Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to fraud consisting of having abused her position as a Chicago public-school board member by accepting kickbacks of more than $500,000 from bus companies to which she steered transportation contracts worth $21 million. The parties stipulated that the value of the benefit received from the fraud was $7-$20 million, and so the guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. The guidelines in effect at the time required a 20-level enhancement for honest services fraud when “the value of the payment, the benefit received or to be received in return for the payment, the value of anything obtained or to be obtained by a public official or others acting with a public official, or the loss to the government from the offense, whichever is greatest,” was between $7 and $20 million, U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2), 2B1.1(b), but the statutory maximums for the two counts were 20 years and 3 years respectively, and that changed the range to 276 months. The judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 120 months, ordered the defendant to pay restitution of $7.2 million, and imposed a year of supervised release, which the judge may have thought mandatory. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the district court’s explanation inadequate. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

The law firm represented Goesel, a minor, and his parents in a personal-injury suit that settled before trial. The law firm needed judicial approval to finalize the settlement. The contingent-fee agreement entitled the firm to one-third of the gross settlement; all litigation expenses would be covered by the Goesels’ share. The court refused to approve the settlement unless litigation expenses were deducted off the top and one-third of the net settlement was allocated to the firm and rejected the firm’s attempt to count the cost of computerized legal research as a separately compensable expense rather than rolling it into the fee recovery. The Goesels declined to participate in an appeal, so the court appointed an amicus to argue in support of the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Though the court enjoys substantial discretion to safeguard the interests of minors in the settlement of litigation, this discretion is not boundless. Here, the judge criticized aspects of the firm’s contingent-fee agreement that have received the express blessing of Illinois courts. Once these improper reasons are stripped away, the only rationale that remains—that “fairness and right reason” require that the Goesels receive 51% of the gross settlement amount rather than 42%—is insufficient to justify discarding a reasonable contingent-fee agreement. View "Williams, Bax & Saltzman, P.C. v. Boley Int'l (H.K.) Ltd" on Justia Law

Rogers has a long criminal record that includes West Virginia convictions for sexually abusing his daughter and stepdaughter. He is required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act to register in each state in which he resides, is employed, or is a student. 42 U.S.C. 16911(1), 16913. In 2011 he moved from West Virginia to Indiana and failed to register there. A few months later his 18-year-old daughter reported to West Lafayette police that Rogers was sexually abusing her. Rogers pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250. The judge applied a six-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) for committing a sex offense (incest against his daughter) while in failure-to-register status. The judge refused to award credit for acceptance of responsibility because Rogers falsely denied this relevant conduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 105-month sentence. The threshold definition of “sex offense” found in section 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an inquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the exception in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the specific facts of the offense conduct. The district court conducted the correct analysis and properly applied the section 2A3.5 enhancement. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Continental sells carbon black, a material used in rubber products. BRC makes rubber products for the automotive industry. The companies entered into a contract that stated: It is the intent of this agreement that Continental agrees to sell to BRC approximately 1.8 million pounds of carbon black annually. In 2010, Continental shipped 2.6 million pounds to BRC. In 2011, for various reasons, Continental was struggling to keep up with the total demand from all its customers. When Continental refused to confirm or ship some of BRC’s orders, BRC sued, alleging that Continental had breached and repudiated the contract. The district court entered judgment for BRC, finding that as a matter of law that the agreement was a “requirements contract,” meaning it obligated Continental to sell as much carbon black as BRC needed, and obligated BRC to buy all its carbon black exclusively from Continental. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the agreement did not obligate BRC to buy any—much less all— of its carbon black from Continental. View "BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Cont'l Carbon Co." on Justia Law

Vinyard pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. At sentencing, he started to backtrack on whether he was admitting some of the relevant conduct. After consulting his attorney, he withdrew his objections. His hesitation prompted the district judge (Gilbert) to vacate his plea and sentence on the court’s own initiative, which led to unusual proceedings culminating in a writ of mandamus ordering the court to reinstate Vinyard’s plea and sentence. Vinyard tried to challenge his plea in district court proceedings conducted to comply with the mandate. Judge Stiehl rejected Vinyard’s challenge and reinstated the plea and sentence. Vinyard then could have filed either direct appeal or a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. On his attorney’s advice, he chose collateral attack. He later sought reinstatement of his right to direct appeal, arguing that advice caused him to default some claims and amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The district court denied relief, concluding that the decision to forgo a direct appeal was strategic and not objectively unreasonable, and that Vinyard could not show prejudice in any event. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Vinyard proved neither deficient performance nor prejudice. View "Vinyard v. United States" on Justia Law

A jury found Ferrell, a licensed psychologist, and Bryce, Ferrell’s employee, guilty of six counts of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. Ferrell was sentenced to 88 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s refusal to admit two out-of-court statements made by Bryce’s brother (also Ferrell’s employee), and contained in a voicemail and an email. The district court held that these statements were hearsay and did not fall within Rule 804(b)(3)’s hearsay exception. The district court held that although the brother was unavailable to testify, the statements were not against his interest and the corroborating circumstances did not indicate that his statements were trustworthy. The court also upheld admission of testimony by another doctor concerning Ferrell’s conduct while in Texas. The court found that the testimony did not constitute impermissible character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). View "United States v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Williams received information from a registered informant that an individual whom the informant personally knew was selling narcotics from a gold Toyota Camry with tinted windows near 71st and Paxton. The informant gave the license plate number and the suspect's description. Williams drove to the location, saw Sands in the driver’s seat of a gold Toyota Camry at 7102 South Paxton, and parked to conduct surveillance. Officers Kilroy, Darling, and Gadzik were in another vehicle, out of sight. Williams saw Sands engage in a hand-to-hand transaction. He informed the enforcement officers that a narcotics transaction had occurred. Kilroy drove the enforcement vehicle to block the Camry. Kilroy testified that the buyer exited the Camry and ran into a store. Gadzik pursued the buyer. Kilroy approached the Camry and saw Sands, holding a firearm, which he moved to the center console. Kilroy ordered Sands to exit the car, then removed Sands, patted him down, and passed Sands to another officer. Kilroy entered the Camry, opened the console, and located Sands’s firearm, containing live ammunition, and 10-15 bags of marijuana under a false console floor. At trial on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), the court precluded Sands from arguing that Hunter placed the firearm into the console, but allowed Sands to argue that the firearm was Hunter’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding that ruling and denial of a motion to suppress. View "United States v. Sands" on Justia Law

Cruse, McClain, Henderson, and eight others were indicted for involvement in a long-running conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in Milwaukee. The indictment centered on two street gangs that controlled the crack-cocaine trade in adjacent neighborhoods on the city’s northwest side. The eight co-conspirators pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government. Henderson agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy but only with respect to crack and marijuana, not powder cocaine. In exchange the government would recommend the mandatory minimum sentence. Henderson pleaded guilty, but the government neglected to file an information narrowing the charged drug types as contemplated by the agreement. A jury found Cruse and McClain guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Henderson and McClain. Henderson understood the charge against him and the possible penalty, and the judgment conforms precisely to the terms of the agreement. The court rejected claims that the trial was contaminated by two Batson violations, improperly admitted hearsay, and faulty jury instructions (about the scope of coconspirator liability). The court vacated Cruse’s conviction based the absence of a jury instruction distinguishing the buyer-seller relationship from a conspiracy. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has a neurological disorder, tardive dyskinesia. Plaintiff’s involuntary movements include tongue thrusting, pursing of the lips, choking, and side-to-side chewing of the jaw. She becomes mute, screams or makes non-verbal sounds, particularly under stress. She also suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, with severe anxiety. Shortly after plaintiff was diagnosed with TD, a personal injury suit that she had filed went to trial. She had no lawyer. Before trial, she sought accommodations of her medical problems, and was permitted to have a friend and a family member take notes, was given a podium, and was allowed to take occasional recesses. She was denied other requested help—a microphone, an interpreter, and a jury instruction explaining her disorder, lest the jurors think she was just acting up. She was hectored by the judge, who told the jury that the plaintiff has a “speech impediment.” She suffered other embarrassments in front of the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act yet had been denied reasonable accommodations. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that plaintiff was denied a full and fair opportunity to vindicate her claims. View "Reed v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Garcia pled guilty to two counts of distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The court found that Garcia had a Criminal History Category of V and a total offense level of 19, which led to a guideline range of 57 to 71 months. The government recommended a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, arguing that Garcia’s criminal history was almost that of a career offender and the career offender guideline range was approximately 151 to 188 months. Garcia’s counsel recommended a sentence at the low end of the range, 57 months, and argued that Garcia’s traumatic childhood and his acceptance of Christianity were strong factors in mitigation. Defendant also made a statement in allocution that addressed both of those mitigating factors. The district court sentenced Garcia to 108 months and imposed three years of supervised release without any consideration of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. Garcia presents three issues on appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The court adequately explained why an above-range sentence was appropriate, but made no statement of reasons justifying the non-mandatory conditions of supervised release or the length of the term of supervised release. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law