Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Reed claims that during a 2012 stay at the hospital, its staff ignored her requests, treated her poorly, refused to consult with her regarding her care, and physically injured her when she was forcibly discharged. An amended complaint alleged an unelaborated claim of “retaliation,” a violation of the ADA, and state-law claims. The judge dismissed, without prejudice, after considering whether any of her claims asserted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 or the retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12203. Reed filed a second case, asserting that she suffers from tardive dyskinesia plus post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and acute anxiety; she uses a computer to communicate. The complaint alleged specific instances of mistreatment and various constitutional violations 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, finding that her claims were precluded by the dismissal of her earlier suit and that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act could offer her any remedy. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the complaint stated viable claims. View "Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp." on Justia Law

King filed a civil rights lawsuit, claiming that he was forced to wear a see-through jumpsuit that exposed his genitals and buttocks while he was transported from county jail to state prison and that this amounted to an unjustified and humiliating strip-search in violation of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court reviewed King’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915 and determined that King had not stated a viable claim of cruel and unusual punishment, but allowed him to proceed on his theory of unreasonable search. The court later granted summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, finding that King failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that he exhaust the jail’s administrative remedies before suing, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed. King’s transfer to the state prison made it impossible for him to comply with the jail’s grievance procedures, so there were no available remedies to exhaust. King alleged a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the use of the unusual jumpsuit had no legitimate correctional purpose but was used to humiliate and inflict psychological pain, but as a convicted prisoner, King is not entitled to argue that requiring him to wear the jumpsuit subjected him to an unreasonable search. View "King v. McCarty" on Justia Law

The warrant affidavit stated that: a 14-year-old female began a Facebook relationship with “Nathan Solman,” who claimed to be her age; the victim sent “Solman” more than 300 “naked pictures of herself in varied sexual positions;” when she tried to stop sending pictures, “Solman” threatened to show the pictures to others; the internet protocol address associated with “Solmon’s” Facebook account was linked to the residence of Reichling’s parents; and the victim met “Solman” outside her residence and he appeared to be much older, with a physical description resembling Reichling. The affidavit also quotes threatening text messages sent to the victim, indicating that the sender was watching her; they were sent from a cellular telephone registered to Reichling, who either lived in his parent’s residence or in a trailer on an adjacent property owned by Reichling’s brother. Reichling was a registered sex offender, convicted of sexual assault of a 17-year-old female. Warrants issued for Reichling’s parents’ residence and for the trailer. Based upon items seized, Reichling was charged with producing, receiving, and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4). Reichling pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The affidavit, detailing a largely online relationship between Reichling and the minor, established probable cause to seize digital and non-digital storage devices. View "United States v. Reichling" on Justia Law

He, a citizen of China, entered the U.S. in 2007 through Indonesia and Canada. A year later He retained an attorney to apply for asylum based on mistreatment (arrest and beatings) that he had suffered in Fujian Province on account of his Christian beliefs. A month later, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability as an alien present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). The immigration judge denied relief, finding that: He’s testimony was not credible; he failed (under the REAL ID Act) to provide corroborating evidence; He was statutorily ineligible for asylum because he did not apply within one year of his arrival; and He was ineligible for withholding or CAT protection because he failed to show it is more likely than not that his life would be threatened or that he would be tortured in China. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and denied a motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit denied He’s petition for review, which focused on only the underlying denial of his application for asylum and withholding, a ruling not properly before the court. He did not argue that denial of his motion to reconsider was erroneous. View "He v. Holder" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, then age 40, applied to the Social Security Commission in 2009 for benefits, claiming to be disabled from gainful employment as a result of psychiatric disorders (depression and bipolar disorder), chronic back and hip pain, and an anal fissure. He had been trained as a machinist and, until 2002, had worked intermittently as a machinist and an assembly line worker. The administrative law judge denied his claim on the ground that he was capable of performing unskilled sedentary work. The district court upheld the denial of benefits. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting contradictions and gaps in the ALJ’s reasoning. The court did “not say that Voigt is in fact totally disabled from gainful employment, however— only that he’s entitled to a more careful analysis of his claim by the Social Security Administration.” View "Voigt v. Colvin" on Justia Law

DiFoggio worked as an FBI cooperating witness and introduced Medrano to a man purporting to be Castro, a health care consultant. Castro told Medrano that by bribing a corrupt official he could obtain contract approval from Los Angeles County for the purchase of bandages for its hospital system. Castro was an undercover FBI agent. There was no corrupt official. When the medical bandages deal was concluded, Medrano approached Castro about making another deal to involve his friend, Buenrostro. Buenrostro and Castro brought Barta into the discussions; A bribe would be paid to the corrupt official by Castro to obtain a county contract for Sav‐Rx, a company founded by Barta, to provide pharmaceutical dispensing services. Sav‐Rx would service the contract through a business started by Buenrostro and Medrano. Barta wrote a check for $6,500 to Castro. Buenrostro and Medrano were to pay their 35 percent share after that last meeting. Before that happened, they were arrested. In a separate opinion, the Seventh Circuit held that Barta was entrapped as a matter of law. Neither Buenrostro nor Medrano argued entrapment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed their convictions for conspiracy to commit bribery, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentences. View "United States v. Buenrostro" on Justia Law

While White was on parole from an Illinois state prison sentence, police suspected that he was involved in a shooting and had a warrant to arrest him. Before the police found White, they located his gym bag that he had left in his cousin’s at. Without a search warrant, but relying on a condition of his parole that required White to agree to searches of his property, the police opened the bag and found a gun. White was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the court denied his motion to suppress evidence of the gun on the ground that neither he nor his cousin had consented to the search of the bag. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search of the property of a suspected parole violator who had agreed in writing to consent to property searches and whom the police could not locate was reasonable. View "UNited States v. White" on Justia Law

Hutchens is a black woman. A large-scale layoff in the Chicago public schools system’s Professional Development Unit, where she worked, required the unit to decide whether to retain her or a white woman, Glowacki, who Hutchens argues was less qualified. She claimed that the unit’s director, Rivera, preferred whites to blacks. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that their justification for the replacement that was not merely a “pretext.” The Seventh Circuit reversed as to racial discrimination (42 U.S.C. 1983) and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. A reasonable jury could credit Hutchens’ evidence while rejecting that of the defendants, and impressed by Hutchens’ credentials, her seniority over Glowacki, her earlier receipt of National Board Certification, her other credentials superior to Glowacki’s, her writing skills, and her toughness in teaching inmates of Cook County Jail year after year, could conclude that she was better qualified for the job than Glowacki. That reasonable jury might nevertheless deem Hutchens a victim not of racism but of error, ineptitude, carelessness, or personal like or dislike, unrelated to race. View "Hutchens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

In 1999, Nelson, riding his bike away from a liquor store, received a fatal blow to the head. Eyewitnesses, Johnnie and Evans, identified Owens from a photo array and from a lineup. Owens was the only person in the line-up who also was in the array. At trial, though Owens was in the courtroom, Evans twice pointed to someone else in the photo array as being Owens. Evans testified that there had been two assailants, Johnnie that there had been one. Evans, but not Johnnie, testified that Nelson had spoken with the assailants. Nelson had crack cocaine on his person that appeared to be packaged for individual sale. No evidence was presented that Owens knew Nelson, used or sold illegal drugs, or had any gang affiliation. There was no physical evidence linking Owens to the murder, which occurred almost two hours after sunset. After closing arguments the judge made statements about Owens knowing that Nelson was a drug dealer and found Owens guilty. The appellate court found the error harmless because Johnnie’s eyewitness identification of Owens was sufficient to establish guilt. The federal district court denied Owens habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed: a judge may not convict on the basis of a belief that has no evidentiary basis. View "Owens v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Matichak was injured at work in 2009 and filed a workers’ compensation claim. Matichak filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2010, disclosing the claim, valued at $7,500. About a year after the discharge, Matichak filed a tort suit against firms that, he maintained, had contributed to his injury, seeking substantial damages. Defendants sought summary judgment, because Matichak had not listed any tort claim in his bankruptcy assets. Matichak then notified the Trustee, who reopened the bankruptcy and moved to replace Matichak as the plaintiff in the tort suit. The district court allowed the substitution but held that recovery could not exceed the value of debts that had not been paid in 2010. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The judge did not find that Matichak deliberately hid the tort claim; he claims that he thought that the workers’ compensation claim was his only potential source of compensation. Allowing the tort suit to proceed without a damages cap will allow the Trustee to hire counsel to take the suit on a contingent fee. If Matichak was trying to deceive his creditors, the bankruptcy judge may decide to give the creditors a bonus, or to return any excess to the tort defendants. View "Metrou v. M.A. Mortenson Co." on Justia Law