Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Dr. Kamal Patel was a physician who commonly prescribed home health care services for his patients. Federal investigators learned that defendant had been receiving undisclosed payments from Grand Home Health Care. Patel was charged with six counts of violating (and one count of conspiring to violate) the Anti-Kickback Statute. During his bench trial, at the close of the government’s evidence, defendant moved to acquit, arguing that he had not “referred” any patients to Grand because there was no evidence that he steered or directed his patients to Grand; rather, the patients independently chose Grand as their provider after defendant prescribed home health care. The district court rejected that argument, holding that, even if a patient had initially chosen Grand, defendant “referred” the patient to Grand when he certified or recertified that the patient needed care, that the care would be provided by Grand, and that Grand could be reimbursed by Medicare for services provided. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred by holding that the certification and recertification, via a standardized Medicare form (Form 485), of patients for treatment constituted a “referral” under the Anti-Kickback Statute. He also argued that even if those certifications were referrals, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Patel was paid “in return for” certifications, as required by the statute. Finding no reversible error, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Patel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patrick Novak filed suit against Southern Illinois University and three of its professors, alleging that he had been terminated from the University’s doctoral program in Curriculum and Instruction on the basis of his post-traumatic stress disorder, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination and that, in any event, he had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants’ stated reason for terminating him from the program was a pretext for discrimination. After review of plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff could not show that the reason given by the University for his dismissal was pretextual. On that ground, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of So. Ill. University" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christopher Baines pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute heroin, for which he received a 240-month sentence in prison. Defendant appealed, raising three issues: (1) the district court improperly attributed significant quantities of heroin to him a relevant conduct in determining his sentence; (2) the district court failed to sufficiently account for his mitigation evidence; and (3) in light of a recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines with regard to certain drug trafficking offenses, defendant qualified for a lesser sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Baines" on Justia Law

National Retirement Fund sought to hold Mezz Lender and Oaktree Capital responsible for multiemployer pension fund withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1381. Oaktree, through Mezz Lender, provided financing for the acquisition of a hotel by Chicago H&S. When H&S defaulted, it was taken into bankruptcy and the hotel was liquidated. NRF contends that the sale of the hotel triggered withdrawal liability on the part of H&S and any other “trade or business” under common control with it, including bot Oaktree and Mezz Lender. Oaktree and Mezz Lender, argued that the claim of withdrawal liability was barred by the bankruptcy reorganization plan pursuant to which the hotel was sold. On motions for summary judgment, the court stated that having decided that Oaktree and Mezz were not jointly and severally liable for H&S’s withdrawal liability, "the Court need not address the parties’ arguments as to [the Oaktree parties’] motion" concerning the bankruptcy. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court decided in the absence of a cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue that it found to be dispositive, and without first giving the unsuccessful movant notice that it was entertaining the possibility of entering summary judgment against it or the opportunity to respond. View "Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. National Retirement Fund" on Justia Law

Ledbetter, a black male, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981 against his former employer, Good Samaritan Ministries of Carbondale, Illinois, a tax-exempt nonprofit organization that provides services to needy people. The suit charged retaliation for Ledbetter’s having filed a charge of racial discrimination and of retaliation with the EEOC. Ledbetter had been warned, based on complaints by shelter residents and co-workers about alleged intimidation and threats. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding too many " loose ends" for summary judgment. View "Ledbetter v. Good Samaritan Ministries" on Justia Law

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721, prohibits individuals from knowingly obtaining or disclosing “personal information” from a motor vehicle record. Chicago police officers brought suit against Sun-Times Media, alleging that the publishing company violated the DPPA by obtaining each officer’s birth date, height, weight, hair color, and eye color from the Illinois Secretary of State’s motor vehicle records, and publishing that information in a newspaper article that criticized a homicide investigation lineup in which the officers participated. Sun-Times unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the officers’ complaint, arguing that the published information does not constitute “personal information” within the meaning of the DPPA, or, in the alternative, that the statute’s prohibition on acquiring and disclosing personal information from driving records violates the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. DPPA’s definition of “personal information” extends to the details Sun-Times published here; Sun-Times possesses no constitutional right either to obtain the officers’ personal information from government records or to subsequently publish that unlawfully obtained information. View "Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC" on Justia Law

Rogers, Hardy and others waited across from a bank. When the first bank employee arrived, they drew guns and forced her inside. Under Rogers’s direction, she turned on lights and deactivated the alarm. She did not give the all-clear signal indicating to other employees that it was safe to enter. Rogers ordered her to open the vault, but she could not. While they struggled with the vault, Hardy took her keys. Rogers and Hardy restrained her and fled in her car. The others also fled. FBI agents were nearby; co-conspirator Armour was under surveillance for suspicion of robbing other Indiana banks. Chases ensued. Hardy was arrested nearby in possession of a pistol. Rogers was found hiding in the hotel. Officers located Rogers’s handgun, two-way radio, and clothing worn during the robbery. The others, including Armour, were arrested. Rogers pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 371), armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and 2113(d)), and knowingly using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)). The court sentenced Rogers to 60 months’ imprisonment on Counts One and Two (concurrently), and 84 months on Count Three (consecutively). Rogers’s plea agreement left open whether he should receive the two-level enhancement for carjacking, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(5). The Seventh Circuit affirmed application of the enhancement View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Wagoner, a paraplegic since a 1996 accident, is incarcerated by IDOC. Five years into his confinement, Wagoner filed a complaint, asserting that IDOC failed to accommodate his disability, citing humiliating toileting arrangements; a cell so small that Wagoner had to move his wheelchair to allow his cellmate to use the toilet; sidewalks that caused him to tip out of his wheelchair; no access to the weight room or the library; problems with his wheelchair; failures to provide other medical supplies; exclusion from job training; and transportation in a vehicle not equipped for wheelchairs. IDOC argued that Wagoner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Wagoner sought a “Pavey hearing.” The court denied the motion, stating that Wagoner had not established that a dispute of fact existed and could use his response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion to create a record. Wagoner filed a brief opposing summary judgment and a second Pavey motion, with a deposition excerpt detailing IDOC’s threats when he filed grievances and support for his futility claim. The district court granted IDOC summary judgment, refusing to consider the Pavey motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is better practice to hold a Pavey hearing before considering summary judgment, but there was no reversible error. The court correctly concluded that no material facts were disputed. View "Wagoner v. Ind. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Footstar operated the footwear departments in various Kmart stores as though they were islands. Footstar employees could only work in those departments unless they had written permission from Kmart. In 2005, a Footstar employee tried to help a customer get an infant carrier off a shelf outside the footwear department and the customer was injured. She sued. Kmart sought indemnification from Footstar and its insurer, Liberty Mutual. A magistrate judge found that Footstar and Liberty Mutual both had a duty to defend beginning the day Kmart formally requested coverage since the injury was potentially coverable under the agreement between Kmart and Footstar and the insurance policy. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither Liberty Mutual nor Footstar had a duty to indemnify Kmart because the injury did not occur “pursuant to” or “under” the agreement between Kmart and Footstar. That agreement specifically precluded Footstar employees from working outside of the footwear department, where the injury occurred, and actions taken in contravention of the agreement were not “pursuant to” or “under” it. Liberty Mutual did not deny coverage in bad faith and that Kmart did not breach the relevant notice provisions such that Liberty Mutual and Footstar could withhold defense costs. View "Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the 2012 Wisconsin deer-hunting season, Pierotti bought a Remington rifle at Walmart. A clerk asked him to use a computer to complete ATF form 4473. The form asks whether the purchaser has ever been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Pierotti’s initial response was “Yes.” In 2011, he was convicted of misdemeanor battery against his then-fiancée. When Pierotti clicked to submit his completed form, a window popped up advising him to review his answers. He then changed his response to only that question and submitted the form again. He did not seek further information, although he could have clicked a link providing instructions for the question. Had he clicked, he would have seen that his prior offense was a misdemeanor of domestic violence. Pierotti was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), for making false statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm. The district court instructed the jury on the definition of “knowingly” in section 922(a)(6), including (over Pierotti’s objection) the ostrich instruction, which informs the jury that the defendant acted “knowingly” if he strongly suspected his statement was false and deliberately avoided the truth in making it. The jury found Pierotti guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Pierotti" on Justia Law