Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Senne parked his car on the street in front of his Palatine, Illinois house in violation of an ordinance. A police officer stuck a parking ticket face down under the windshield wiper; it included Senne’s name, birthdate, sex, height, weight, driver’s license number, and address (outdated), plus the vehicle’s description and vehicle identification number. Senne filed a purported class action under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which forbids knowing disclosure of personal information obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record, “except as provided in subsection (b).” Subsection (b) permits “disclosure” “in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding”” and “use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions.” After a remand, the court rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that anyone has ever taken a parking ticket from a windshield in Palatine and used personal information on the ticket. There has never been a crime or tort, resulting from personal information placed on traffic tickets. Had the Village made parking ticket information publicly available over the Internet, or included highly sensitive information such as a social security number, the risk of a nontrivial invasion of privacy would be much greater and might outweigh the benefits to law enforcement. View "Senne v. Village of Palatine" on Justia Law

Chivalry contracted with Rehtmeyer to develop and manufacture a board game. Chivalry paid Rehtmeyer over $128,000, but the relationship deteriorated. Rehtmeyer never produced the game. Chivalry sued for breach of contract and won a judgment of $168,331.59, plus $621.25 in costs in Illinois state court. Rehtmeyer never paid. Chivalry issued a citation to discover assets. At the citation examination, Rehtmeyer testified that she had no ownership interest in any real estate; securities, stocks, bonds or similar assets; office or electronic equipment; nor a personal checking or savings account. Because Rehtmeryer had not produced required documents, Chivalry continued the citation and filed a motion to compel production, which was granted. She did not comply. The state court twice more ordered her to produce all the documents required by the citation. Months later, Chivalry sought a rule to show cause. The day before the scheduled hearing, Rehtmeyer filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Chivalry appeared to object to the discharge of the debt owed to it, claiming that Rehtmeyer had concealed her assets and income during the citation proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied Chivalry’s objection. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Rehtmeyer concealed assets with the requisite intent. View "Jacobs v. Marcus-Rehtmeyer" on Justia Law

Eagan, Minnesota, assisted in apprehending Procknow, who had absconded while serving supervised release imposed by a Wisconsin state court for forgery. Authorities had received information that Procknow and his girlfriend were staying at an Eagan hotel. The girlfriend was registered at the hotel. Officers spotted Procknow’s car, chased Procknow through the lobby, and arrested him. Through the windows of Procknow’s car, they saw a scanner or copier. Learning of the arrests, the hotel manager stated that the their stay was being terminated and asked the officers to collect a dog, believed to be in their room and ensure that there were no other occupants. Officers knocked, and announced. No one answered, so they used a hotel key and found a dog. Entering to ensure that there were no other occupants, officers saw, in plain view, an electric typewriter, a credit card issued in the name of “Smith,” and financial forms bearing various names and social security numbers. Officer photographed the room, sealed it, and obtained search warrants for the room and car. They seized blank W‐2 forms, partially completed tax forms, lists of business employer identification numbers, and prepaid debit cards (tax refunds) in the names of different people. Further investigation revealed that Procknow had obtained the personal identifying information of at least 40 individuals, which he used to file fraudulent tax returns and claim refunds. Procknow pleaded guilty to theft of government money and aggravated identify theft. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the warrantless entry into the hotel room and evidence obtained by grand jury subpoena following the withdrawal of IRS administrative summonses requesting the same information. View "United States v. Procknow" on Justia Law

Highland Park, Illinois prohibits possession of assault weapons or large‐capacity magazines (those that can accept more than 10 rounds). The ordinance defines an assault weapon as any semi‐automatic gun that can accept a large‐capacity magazine and has: a pistol grip without a stock (for semi‐ automatic pistols, the capacity to accept a magazine outside the pistol grip); a folding, telescoping, or thumbhole stock; a grip for the non‐trigger hand; a barrel shroud; or a muzzle brake or compensator. Some weapons, such as AR‐15s and AK‐47s, are prohibited by name. Opponents sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, arguing that it violated the Second Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, stating that the Second Amendment “does not imperil every law regulating firearms.” Supreme Court precedent allows at least some categorical limits on the kinds of weapons that can be possessed. Instead of trying to decide what “level” of scrutiny applies, the court considered whether the law banned weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,” and whether law‐abiding citizens retain adequate means of self‐defense. Whether the limits expressed in Supreme Court precedent should be extended is a question for the Justices. View "Friedman v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted of interference with commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, based on his armed robbery of a UPS truck. During the incident (one hour, 40 minutes) he held a gun and repeatedly threatened to kill the driver. Moore also threatened his cousin, who had determined that Moore was planning another robber, saying, “You ran around here snitching. I’m ‘fin to kill you, B.” The details of what happened next came out later in a state court trial, but were not admitted during the federal trial. After threatening B., Moore threw her into a ditch and fired three shots. One bullet hit her in the head, one struck her hip, and one missed her entirely. She played dead until Moore left, then managed to walk home and summon an ambulance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s decision to run his 235-month federal sentence consecutive to sentences imposed in state court for attempted murder, aggravated battery and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2007, Suarez, a 75-year-old widower from Mexico, opened a checking account at an Illinois Chase Bank. DeMarco, the branch manager, assisted him. The two became friends. Suarez was trying to sell his three acre property, listed for $1.8 million. DeMarco convinced Suarez to break his listing contract, indicating that he had a buyer. DeMarco told Suarez that he needed a home equity line of credit (HELOC) to complete the sale. DeMarco obtained a $250,000 HELOC, under Suarez’s name, secured by Suarez’s property. DeMarco caused the lender to transfer the proceeds into a joint checking account, which he opened in his and Suarez’s name. After the transfer, DeMarco withdrew $245,000 and deposited the funds into his personal account. After Chase terminated his employment, DeMarco transferred the funds into new accounts and spent most of the proceeds to pay off his credit card debt, improve his home and on cars and vacations. He used a small fraction of the money to pay off Suarez’s debts. Suarez later noted irregularities in his bank statement and contacted the FBI. DeMarco was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and sentenced to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to the sentence, claiming that the court erred by applying a two-level increase to his base offense level for abuse of a position of trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3, and the use of sophisticated means, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1). View "United States v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

Brooks, a mother of two minor children, filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Brooks reported her monthly wages of $6214.50 and her $400.00 monthly child support payments from her ex-husband; claimed applicable standardized deductions for living expenses for a household of three people; and deducted her $400.00 monthly child support payments in response to an instruction to “[e]nter the monthly average of any child support payments … for a dependent child … that you received in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child,” 11 U.S.C. 1325(b)(2). Brooks’s monthly disposable income was reduced to $111.46. Brooks deducted another $141.00 for day care, which left her with negative disposable income. Brooks submitted a plan, proposing to pay $100.00 per month for 60 months, which would have resulted in no distribution to unsecured creditors; substantially all payments would have gone to other arrearages, and trustee’s and attorney’s fees. The bankruptcy court concluded that Brooks’s child support payments were fully excludable from disposable income; although a double deduction would be theoretically possible, Congress’s desire to preserve child support payments for their intended beneficiaries prevailed over that risk and the “reasonably necessary” qualification functions as an independent backstop. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Clark v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Illinois requires that motor carriers of property, conducting intrastate operations, obtain a license from the Illinois Commerce Commission, which requires appropriate insurance or surety coverage. A carrier complies by submitting proof of insurance or bond coverage and is then issued a public carrier certificate, stating that the holder “certifies to the Commission that it will perform transportation activities only with the lawful amount of liability insurance in accordance with 92 Ill. Admin. Code 1425.” Drivers must have a copy of the license with them at all times. It is a Class C misdemeanor offense for an operator not to produce proof of registration upon request. Three carriers were cited by the ICC police for conducting regulated activity without a license. During a follow-up investigation, the carriers refused to comply, reasoning that documents sought by the ICC would reveal their rates, routes, and services, so the requirement was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c). The ICC rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the ICC, concluding that the document requests had no significant economic impact on rates, routes or services and, alternatively, that efforts to enforce the licensing requirement are exempted from preemption. View "Nationwide Freight Sys., Inc. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Schlemm, a member of the Navajo Tribe, and a prisoner, sought an order requiring the prison to accommodate his religious practices under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. Members of the Tribe honor the dead through dancing, praying, and eating traditional foods. Wisconsin concedes that this celebration is religious and that Schlemm sincerely believes that “traditional foods” should include game meat. The prison rejected his request for game meat or ground beef and his offer to secure a sealed platter from an outside vendor. The prison permits Jewish inmates to have outside vendors supply sealed Seder platters. Defendants maintain that serving venison would be too expensive, would exceed the capacity of institutional kitchens, and would violate a rule limiting prison foods to those certified by the USDA. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the denial does not impose a “substantial burden” on Schlemm’s religious exercise; the state has a “compelling governmental interest” in costs and using USDA-inspected meats; and that the denial is the “least restrictive means” of furthering those interests. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the state was not entitled to summary judgment and ordering a preliminary injunction allowing Schlemm to order venison and to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell and during group ceremonies. View "Schlemm v. Frank" on Justia Law

Nadmid, a 57-year-old citizen of Mongolia, came to the U.S. in 2003 on a visitor’s visa. After being arrested for DUI, he voluntarily departed in 2006 and returned to Mongolia, where he started a business. Nadmid returned to the U.S. in 2009. He stated that he was visiting his daughter (who holds a green card), and answered ”no” when asked if he feared returning to Mongolia. In a second interview, after speaking with his daughter, Nadmid stated that, if returned to Mongolia, he feared being killed for rebuffing extortion demands. He described confrontations and threats. An asylum officer, speaking through a translator, determined that Nadmid had a credible fear of persecution. In his asylum application and testimony, Nadmid claimed to have been abducted and beaten. The IJ concluded that Nadmid was not credible, finding inconsistencies in the airport interviews “significant problems.” The IJ gave little weight to newspapers or to a medical certificate. Nadmid’s proposed social group, “Mongolian business owners who seek to expose and end political corruption,” was premised on a profession rather than any immutable, fundamental characteristic. The IJ found that Nadmid did not qualify for withholding of removal or for protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding the credibility determination flawed. View "Nadmid v. Holder" on Justia Law