Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mathin sought a declaration of United States nationality, claiming that his Indian-citizen parents had traveled for business while his mother was eight months pregnant with him, and that he was born prematurely in Chicago on September 23, 1965, at the home of a friend, Nielsen, with whom they were staying. According to Mathin, a midwife was present at the birth, along with the midwife’s 17-year-old niece, Nielsen, and Nielsen’s mother. Only Mathin’s father was still living at the time of trial. Mathin stated that after his birth, he was taken to Norwegian American Hospital for examination. No birth certificate was filed. Mathin was unable to provide any records from Norwegian American Hospital indicating that he was there. Although the State Department attempted to verify his parents’ travel through the visa or passport records, it was unable to find any record of the trip. The district court held that Mathin had failed to establish that he was a United States national. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has recognized that doubts should be resolved in favor of the United States in cases involving a petition under 8 U.S.C. 1503. View "Mathin v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Enacted after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), authorizes execution, in satisfaction of judgments against terrorists, on blocked assets that are seized or frozen by the United States. The plaintiffs, victims of terror, hold a judgment against al Qaeda for their $2.5 billion subrogation claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs have constitutional and statutory standing and TRIA is a remedial statute, under the statute the only assets subject to execution are blocked assets. Assets that are subject to a United States government license for final payment, transfer, or disposition, among other requirements, do not qualify as blocked assets. By the time plaintiffs filed their initial claims, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had already issued its license and the funds had already been arrested to preserve them for forfeiture; the funds were no longer blocked. View "United States v. Art Ins.Co." on Justia Law

The Glenns, real estate developers, asked a loan broker (Chung) to find them a loan. Attorney Sullivan agreed to lend the Glenns $250,000 repayable in two weeks with interest of $5,000 per week. They needed the money for longer, but Chung told them and Sullivan that a bank had agreed to give the Glenns a $1 million line of credit that would be available in a few weeks. The Glenns and Chung signed promissory notes. There was no line of credit. The loan was never repaid. Chung declared bankruptcy. Sullivan filed an adversary complaint, claiming that Chung was not entitled to discharge the debt created by her note because it was her fraudulent assurance that the line of credit had been approved that had induced him to make the loan. The Bankruptcy Code bars discharge of a debt “obtained by … false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,” 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). The court denied Chung her discharge. The Glenns also declared bankruptcy. Sullivan filed adversary complaints. The bankruptcy judge found that the Glenns had not committed fraud and refused to impute Chung’s fraud to them under an agency theory. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. If a debt is the result of fraud, the debtor can discharge it in bankruptcy if he was not complicit in the fraud, even if the fraud was created by his agent. View "Sullivan v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Window washers employed or formerly employed by CCS filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, which requires an employer to pay hourly workers at least one and a half times their normal hourly wage for hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week, which CCS has not done for the plaintiffs. There is an exception where: the worker’s regular pay exceeds one and a half times the federal minimum wage (conceded by plaintiffs); “more than half his compensation for a representative period represents commissions on goods or services”; and he is employed by “a retail or service establishment.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CCS with regard to its status as a retail or service establishment and, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of CCS on the commission requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that FLSA is intended to encourage employers to spread out full‐time work among different employees. Giving plaintiffs overtime pay would not further that purpose because it was not shown that they are on average working more than 2,000 hours a year. CCS has an admirable safety record without paying its workers for overtime; plaintiffs are well paid. View "Alvarado v. Corp. Cleaning Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Chen, a Chinese citizen, entered the U.S. in 2005. DHS sought to remove him as “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Conceding removability, Chen has applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. He argued that Chinese authorities will persecute him for refusing, by having two children, to follow the one‐child policy. He testified that he fled China after he was arrested, detained for six months, and beaten, in his home province of Fujian, when officials found out that his wife was pregnant with their second child. The police released him after his parents paid 480 dollars, on the condition that his wife undergo forced sterilization or they pay a fine of approximately 3,200 dollars to register the son. During the removal proceedings, the case focused on whether Chen actually has two children. The IJ denied relief and the BIA denied a motion to reopen. The Seventh Circuit remanded: the BIA must determine whether Chen’s attorneys incompetently neglect ed to offer evidence and arguments that might have resolved the inconsistencies identified by the IJ and whether the IJ would have ruled against Chen anyway. View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Following an FBI investigation, 51 people associated with the Indianapolis Outlaws Motorcycle Club were indicted for 49 offenses. Most pleaded guilty to all charges. Bowser pleaded guilty to: wire fraud, extortion, witness tampering, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, but pleaded nolo contendere to violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).The court noted that the plea allowed Bowser to refuse to admit that the Outlaws acted as a criminal organization and maintain his membership, but decided that this concern was outweighed by the burden of a trial and denied Bowser a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Bowser received a sentence of 180 months, below the guidelines range of 235 to 293 months. Miller argued that the government could not prove the robberies charged as the predicate acts necessary for finding him guilty of a “pattern” of racketeering under RICO. Convicted, he was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. A jury found Jordan guilty of distributing 500 or more grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. Jordan unsuccessfully argued that the government had presented insufficient evidence. The court concluded that he had a prior felony drug conviction and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to a single condition of Bowser’s supervised release. View "United States v. Bowser" on Justia Law

In 2005, a Union Pacific freight train carrying steel injection molds to Plano Molding in Illinois derailed in Oklahoma; the molds broke through the floor of their shipping container, causing that train car and many behind it to derail. The molds had been manufactured in China and shipped to the U.S. before being transferred to the train. Three companies that were involved in the shipment and that sustained losses sued Plano, claiming that a company Plano hired packed the molds improperly, causing the floor of the container to break and ultimately causing the derailment, so that Plano was liable for breach of a warranty found in the “World Bill of Lading,” which provided shipping terms. Plano argued that the molds were properly packed and that they fell through the floor of the container because the container was defective. The district court found in favor of Plano, finding that the derailment was caused by deficiencies in the container. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plano had no obligation to explain why the accident occurred. Once the court found that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that Plano had breached the warranty, the actual cause of the accident became legally irrelevant. View "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co." on Justia Law

Curtis, a lawyer, filed 1996-1997 returns reporting tax obligations of $218,983 and $248,236, but made no payments. His partner had taken $600,000 from the practice and declared bankruptcy; Curtis underwent an expensive divorce. Curtis failed to file a return for 1998. Curtis entered into an installment agreement. He filed a return for 2000 but failed to pay $90,000. He entered into a second agreement, but filed returns for 2003 and 2004 reflecting unpaid tax liabilities of $176,802 and $61,000. Curtis did not make estimated payments and stopped making installment payments. He filed returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009, but paid nothing. Curtis was charged with misdemeanor willfully failing to pay taxes owed for 2007, 2008 and 2009, 26 U.S.C. 7203. The court allowed evidence under Rule 404(b), of Curtis’s history of failing to pay his taxes and his withdrawals of money from his law practice for personal expenses. Curtis did not object, but objected to the government’s proposed evidence that he failed to pay payroll taxes for his employees in 2013, arguing that any violations after the charged years did not bear on his state of mind during the time of the charged offenses. Although the court gave Curtis’s proposed instruction on good faith, it declined to modify the pattern instruction to include a requirement for bad motive, with respect to willfulness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. View "United States v. Curtis" on Justia Law

In 1981, Lockett pleaded guilty to robbery. In 1982, he violated probation, pleading guilty to unlawful use of a weapon. In 1984, he pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. In 1990, he was pleaded guilty to armed violence, with several counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin. While on parole, he pleaded guilty to drug offenses; once in 1992 and twice in 1993. In 1998, he pleaded guilty delivery of cocaine. In 2003, he pleaded guilty to attempt to possess a controlled substance. In 2004, Lockett pleaded guilty to burglary. In 2010, Lockett was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The parties disagreed over whether a third qualifying conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) could be based on his 1990 drug convictions. The government argued that because Lockett was subject to an Illinois recidivist enhancement, which increases the maximum penalty, the convictions were qualifying ACCA predicates. The court held that a 1995 restoration of civil rights letter did not apply to Lockett’s 1990 convictions, that they could serve as predicates, and imposed the 15-year minimum sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court erred in finding that the 1990 drug convictions qualified as predicates because there was no evidence that he actually faced the recidivist enhancement. View "United States v. Lockett" on Justia Law

Tomkins sent threatening letters to investment firms and their employees and then mailed packages to investment managers containing what appeared to be pipe bombs. The homemade devices consisted of a plastic pipe holding gunpowder, lead pellets, and an igniter connected to live batteries. Letters warned that the recipients were only alive because Tomkins left one wire on each device unattached. Investigators identified Tomkins using purchasing records for the stocks referred to in his letters. Postal inspectors obtained search warrants for his home and storage lockers. The searches revealed two additional pipe bombs, drafts of the letters, bomb-making materials, information about Tomkins’s targets, and records related to the stocks mentioned in his threats. Tomkins was convicted of mailing threatening communications, 18 U.S.C. 876(b), illegally possessing firearms, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(ii) and sentenced to 37 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by barring defense that the devices were meant as hoaxes, admitting an x-ray of a device that the government failed to turn over until mid-trial, and refusing to suppress evidence from searches of his home and storage lockers. View "United States v. Tomkins" on Justia Law