise an inference of disability discrimination. View "Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of electrical workers, claimed that their respective employers, in collusion with Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority (MPEA, which used electricians supplied by the employers) wrongfully terminated them, in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and federal labor law and circumvented the CBA-mandated hiring process and that their union, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, failed to adequately represent them in the CBA-mandated grievance process. The district court denied motions to dismiss four counts, but dismissed a declaratory judgment motion against MPEA and two employers, and the claim of state law tortious interference with contracts against MPEA. The district court held that, as a political subdivision, MPEA is not an “employer” under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 185. Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of the tortious interference claim against MPEA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that jurisdiction was created by the need to interpret the CBA. With respect to political subdivisions, section 301 preempts not only claims “founded directly” on the collective bargaining agreement, but also state law claims that indirectly implicate a collective bargaining agreement. View "Healy v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth." on Justia Law

In 2000, Huri began working at the Circuit Court of Cook County. Her manner of dress marked her as a follower of Islam. Huri is from Saudi Arabia. From 2002-2010, she worked as a child care attendant—the only one who was an Arab, and the only one who was a Muslim— under McCullum, a devout (and allegedly vocal) Christian. Huri filed internal complaints regarding McCullum’s behavior. McCullum became aware of those complaints and told Huri that the Chief Judge’s Office was uninterested in — and tired of—Huri’s complaints. McCullum apparently complained about Huri. In2010, Huri was transferred to the Court Reporters’ Office, where, Huri alleges, she was also treated badly and subject to retaliation for filing Equal Employment Opportunity complaints. The district court dismissed Huri’s suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Seventh CIrcuit reversed, concluding that Huri had stated a claim of hostile work environment and that Huri’s superiors were not protected by qualified immunity. View "Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge, Cook County" on Justia Law