Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

From 1998 to 2012 Abbott marketed the anticonvulsant medication Depakote for applications that had not been FDA-approved (off-label uses). Physicians may prescribe drugs for off-label uses, but pharmaceutical companies are generally prohibited from marketing drugs for those same applications. Qui tam actions were filed under the False Claims Act. In 2009, Abbott disclosed in an SEC filing that the Department of Justice was investigating its marketing. Abbott pleaded guilty to illegally promoting Depakote from 2001 through 2006 and agreed to pay $1.6 billion to settle the criminal and qui tam actions. Employee benefits funds filed suit 15 months later, alleging that Abbott misrepresented Depakote’s safety and efficacy for off-label uses, paid kickbacks to physicians, established and funded intermediary entities to promote the drug for off-label uses, and concealed its role in these activities, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court dismissed, finding that the statute of limitations for the RICO claim began to run in 1998, when the funds initially reimbursed a prescription for off-label use. The court refused to toll the limitations period until the guilty plea, finding that Abbott’s concealment efforts were not designed to hinder potential lawsuits. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that dismissal was premature without an opportunity for discovery into when a reasonable fund should have known about its injuries from off-label marketing. View "Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., Inc." on Justia Law

Modjewski pled guilty to possession and transportation of electronic child pornography. His collection included more than 12,500 images and 700 videos. At sentencing, Modjewski presented the expert testimony of Dr. Rone, an Assistant Professor of Clinical Psychiatry at Northwestern University, Feinberg School of Medicine, that Modjewski suffered from post-traumatic stress and bipolar disorders; that he had minimal risk factors for reoffending since he did not have a personality or impulse control disorder and was being adequately treated; and that he was not a pedophile, based on her experience with people who have had post-traumatic stress disorder from childhood sexual abuse. Rone’s opinions were based on one meeting with Modjewski. She relied on tests conducted by others, and did not review any of the images he downloaded. After the government rested, the judge questioned Rone regarding whether Modjewski could be classified as having a pedophilic identification. The judge came to her own contrary conclusion based on her knowledge of the field. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 15-year sentence, below the 210-262 month advisory guideline range, rejecting Modjewski’s argument that the questioning rose to the level of personal bias. Neither the judge’s general knowledge of the field nor her determination that Modjewski was more accurately classified having a pedophilic identification constituted personal knowledge of a disputed evidentiary fact, View "United States v. Modjewski" on Justia Law

Makiel was convicted of the 1988 murder of Hoch and the armed robbery of a gas station where she worked. After exhaustion of state remedies, the district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois courts did not apply federal law unreasonably in concluding that Makiel’s counsel was not ineffective in selecting the issues to pursue on appeal: One issue she raised drew a remand, and, although the other two issues did not prevail, each drew a dissenting opinion. An evidentiary ruling preventing impeachment of a prosecution witness with a pending forgery charge was not clearly a stronger issue than those she raised, nor was the exclusion of testimony about the reputations of prosecution witnesses. The state court did not act unreasonably in finding no violation of Makiel’s constitutional right to compulsory process by exclusion of the testimony of an 11-year-old, who would have blamed another young boy for the murder. The proffered testimony was uncorroborated at the time. Its exclusion was an error and was the basis for the state court’s remand. By the time the state courts decided the constitutional issue, however, he had disavowed his proffered testimony, and there was no reason to think it would have been probative or reliable. View "Makiel v. Butler" on Justia Law

Air travelers sued Delta Airlines, seeking compensation for a nationwide class of persons who were inconvenienced when their flights from airports located in the European Union were delayed for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice. The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(d). The claim cited a consumer-protection regulation promulgated by the European Parliament setting standardized compensation rates ranging from €250 to €600 (depending on flight distance) for cancellations and long delays of flights departing from airports located within EU Member States. The district court held that the regulation could not be enforced outside the European Union and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation is not incorporated into Delta’s contract of carriage, so the claim is not cognizable as a breach of contract. A direct claim for compensation under the regulation is actionable only as provided in the regulation itself, which requires that each European Union Member State designate an appropriate administrative body to handle enforcement responsibility and implicitly limits judicial redress to courts in Member States under the procedures of their own national law. View "Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Matthew, now 20 years old, is autistic. While he was a high school student in the St. Charles Community Unit School District, he received special-education services. Although he is now in college, he and his parents sued the District and various administrators and teachers for failing to provide necessary educational services to Matthew before his graduation. The district court dismissed the parents’ claims for lack of standing to sue. The court dismissed Matthew’s case for failure to sue an appropriate party. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Matthew’s claim of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 to 796, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12201 to 12213, all plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims against the individual defendants except for the District Superintendent, and the individual-capacity claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA. The court vacated with respect to claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 to 1418, View "Stanek v. Saint Charles Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The plaintiff applied for social security disability benefits in 2009, at the age of 43, claiming to be disabled by a cyst (a liquid-filled sphere) in her pineal gland, a small endocrine gland in the brain that produces melatonin, which regulates sleep. The cyst caused her to experience vertigo, blurred vision, and headaches. She has a high-school education, is married and has children, but has never held a full-time job. In 2010 she underwent brain surgery to remove the cyst. Although an MRI following the operation showed that the cyst had been removed and the site of the operation in the brain was healing normally, and her vertigo and vision problems had been resolved, within weeks she was complaining about pain and numbness in her head. She had declined suggested treatments and had continued her hobby of long-distance running. After a hearing before an administrative law judge in 2011, her application was rejected. The rejection upheld by the district court and the Seventh Circuit. The administrative law judge was entitled to find that the plaintiff, although she may well suffer from chronic pain, is capable of full-time employment and therefore not totally disabled. View "Mitze v. Colvin" on Justia Law

A class action antitrust suit on behalf of text messaging customers, claimed conspiracy by providers, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, to increase price per use. On remand, after three years of discovery, the district judge granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that it is difficult to prove illegal collusion without witnesses to an agreement. Competing firms can be expected to keep close track of each other’s pricing and other market behavior and often to imitate that behavior rather than try to undermine it. The plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence consistent with an inference of collusion, but that evidence was equally consistent with independent parallel behavior. Tacit collusion, also known as conscious parallelism, does not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Collusion is illegal only when based on agreement. Agreement can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the plaintiffs failed to find sufficient evidence of express collusion to make a prima facie case. View "Aircraft Check Servs. Co. v. Verizon Wireless" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit consolidated three appeals that raised similar challenges to conditions of supervised release. Remanding the cases for resentencing, the court identified general sentencing principles: it is important to give advance notice of the conditions being considered; the court should justify the conditions by an adequate statement of reasons and impose appropriately-tailored conditions; and the fact that certain non-administrative conditions are labeled “standard” does not render them immune from the requirements that they be adequately supported and not vague or overbroad. While noting that it could just vacate the conditions, the court vacated the sentences entirely. If certain supervised release conditions are vacated, the balance struck by the sentencing judge might be disrupted to a degree where the judge would wish to alter the prison term or other conditions to ensure that the purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protecting the public are appropriately furthered by the overall sentence. View "United States v. Jurgens" on Justia Law

France had a Chicago dental business and fraudulently billed insurers for city employees. France closed his practice after being injured in an accident and started collecting benefits from a disability income policy. In 1999, he exchanged monthly payments, for a limited time, for a lump sum of $300,000. He transferred this money to other people, including his wife, Duperon, before filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. He failed to disclose the payment or transfers. He later pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and to knowingly making a false declaration under penalty of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). The district court sentenced France to 30 months in prison and ordered him to pay $800,000 in restitution. The bankruptcy trustee obtained title to ongoing disability insurance payments. France and Duperon divorced. A California court approved a settlement with payments for child support from the disability payments. France’s insurance company sued in California to resolve conflicting claims. The parties reached an agreement, which the bankruptcy court approved, purporting to control all other judgments, but did not mention the criminal restitution lien. The government filed Illinois citations to discover assets. France moved to quash, but the insurance company responded and began withholding $9,296 that had been going to France. The government moved to garnish the entire distribution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3613(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling allowing the government to garnish the entire disability payment. View "United States v. France" on Justia Law

Bozovich was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin. He argued that he was entitled to a new trial on the theory because the court the government to cross-examine him beyond the scope of his direct testimony and that his 235-month prison sentence was based on an erroneous drug quantity finding. The cross-examination concerned his statement to DEA agents about who supplied him and his associates with heroin. Bozovich had claimed to be an addict, but not a conspirator in distribution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. Determining the “subject matter” of the direct examination is not an exact science; under Rule 611(b) the district judge could reasonably treat alleged admissions to buying heroin from several suppliers, buying heroin in quantities much larger than $100 a day, and brokering drug deals among his associates, as “matters reasonably related to the subject matter of direct examination.” The district judge made a clear credibility finding and otherwise carefully scrutinized the drug quantity evidence. View "United States v. Bozovich" on Justia Law