Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was ultimately convicted of bank robbery by force or violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and for brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He suffers from “antisocial personality disorder.” After his arrest the defendant acted as if he were in a catatonic state. His lawyer successfully requested a hearing to determine competency to be tried. He told the psychologist that he could not read and did not know what a bank was, what a year was, his birthday, or the name or address of any family member, but prison staff told the psychologist that they had observed the defendant reading and that he followed instructions without difficulty. The psychologist concluded that defendant was exaggerating his mental deficits and was competent to stand trial. At the competence hearing, the defendant’s ex‐wife testified that he could read, drive, and use a cell phone, and that he knew what banks, money, courts, police, and prosecutors are. The judge determined that the defendant had, by exaggerating his mental deficits, delayed the prosecution, applied the 2‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice, and sentenced him 135 months. Noting extensive evidence of defendant’s competence, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Wilbourn" on Justia Law

Sibanda arrived in the U.S. on a non‐immigrant visa. She sought asylum in 2009, claiming that, after her husband died, her brother‐in‐law attempted to rape her and force her to become his second wife, in accordance with the custom of “bride‐price” practiced by several tribes. Sibanda testified that Zimbabwean law did not protect her; when she sought help from the police, they told her that they would not intervene in a family matter. Her family and her tribal chief insisted that she was bound by the custom. The IJ denied relief, finding that Sibanda credibly had testified that a bride‐price had been paid for her marriage. He did not address the credibility of her testimony about her duties to and attacks by her brother-in-law, but concluded that Sibanda’s failure adequately to corroborate her testimony meant that she had not demonstrated past persecution. She had not presented a country report or “any statements from any authority or anyone else who was aware” of the attacks. The Board of Immigration Appeals also found her account credible, but dismissed her appeal for insufficient corroboration. The Seventh Circuit remanded; the Board did not adequately consider whether more corroborating information was reasonably available to Sibanda. View "Sibanda v. Holder" on Justia Law

Carter, an African-American male, holds an MBA and is a CPA. CSU’s College of Business hired him in 1986 as a temporary assistant professor. In 1992, CSU granted Carter tenure and promoted him to associate professor. In 1995-1996, he was department chair until he was removed by the university president. In 2006-2007, Carter was dissatisfied with his teaching assignments. Beginning in January 2007, Carter called in sick every Thursday. Carter blamed CSU’s failure to accommodate his sleep apnea. CSU’s Assistant Vice President recommended that Carter be sanctioned. Carter sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The district court entered partial summary judgment against Carter; the parties settled the remaining claim. On January 22, after the start of the spring 2008 semester, Carter requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. CSU granted the request. When Carter returned on March 20, CSU assigned him non-teaching duties for the remainder of the semester. His supervisor, Simyar was not willing to recommend Carter as Department Chair. The president had previously rejected candidates for other chair positions because they lacked terminal degrees, but at least three other chairs did not have PhDs at the time. Carter sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the FMLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the person chosen as Chair was no more qualified than Carter. View "Carter v. Chicago State Univ." on Justia Law

In 2010, Curvin applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401, alleging that she became disabled beginning in January 2009 from glaucoma, overactive thyroid, high blood pressure, difficulty sleeping, and knee pain. The ALJ denied her claim in 2011, finding that Curvin had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability; that Curvin’s glaucoma in her right eye was a severe impairment, and that the objective medical evidence showed that her remaining impairments were not severe; that based on the conclusions of Curvin’s treating and examining physicians and objective medical evidence, Curvin did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met the severity of a listed impairment. The ALJ determined that Curvin had a residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertion levels, but with a nonexertional limitation of no peripheral vision on her right side due to her glaucoma. The district court vacated. The agency appealed. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the denial as being supported by substantia evidence. View "Curvin v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Lodholtz was injured in the Pulliam factory and sued, seeking compensation. Pulliam filed a claim with its insurer, Granite State, which retained a claims adjuster, York. Pulliam assumed, erroneously, that Granite would provide a defense and defaulted on the state court claim. Neither Granite nor York ever had communicated to Pulliam whether they believed Granite had a duty to defend Pulliam under the terms of the policy. Pulliam subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with Lodholtz, assigning to Lodholtz any claims it had against Granite or its agents for failing to undertake a defense. The agreement also provided that Lodholtz would not seek to recover its damages from Pulliam. Granite sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify Pulliam. Lodholtz later filed a complaint against Granite, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and negligence, and against York for negligence. The district court consolidated the cases. After the district court entered a final judgment in favor of York, Lodholtz appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Indiana has held that an insurance adjuster owes no legal duty to the insured, and Lodholtz failed to establish that the Indiana Supreme Court would disagree with that decision. View "Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

The Piltches were traveling in their 2003 Mercury Mountaineer in February 2007 when they hit a patch of black ice, causing the car to slide off the road and into a wall. Upon impact, none of the car’s air bags deployed and both were injured. They filed suit in 2010, alleging the vehicle was defective under Indiana law. The district court granted Ford’s summary judgment motion holding that, without expert testimony, the Piltches could not create an issue of fact as to proximate cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Piltches stated a claim for relief under the Indiana Products Liability Act; there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a defective product that expert testimony is not required; they are not required to produce expert testimony to establish proximate cause; and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, raising an inference of negligence on the part of Ford. The Piltches’ presentation of circumstantial evidence was not “one of the ‘rare instances’ where it is enough to negate all possible causes other than a product defect.” View "Piltch v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Spencer stopped paying her mortgage in 2008. In Wisconsin state court foreclosure proceedings, Spencer’s attorney, Nora, adopted an “object-to-everything litigation strategy and buried the state court in a blizzard of motions.” While a hearing on a summary judgment motion was pending in state court, Nora removed the case to federal court. Finding no objectively reasonable basis for removal, the district court remanded the case and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the lender, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The Seventh Circuit dismissed Spencer’s appeal as frivolous; the district court did not order her to pay anything. The court affirmed the award as to Spencer “because she has not offered even a colorable argument that removal was reasonable” and ordered Nora to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for litigating a frivolous appeal. Several months later, noting Nora’s similar behavior in another case, the court imposed an increased sanction of $2,500, suspended until the time, if ever, that Nora submits further inappropriate filings, and directed the clerk of court to forward a copy of the order and earlier opinion to the Office of Lawyer Regulation of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. View "PNC Bank v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Taylor was convicted in 2009 of conspiring to distribute crack, possessing and distributing powder cocaine, possessing a firearm as a felon, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in 2005 and 2006. The court found that Taylor was responsible for 837 grams of crack and 396 grams of powder cocaine and noted Taylor’s responsibility for 227 kilograms of marijuana. Under the 2008 Guidelines, the drugs were together equivalent to 17,046 kilograms of marijuana, for an offense level of 36; Application Note 10(D) provided for a two-level reduction if a drug offense involved both crack cocaine and another controlled substance. Taylor’s base offense level was set at 34. Two levels were added for obstructing justice, yielding a range for the drug counts of 188 to 235 months. The court sentenced Taylor to concurrent terms of 180 months for those crimes, with a mandatory consecutive sentence of 60 months for possessing the gun in furtherance of a drug crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 2013 Taylor moved under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for a reduced sentence, arguing that Amendment 750, which made permanent and retroactive the temporary changes in Amendment 748, had reduced his base offense level to 32. The district court concluded that Taylor’s range had not been lowered, so that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that Taylor’s motion lacked merit, but that 3582(c)(2) did not limit subject-matter jurisdiction. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

HSBC initiated a Wisconsin foreclosure action on the Rinaldi’s mortgage. The Rinaldis counterclaimed, alleging that the mortgage paperwork had been fraudulently altered and that HSBC lacked standing to enforce the mortgage. The Rinaldis lost at summary judgment and did not appeal. The court later vacated its foreclosure judgment after HSBC agreed to modify the loan. The Rinaldis filed a new state lawsuit reasserting their counterclaims. Before the court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Rinaldis filed for bankruptcy. In those proceedings, HSBC filed a proof of claim for the mortgage. The Rinaldis objected and filed adversary claims, alleging fraud, abuse of process, tortious interference, breach of contract, and violations of RICO and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bankruptcy court found in favor of HSBC and recommended denial of the adversarial claims. The district court agreed, noting the Rinaldis’ failure to comply with Federal Rules. The court dismissed the Rinaldis’ adversary claims as meritless and warned that the Rinaldis would face sanctions if they filed additional frivolous filings because their tactics had “vexatious and time- and resource-consuming” and their filings “nigh-unintelligible.” After additional filings of the same type, the Rinaldis voluntarily dismissed their bankruptcy. Their attorney filed additional frivolous motions. The court ordered the attorney to pay $1,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sanction. View "Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Maurice Salem was admitted pro hac vice in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in connection with some commercial litigation. Salem represented Trade Well International, a Pakistani company, which was suing United Central Bank for damages and the return of property that was left behind in a hotel that the Bank owned. Problems arose when Salem filed a Notice of Lien on behalf of his client; the Notice stated that there was a lien on the hotel and purported to provide notice of the litigation. The district court, concluding that the Notice was defective in several ways, held Salem in contempt of court, revoked his pro hac vice status, barred him from practicing in the Western District of Wisconsin for three years, and imposed a $500 fine. Salem appealed. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court’s orders should have been set aside: nothing Salem did warranted a finding of contempt, nor these sanctions. View "Salem v. United Central Bank" on Justia Law