Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At age 15 Cary was on supervision for battery after touching the buttocks of a woman. He dropped out of high school and worked washing dishes. He was diagnosed as cannabis- and alcohol-dependent, but was asked to leave a treatment center after threatening staff and patients. In 2009, then age 25, Cary had sexual intercourse with a minor under age 17. He pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and registered as a sex offender in Illinois. He also pleaded guilty to unrelated charges of theft and domestic battery. Released from jail, he moved to Florida, assuming a new identity. He did not report his departure from Illinois, nor did he register as a sex offender in Florida, violating the Illinois registry law and the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250. In 2011, Cary was found peering into the windows of a university sorority house. He pleaded guilty to prowling and failing to register. The court sentenced him to 33 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit remanded for modification of conditions of supervised release, including a hearing on the scope of the computer monitoring and filtering software and sexually oriented websites Cary is prohibited from accessing. View "United States v. Cary" on Justia Law

Police went to a residence, responding to an anonymous tip. Approaching, one heard a door close and went to the side yard where he encountered Webster. Webster had $2,296 in cash on his person; officers smelled a strong odor of marijuana from the house and on Webster’s clothing. Individuals exited the house and ran. One escaped, but Jones was apprehended. The officers placed the two in the back of a squad car while they sought a search warrant and recorded conversations in the vehicle. The search revealed a marijuana grow operation and guns. Defense counsel offered no objection; the court admitted the tape, stating that the recording was evidence but the transcript was not and merely reflected what some people believe is on the tape. Webster was convicted of: possession with intent to distribute cocaine; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense; manufacture of marijuana; possession with intent to deliver cocaine base; and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in admitting forensic laboratory reports and the recording of the conversation in the squad car, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. View "United States v. Webster" on Justia Law

Rojas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Cicero fired him because he supported a political opponent of the town president. A jury awarded him $650,000 in damages, but the judge granted a new trial, concluding that Kurtz, Rojas’s lawyer, had engaged in misconduct by making misleading statements, eliciting hearsay responses to prejudice the defendants even though the judge would strike them, arguing in a way that informed the jury about excluded evidence, and undermining the credibility of a defense witness by asking questions that presented him in a bad light, without a good-faith basis for the questions. The parties settled, providing Rojas with $212,500 compensation for the discharge and Kurtz with fees of $287,500. The settlement did not resolve motions for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927, which authorizes sanctions against lawyers who needlessly multiply proceedings, and under FRCP 26(g)(3) based on not revealing bankruptcy proceedings that could have affected whether Rojas was a proper plaintiff. The judge denied sanctions, reasoning that Rojas and Kurtz lost about $400,000 apiece when the settlement replaced the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to section 1927, but vacated with respect to the rule, which does not afford judges the same discretion. View "Rojas v. Town of Cicero" on Justia Law

Kuznar left Poland and moved to the United States, leaving his wife, Emilia, and son Thomas. In the U.S., he married Anna without divorcing Emilia. Anna collected spousal pension benefits after his 1995 death. In 1997, Thomas, now living in the U.S., opened probate in Illinois state court, on his mother’s behalf. The probate court ordered Anna to pay Emilia the amount she had collected from Mitchell’s pension fund. Emilia died before judgment entered; the Appellate Court remanded. In 2011 Thomas opened administration of Emilia’s estate and renewed his motion for summary judgment in the 1997 case, on behalf of Emilia’s estate. Anna filed notice of removal. Thomas filed notice of voluntary dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Anna then argued that she had removed the 1997 case, not the 2011 case, and that no dismissal could be valid unless it dismissed the 1997 case entirely. The district judge reasoned that Anna’s submissions indicated that she was attempting to remove a “new action” filed in the 2011 probate case. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal was effective. Thomas was entitled to accept Anna’s “doubtful” characterization of his motion and voluntarily dismiss the supposed “new action” rather than dispute Anna’s shifting characterization of his filings. View "Kuznar v. Kuznar" on Justia Law

In 2009 defendant was sentenced to 24 months in prison, with 3 years of supervised release, as a felon in possession of a gun. After his 2011 release, he violated probation and was sentenced to five months in prison plus 30 months more of supervised release. After subsequent violations, the judge ordered 45 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring and enrollment in a mental health treatment program. In 2013, the probation officer advised the judge that defendant had committed five traffic offenses in one day. The judge revoked supervised release, imposing a five-month sentence of imprisonment with two more years of supervised release. He was released; his probation officer advised the court that defendant had again violated. Although the recommended range was 5 to 11 months, the government asked for 15 months. Counsel noted that defendant had young children and that prior employers would rehire him. The judge sentenced him to 15 months with no more supervised release. After supplemental briefing, the Seventh Circuit vacated, after learning that the prosecutor in an earlier matter involving the defendant became the judge who sentenced him. The possibility that a conscious or unconscious recollection influenced the sentence cannot be excluded. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

After initiating a sale to a confidential informant, Morris pled guilty to distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Although the district court sentenced him below the guidelines range of 57-to-71 months, it did not address his principal arguments in mitigation: that for one transaction he delivered a counterfeit substance that contained no crack cocaine; that the informer requested the quantity, while there was no evidence that he had a history of selling or an ability to sell such a large quantity of drugs; that the court should apply a 1:1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio because the guidelines disparity was the result of political compromise rather than for any reason founded in medical, chemical, physiological, or other scientific or social science evidence; and that at that ratio, his advisory sentencing range would be 15 to 21 months. The court noted and took into account Morris’s difficult family history, his attempts at rehabilitation, his failures at avoiding a return to crime, his attempts at employment and education, and other factors relevant under section 3553(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of his arguments. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Sultan claims that medical providers and prison staff forced him to live in unsanitary conditions and denied him medical care. He moved to proceed in forma pauperis and attached a certified statement from his prison trust account, which was $300 overdrawn. The court assessed an initial partial filing fee of $2.02. He earns $10 per month from a prison job. The prison did not remit payment. Responding to an order to show cause, Sultan stated that the administrator was at fault, and that his daughter had tried to wire the money. Sultan tendered a grievance he submitted complaining that staff had not complied with the court’s order to send the fee and a Western Union receipt. The judge gave Sultan another 30 days. Sultan sought 30 more days to pay. The judge dismissed Sultan’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Prison trust “accounts” are not like bank accounts in which the depositor has creditor status, nor does any rule require state administrators to pay a federal court before they satisfy an inmate’s debt to the prison. There is a conflict in asking the prison to process a payment to permit a lawsuit against it. Section 1915(b)(4) provides that no prisoner shall be prohibited from bringing a civil action for lacking means to pay the fee. View "Sultan v. Fenoglio" on Justia Law

Bronk incurred debts providing his wife’s medical care before her 2007 death. He suffered a stroke in 2009. With medical debts exceeding $345,000, his assets included his home, without a mortgage, and a $42,000 certificate of deposit. On advice of counsel, Bronk borrowed $95,000, mortgaging his home, to establish college savings accounts for his grandchildren under IRC 529. Account owners control the funds in such accounts, may change beneficiaries, and may, at any time, request a 100% distribution. Bronk converted the $42,000 c.d. into an annuity, to begin making payments in 2035, including a death benefit. Bronk filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The trustee objected to the college-fund and annuity transactions, citing 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(2)(A).The bankruptcy judge found no evidence that Bronk had acted with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, but interpreted section 815.18(3)(p) (exemption for college accounts) as applying only to the beneficiary’s interest, not the owner’s interest, and disallowed exemptions. The judge held that the annuity was a fully exempt retirement benefit under section 815.18(3)(j). The Seventh Circuit held that the college accounts are exempt and that the annuity satisfies the basic definition of an exempt “retirement benefit.” To qualify as a fully exempt retirement benefit, however, the plan must be either employer sponsored or comply with IRC 815.18(3)(j)2; the trustee waived that issue. View "In re: Bronk" on Justia Law

Borostowski pled guilty to receiving child pornography, five counts of distributing child pornography, and three counts of possessing child pornography, reserving his right to appeal denial of motions to suppress. The district court sentenced him to 293 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Borostowski challenged findings that he was not in custody when officers questioned him on the day a search warrant was executed at his home, and that a hard drive seized from his mother’s car was within the scope of the warrant. The Seventh Circuit remanded the issues of whether Borostowski was in custody during his interrogation and when he invoked his right to counsel. A reasonable person in Borostowski’s circumstances might not have felt free to end the interview and leave, given the strong police presence, the use of handcuffs and a de facto two-man guard as restraints, the extended length of interrogation, and confinement to a small crowded room, despite being told that he was not under arrest or in custody and that the tone never became hostile or combative. The court affirmed with respect to the contents of the hard drive retrieved from the car and found no plain error in the procedure used in sentencing. View "United States v. Borostowski" on Justia Law

Jonas and his wife purchased life insurance: each owned the policy on his or her life, with the other as beneficiary. When they divorced, the court reassigned ownership: Troy owned the policy on Jennifer’s life. Each policy provided that change in ownership “does not change the Beneficiary Designation.” Troy thought it unnecessary to redesignate himself as beneficiary. Jennifer died. Troy claimed the proceeds ($1 million). State Farm did not pay, concerned that the proceeds might belong to the children (named secondary beneficiaries) or to Jennifer’s estate under Tex. Family Code 9.301, which provides that if a divorce occurs after one spouse has designated the other as beneficiary of an insurance policy, the designation lapses. Texas law requires an insurer to pay within 60 days of receiving a claim and provides for “damages” at 18% a year plus reasonable attorneys’ fees. An insurer that receives “notice of an adverse, bona fide claim” may defer payment and file an interpleader action not later than the 90th day. State Farm did not receive any other claim, but filed an “interpleader” before the 60 days had run. The district court treated concerns about the potential rights of the children and Jennifer’s estate as equivalent to a claim and disbursed the money to Troy, who argued on appeal that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees and interest at 18%. The Seventh Circuit vacated for dismissal. When the litigation began, there was no justiciable controversy. View "State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Jonas" on Justia Law