Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lenjinac was born in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1987 and is a Muslim. From 1992 to 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina was entrenched in a civil war, characterized by ethnic cleansing. Lenjinac’s family home was burned to the ground and Serbian forces captured several male family members who have not been seen since. In 2002, Lenjinac emigrated to the U.S. He became a permanent resident in 2005. In 2010, Lenjinac pleaded guilty to dealing in cocaine. Charged with removability as an aggravated felon (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), Lenjinac sought asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. He indicated that given his criminal history in the U.S., he would likely be detained upon his return and tortured. He stated that he would have no safe place to live because he has no family or home in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The IJ only considered CAT deferral because the aggravated felony conviction rendered him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal and granted his application. Although the BIA accepted the IJ’s findings of fact, it vacated the deferral of removal, citing lack of evidence that parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina retained an interest in harming Lenjinac or that he would be imprisoned for the purpose of causing him pain and suffering. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Lenjinac v. Holder" on Justia Law

Following a 13-month investigation of a drug-trafficking network that stretched from Mexico to California to Indiana, the government secured a warrant to search seven Fort Wayne, Indiana hoes. Sewell stayed in one of those homes. When a team of federal and local authorities arrived there, they discovered, among other items, 110 grams of marijuana, cutting agents for cocaine, a drug ledger, multiple scales, $19,900 in cash in the dishwasher, and a loaded revolver. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentencing enhancements for possession of a firearm in connection with drug dealing and criminal activity involving not less than 15 kilograms but not more than 50 kilograms of cocaine, but vacated conditions of supervised release that did not “fit the peculiar circumstances of the defendant being sentenced.” The court rejected a claim that the search warrant was issued without probable cause and a challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. View "United States v. Sewell" on Justia Law

A large commercial development in Kansas City, Missouri was aborted in the middle of construction due to cost overruns. When the developer would not cover the shortfall, the construction lender stopped releasing committed loan funds, and contractors filed liens against the property for their unpaid work on the unfinished project. Bankruptcy followed, and the contractors’ liens were given priority over the lender’s security interest in the failed development, leaving little recovery for the lender. The lender looked to its title insurer for indemnification. The title policy generally covers lien defects, but it also contains a standard exclusion for liens “created, suffered, assumed or agreed to” by the insured lender. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the title company. The exclusion applies to the liens at issue, which resulted from the lender’s cutoff of loan funds, so the title insurer owed no duty to indemnify. The liens arose from insufficient project funds, a risk of loss that the lender, not the title company, had authority and responsibility to discover, monitor, and prevent. View "BB Syndication Servs, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Richardson was arrested by Indiana police in December 2011, for domestic battery and intimidation with a deadly weapon. A same-day search of his home revealed guns, a violation of state and federal law because he had been convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. Days later, the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause and a detainer. A complaint that charges a felony can establish a basis for an arrest warrant and initiate or expand an investigation, but unlike an indictment or information, cannot initiate felony prosecution. A detainer merely informs the jail that a person being held is wanted on other charges, so that the jail should notify the issuing agency of the prisoner’s imminent release. The federal court issued a warrant for Richardson’s arrest, which was not executed while he remained in jail. In March 2013, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served. The next day the federal warrant was executed, and he was jailed. The following month he was indicted. He moved to dismiss, citing his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district judge denied the motion. Richardson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held that the clock does not begin to tick until a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Michael's brother, Kevin, purchased a lakefront lot. Michael was to cover expenses and ultimately purchase the lot. A dispute arose and Kevin put the lot up for sale. Kevin offered to reimburse Michael $54,049.10 and directed Michael to stop tampering with “For Sale” signs. Michael recorded a lien. Although Michael had about a 5% interest in the lot, the lien stated that Kevin “acquired title for convenience only.” Kevin sought a declaration of quiet title, and alleged slander of title, partition, and breach of contract. The jury was instructed, based on Wis. Stat. 706.13(1), which defines slander of title as submitting, entering, or recording, claim of lien, lis pendens, writ of attachment, financing statement or other instrument relating to a security interest in or the title to property, if the submitter “knows or should have known” that any part of the instrument was false, a sham, or frivolous. An interlocutory judgment of $281,000 was entered for Kevin. Michael filed a bankruptcy petition. Kevin asserted that their judgment was precluded from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) as a “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court concluded that the issue was preclusively decided and entered judgment for Kevin. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The state court jury’s slander of title findings did not preclusively established that Michael acted “willfully.” The verdict could have been based on negligence. View "Gerard v. Gerard" on Justia Law

Dr. Simpson, an African-American was recruited to apply for a position at BDCH in 2010. BDCH’s CEO offered Simpson employment with the concurrence of BDCH’s COO. Both were aware of Simpson’s race. BDCH paid the recruiter $12,000. BDCH’s Physician Employment Agreement stated that Simpson “must apply for, obtain and maintain” active medical staff membership and clinical privileges. BDCH was to pay Simpson a $20,000 signing bonus “within five (5) days after first day of employment,” contingent on Simpson’s obtaining medical staff privileges and fulfilling other conditions of the employment agreement. Simpson applied for medical staff privileges at BDCH, stating that he was certified with the American Board of Family Physicians and held an unrestricted license to practice medicine in Indiana and Illinois. He also indicated that he was a defendant in two medical malpractice cases involving wrongful death, but did not disclose that these claims were not covered by malpractice insurance. Simpson noted that he had been placed on academic probation during his first year of residency. The Committee denied his application for staff privileges. Simpson sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BDCH. Simpson failed to show that the Committee’s concerns were untrue, unreasonable, or pretexts for discrimination. View "Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps." on Justia Law

Fridman paid her mortgage electronically, using the online payment system on the website of her mortgage servicer, NYCB. By furnishing the required information and clicking on the required spot, she authorized NYCB to collect funds from her Bank of America account. Although Fridman filled out the form within the grace period allowed by her note, NYCB did not credit her payment for two business days, causing Fridman to incur a late fee. Fridman filed suit on behalf of herself and a putative class, alleging that NYCB’s practice of not crediting online payments on the day that the consumer authorizes them violates the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601. The district court granted NYCB summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An electronic authorization for a mortgage payment entered on the mortgage servicer’s website is a “payment instrument or other means of payment.” TILA requires mortgage services to credit these authorizations when they “reach[] the mortgage servicer.” View "Fridman v. NYCB Mortgage Co. LLC" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Souley, a citizen of Niger, entered the U.S. in 2005 on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Apparently unaware of a 2008 removal order, Souley married a U.S. citizen in 2009. After his removal was reopened, Souley’s wife’s I-130 petition was denied for lack of clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was bona fide and entered into in good faith, 8 U.S.C. 1154(g), 1255(e). Souley sought to continue his removal proceedings to give his U.S. citizen wife time to file a second I-130 visa petition on his behalf. The IJ thought her second, unfiled petition had no greater chance of success and denied the request for a continuance, noting that Souley’s wife had failed to appeal that decision or introduce any new evidence to support the existence of a valid marriage. The Board upheld the IJ’s ruling, The Seventh Circuit denied review. Souley had over a year and a half to gather additional documents to support a second I-130 petition, yet he failed to do so. Souley never explained what documents he would present if the IJ had given him more time. View "Souley v. Holder" on Justia Law

Campbell was convicted in Illinois state court of first-degree murder for participating in a mob-style beating. No physical evidence linked Campbell to the crime. The state’s case hinged on the testimony of three eyewitnesses; two had been charged with the murder but were granted immunity in exchange for testifying against Campbell. Both had serious criminal histories, and both denied any involvement in the crime when they testified at Campbell’s trial. The third witness testified that Campbell started the fight with the victim, but she saw the fight from inside a van that was parked around the street corner and facing away from the brawl. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Campbell’s habeas corpus petition. The state courts unreasonably applied “Strickland” when they rejected Campbell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without addressing key factual questions: whether Campbell’s lawyer interviewed certain witnesses and whether they would have testified credibly and consistently with their affidavits and statements to the police. Affidavits from two of those witnesses say that Campbell’s lawyer never contacted them, but the affidavits have not been tested through the adversarial process. There is no affidavit from the third exculpatory witness or the lawyer himself, nor a record of live testimony. View "Campbell v. Reardon" on Justia Law