Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The owners of an adult entertainment establishment in the 500-resident Village of Dix that features nude dancing and permits customers to bring their own alcoholic beverages onto the premises, challenged the enactment of three ordinances that ban public nudity, open containers of alcohol in public, and the possession of liquor in public accommodations. Plaintiffs argued that the public nudity ban violates the free speech protections and that the Village lacks statutory authority to pass the challenged alcohol restrictions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to the First Amendment challenge; at this early stage of the litigation, Dix has not established the necessary evidentiary basis for its assertion that nude dancing causes adverse secondary effects to the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. The court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenge to Dix’s alcohol regulations, the enactment of which fell within the parameters of Illinois law and was supported by a rational basis. View "Foxxxy Ladyz Adult World Inc.v. Village of Dix" on Justia Law

Love, who is African-American, was dismissed from the Milwaukee city hall renovation site, where he worked as a foreman, after a physical altercation with another worker. Cullen was the general contractor; Cullen’s subcontractor (Matthews) employed Union Contracting, which employed Love. Love brought a Title VII action against Cullen, alleging that his dismissal was racially motivated. Union, which had no contractual relationship with Cullen, paid Love’s salary and provided all other benefits, set Love’s hours, and passed Cullen’s instructions on to Love. Cullen only gave specific directions if it reviewed a finished product and found it unsatisfactory. In the event of “serious incidents” involving threats to workplace safety or productivity, Cullen retained the right to investigate its subcontractors’ employees, discipline them, and permanently remove them from the job site. According to Love, there was another physical altercation between two Caucasian workers at the site that resulted in no significant disciplinary action. The district court concluded that Love failed to demonstrate an “indirect” employment relationship and granted Cullen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Cullen’s involvement in Love’s dismissal was relevant to their relationship, it was not enough to overcome other factors. Cullen, in the aggregate, exercised very little control over Love. View "Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Facing financial problems and lawsuits from victims of sexual abuse, the Catholic Archdiocese of Milwaukee filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2011. A Creditors’ Committee composed of abuse victims sought to void a one-time transfer of $55 million from the Archdiocese’s general accounts to a trust, created after the settlement with victims and earmarked for maintaining cemeteries in accordance with Canon Law, as fraudulent or preferential. The district court found that the application of the Bankruptcy Code to that transfer would violate the Archbishop’s free exercise rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. RFRA is not applicable. The government is not a party; the Committee does not act under “color of law” and is not the “government” for RFRA purposes. It is composed of non-governmental actors, owes a fiduciary duty to the creditors and no one else, and has other nongovernmental traits. Although the Free Exercise Clause is implicated, but does not bar application of the Code to the $55 million. The Code and its relevant provisions are generally and neutrally applicable and represent a compelling governmental interest in protecting creditors that is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. View "Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Listecki" on Justia Law

Bailey was detained for 23 days while police investigated a 2009 Chicago schoolyard brawl that resulted in the death of another student. A video of the incident showed an attacker who punched victim as he tried to stand up. Detectives showed the video to Officer Massey, who was assigned to the school and had worked there for several years. Massey identified Bailey and another student as assailants. She claimed that she had known Bailey for 18 months, and recognized his face. They also showed the video to another student (then-suspect) who witnessed the fight; he identified Bailey as one of the attackers and told detectives that he knew him from school. Two school staff members also identified Bailey on the video. The charges against him were ultimately dropped after the investigation revealed that five other persons, but not Bailey, were involved in the fight. Bailey sued, claiming malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the delay was imposed for improper motivations such as punishing Bailey or drumming up evidence to justify his arrest. View "Bailey v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gerhartz lost control of his vehicle on a rural Wisconsin highway and struck an oncoming car. The Calumet County Sheriff’s Department responded. Paramedic Katalinick, treating Gerhartz, told a deputy that he believed Gerhartz had been drinking alcohol. Sergeant Tyson instructed Richert to follow Gerhartz to the hospital. Tyson then spoke to Zeinert, a first responder and a bartender for a nearby Stockbridge bar. Zeinert stated that, earlier that evening, she had served Gerhartz “three or possibly four glasses of Bud Light beer” and that Gerhartz told her that he had smoked “too much pot tonight.” Tyson instructed Richert to arrest Gerhartz and to obtain a blood sample. At the hospital, Richert ordered, without a warrant, an evidentiary blood draw, pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law. A technician conducted the blood draw about two hours after the accident. Gerhartz was unconscious. His blood-alcohol content was .243g/100ml. Gerhartz was later convicted of injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and of operating a motor vehicle under the influence. Gerhartz sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the officers summary judgment; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol from Gerhartz’s bloodstream was an exigent circumstance sufficient to justify the warrantless blood draw. View "Gerhartz v. Richert" on Justia Law

Bouras, a citizen of Algeria, entered the U.S. in 1997 as a nonimmigrant business visitor and overstayed his visa. In 2006, while living in Chicago, he married Schreiner, who lived in Ohio. He was granted conditional permanent resident status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. For most of their two-and-a-half year marriage, Bouras continued working in Chicago; Schreiner remained in Ohio. For at least six months, Bouras was in Algeria alone, visiting family. The marriage ended by divorce before Bouras had obtained unconditional permanent residency. He was placed in removal proceedings after he failed to convince USCIS that he had entered the marriage in good faith, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(4)(B). Bouras testified, but neither his ex-wife nor any other witness appeared at the hearing to testify about the marriage. Bouras sought a continuance so that his ex-wife could testify. The immigration judge denied that request, stating that no “extenuating circumstances” justified a continuance and finding that Bouras had not established the marriage had been in good faith. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision. The Seventh Circuit denied review; denial of Bouras’s last-minute request for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. View "Bouras v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2003 Brown pleaded guilty to filing a false income tax return. He was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2005, he was charged with conspiracy to engage in financial transactions to conceal the proceeds of illegal narcotics sales, through the purchase of cars in 2002-2005, involving more than $1.5 million in drug proceeds. A key government witness, Coates, refused to testify. Brown pled guilty to one count of money laundering involving the 2003 purchase of a Mercedes Benz by Brown on behalf of Coates. The government agreed to dismiss other charges and to recommend probation. The agreement provided that if Brown breached its terms, “any prosecutions that are not time-barred … on the date of the signing of this Agreement may be commenced.” Meanwhile, the FBI began investigations that would culminate in 2010 charges of mortgage-related fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1344. The scheme had commenced in May 2005 and lasted for about a year. Brown contended that the 2005 plea agreement barred his prosecution absent his breach of the agreement, which had not occurred. Convicted, Brown was sentenced to a below-Guidelines 60 months in prison plus restitution of $1.067 million. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his argument. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The district court certified a nationwide class action, alleging that Nestlé and Waggin’ Train sold dog treats that injured the dogs. The parties reached a settlement, to which the district court has given tentative approval pending a fairness hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). That hearing is scheduled for June 23, 2015. The order tentatively approving the settlement enjoins all class members from prosecuting litigation about the dog treats in any other forum. One case affected by this injunction has been pending for two years in Missouri, and was certified as a statewide class action before the federal suit was certified as a national class action. Curts, the certified representative of the Missouri class, intervened to protest the injunction, citing 28 U.S.C. 2283, the AntiInjunction Act. The Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction, noting that the district judge did not explain why he entered the injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A) provides that every order issuing an injunction must “state the reasons why it issued.” An injunction that halts state litigation is permissible only if it satisfies section 2283 in addition to the traditional factors. The district judge was silent about everything that matters. View "Adkins v. Nestle Purina PetCare Co." on Justia Law

Iqbal bought a gasoline service station and contracted with S-Mart Petroleum for gasoline. Iqbal then hired Patel to conduct the business, ceding operational control to him. He chose Patel on the recommendation of Johnson, S-Mart’s president. Patel ran the business but did not pay for the gasoline, leading S-Mart to sue. The Indiana state court entered a judgment of more than $65,000 against Iqbal as guarantor. Under a settlement, Iqbal gave S-Mart a note, secured by a mortgage on the business premises. When he still did not pay, a state court entered a second judgment against him, and the property was sold in a foreclosure auction. Iqbal filed a federal suit, alleging that Patel and Johnson acted in cahoots to defraud him out of his business and seeking treble damages under 18 U.S.C. 1964, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it challenged the state court’s judgments. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predated the state litigation and caused injury independently of it. View "Iqbal v. Patel" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service determined that Gyorgy (who did not file tax returns 2001-2007) owed approximately $100,000 in unpaid income taxes, penalties, and interest for tax years 2002 and 2003. The IRS mailed notices of his deficiencies in 2006 and 2007, including demands for payment, to the address on his most recently filed tax return. But Gyorgy no longer lived there and did not receive the notices. More than two years later, his debts were still outstanding, so the IRS filed notice of a federal tax lien on his property. Gyorgy challenged the action in a collection due process (CDP) hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals, which sustained the IRS’s filing of the lien notice, findings that the IRS properly mailed Gyorgy’s deficiency notices under I.R.C. 6212(b)(1) before filing the lien and correctly determined his underlying tax liabilities. The tax court and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Gyorgy presented no arguments and no evidence before the tax court to challenge the IRS’s calculation of the taxes and penalties he owes. View "Gyorgy v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law