Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gilbert was convicted of sexual assault in 1992 and sentenced to prison. In 2006, the state sought Gilbert’s commitment under Wisconsin Stat. 980.02 as a “sexually violent person.” The court found probable cause. Gilbert completed his sentence and was transferred, on parole, to a DHS facility because of the pending commitment proceeding. Gilbert violated parole and was returned to a Corrections facility. Gilbert was again paroled and transferred to the DHS Center. Gilbert violated his second parole and was reincarcerated. A jury found him a “sexually violent person.” the court entered a commitment order. Gilbert was not transferred to a DHS facility until months later because he was serving his sentence for his second parole violation. Gilbert filed a post-conviction motion asserting that his parole revocation meant that the commitment petition must be dismissed. State courts rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his federal habeas petition, rejecting Gilbert’s claim that there was not a “current” determination that he was a sexually violent person when he entered DHS care. The delay between the commitment verdict and Gilbert’s entry into DHS care was caused by Gilbert’s actions and he has continued to be evaluated without any indication that his condition has improved. View "Gilbert v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

The owners of multifamily housing rental projects in Wisconsin that are assisted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development program under Section 8 of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 1437f sued the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA), alleging WHEDA breached certain Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) contracts by failing to approve annual rent increases,as required by federal law, and by requiring the owners to submit rent comparability studies as a prerequisite to receiving rent increases. WHEDA filed a Third-Party Complaint against HUD, alleging that, if WHEDA is found to have breached the HAP contracts, then those breaches resulted from WHEDA following congressional and HUD directives. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the district court’s order was entered without the benefit of the parties’ full briefing on jurisdiction. While state law may create the breach-of-contract causes of action, the only disputed issues involve the proper interpretation of Section 8 and HUD’s implementing guidance. The issues are “capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” View "Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Castro" on Justia Law

Garcia and Salgado, drivers for Latino Express, solicited signatures from other drivers to certify the Union. Owners and managers began efforts to undermine the Union activity and the two were eventually terminated. They filed claims with the NLRB alleging that Latino Express had violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (3) by interfering with their organizing activities. The NLRB Regional Director sought interim injunctive relief pending the Board’s remedial action under section 10(j), alleging that Latino created the impression that the union or other concerted activities were under surveillance; granted improved benefits in response to the organizing campaign; instructed employees not to speak with each other about the company’s accident reimbursement policy; announced that union representation was never going to happen; interrogated employees about union activity and threatened discharge; and solicited employee grievances. The Director requested interim reinstatement for Garcia and Salgado. The district court granted relief as requested. Latino sought an extension of time, claiming that its employees had withdrawn their recognition of the union and that a decertification petition was forthcoming. The court found Latino in civil contempt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the status of the union was irrelevant to compliance. View "Ohr v. Latino Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Greengrass sued her former employer, IMS, alleging that IMS retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the U.S. EEOC against the company by naming her in its annual SEC filings and casting her complaint as “meritless.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of IMS on the ground that Greengrass lacked evidence showing a causal link between her EEOC filing and the alleged retaliatory act. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Greengrass made out a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity when she filed her EEOC charge, that IMS engaged in an adverse employment action when it listed her name in its SEC filings, and that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that IMS listed her name because Greengrass filed the EEOC charge. View "Greengrass v. Int'l Monetary Sys., Ltd." on Justia Law

Ortiz pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess heroin with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and received the statutory minimum prison sentence of 120 months. He argued that his cooperation with law enforcement after his arrest qualified him for “safety valve” relief from the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f); U.S.S.G. 5C1.2. The district court decided that Ortiz’s cooperation did not amount to the full and truthful proffer of information required for application of the safety valve. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court had no need to make formal findings about the credibility of the government’s evidence about threats by the Ortiz family against a confidential informant, given its conclusion that Ortiz failed to make a full proffer. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Swanigan was arrested and jailed for more than 50 hours by Chicago police officers who mistakenly thought he was a serial bank robber. Following his release, Swanigan sued individual officers and the city alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims. Swanigan’s “Monell” policy-or-practice claim against the city became a separate lawsuit, which was stayed while the suit against the individual officers proceeded. A jury awarded $60,000 in damages. Swanigan moved to lift the stay and to amend his complaint in light of the jury’s verdict. The judge interpreted the motion as a waiver of all but two of Swanigan’s Monell theories and held that the remaining claims were not justiciable, based on the city’s promise to indemnify its officers and to pay nominal damages of $1 for any Monell liability. The judge dismissed the Monell suit. The Seventh Circuit remanded: the judge wrongly assumed that Swanigan was waiving all but two Monell theories and, under FRCP15(a)(1)(B), Swanigan was entitled to amend his complaint within 21 days of a responsive pleading, which would have been the next step after the stay was lifted. A sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim, a merits adjudication was improper. View "Swanigan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Sweport’s judgment creditors, represented by attorney Wolf, petitioned to place Sweports in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Sweports became the debtor in possession. Wolf was counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The court rejected plans submitted by Sweports and the Official Committee. The U.S. Trustee moved that Sweports’ bankruptcy either be converted to Chapter 7 liquidation or dismissed. Neither Sweports nor the creditors favored conversion. The court dismissed. Weeks later Wolf sought attorney’s fees and expenses of $780,000 for his work for the Official Committee. An interim request for fees and expenses of $410,000 had been granted while Sweports was in bankruptcy, but little had been paid. Wolf’s final request sought $1.13 million. The bankruptcy judge denied awards on the ground that he lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that the awards could be paid only out of the assets of the debtor’s estate, and there were no such assets after the bankruptcy was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that while the bankruptcy court could no longer disburse estate assets, it could determine that Wolf had a valid claim in the amount he was seeking. Such a ruling would create a debt and, if Sweports refused to pay, Wolf could sue in state court. View "Sweports, Ltd. v. Much Shelist, P.C." on Justia Law

From 2002-2010, Salutric, an investment adviser whose firm had more than 1,000 clients, defrauded clients by diverting assets from their Schwab accounts to unapproved, high-risk investments, including restaurants, car dealerships, real estate developments, and an entertainment company. Salutric or his associates had interests in the investments. Salutric’s clients were unaware of these ventures. Salutric represented via falsified paperwork, including forged signatures, that he had clients’ permission to make withdrawals from the Schwab accounts. Six individuals and retirement plans covering 72 small-business employees lost a total of $3,898,818. Salutric pleaded guilty to wire fraud. The court adopted the PSR, including its calculation of an advisory sentencing range of 151 to 188 months in prison, noting victim impact statements which were supplements to the PSR. There were no objections; neither party objected to the court’s declaration that it would consider a statement by the daughter of victims. The court discussed, in detail, 48 letters submitted on behalf of Salutric by family, friends, and community figures detailing his community service and praising his character. After evaluation of the section 3553(a) factors, the court ordered Salutric to serve 96 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s consideration of statements by non-victims. View "United States v. Salutric" on Justia Law

Minnick suffers from several serious medical problems, including fibromyalgia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and degenerative disc disease. Minnick was a truck driver for 24 years until taking short term leave in 2008 due to pain in his legs and hip. After returning to work, he was laid off. In 2010, he applied for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. After the Disability Determination Bureau denied Minnick’s claim, an Administrative Law Judge determined that Minnick is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ did not fully develop the record nor adequately articulate her analysis in discrediting the testimony of one of Minnick’s treating physicians. View "Minnick v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Fard pled guilty to wire fraud pursuant to a blind plea. He later sought to withdraw his plea, alleging that it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The district judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Fard’s plea was based upon a representation by Fard’s original defense counsel that the government had promised to dismiss the indictment if Fard pled guilty and cooperated. At the hearing, counsel denied having made such a statement. Rejecting Fard’s testimony, the judge credited counsel’s testimony and denied Fard’s motion. At sentencing, the judge increased Fard’s guideline sentence, finding that he had obstructed justice by lying at the evidentiary hearing. He also denied Fard’s motion for an acceptance of responsibility reduction, because Fard falsely denied his leadership role in the scheme. The Seventh Circuit vacated the plea and remanded, concluding that the evidence indicated that Fard’s claim was not “so far-fetched.” View "United States v. Fard" on Justia Law